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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Nonmoral Theoretical Disagreement In Law, Alani Golanski Mar 2016

Nonmoral Theoretical Disagreement In Law, Alani Golanski

Alani Golanski

I agree with Dworkin that there is widespread theoretical disagreement in law. I hope to show, however, why this disagreement should not be seen as moral in nature. Legal philosophers have nearly always viewed the existence of theoretical disagreement in law as the indicium of moral dispute. If that is so, and if such disagreement is widespread, then this would be compelling evidence of law’s incorporation of moral standards. Thus, theoretical disagreement has posed a powerful challenge to the "positivist" approach, which claims that, for the most part, legality can be determined without resort to moral criteria. This paper draws …


Linguistics In Law, Alani Golanski Jan 2002

Linguistics In Law, Alani Golanski

Alani Golanski

The "new textualism" is amenable to the use of linguists in legal cases. New textualists seek to interpret statutes "objectively," according to the "plain meaning" of the statutory terms; these jurists and scholars see plain-meaning analysis as linguistics, and linguistics as science. Law and linguistics pursue different ends, however, and linguists construing statutes will miss legally decisive issues. Modern linguistics theory is an area of central concern to cognitive psychologists as well as philosophers of mind and language. While not hegemonic, Chomsky's psychological program influences modern linguistics, and the linguist's approach often leads in a different direction from that taken …


Why Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist Explanation Of Law's Epistemology, Alani Golanski Jan 2001

Why Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist Explanation Of Law's Epistemology, Alani Golanski

Alani Golanski

Daubert requires the court to make judgments about scientific evidence. But judges, like jurors, are lay persons in relation to such evidence. So Daubert has been criticized as requiring too much of the court, and such alternatives as blue ribbon panels have been proposed. This article shows that, notwithstanding any problems that Daubert itself might have, the Daubert scholarship is significantly hampered by the way legal scholars categorize knowledge. A "contextualist" (as opposed to "invariantist") theory of knowledge is both philosophically best, and makes sense of law's relation to science.