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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Deeds And The Determinacy Norm: Insights From Brandt And Other Cases On An Undesignated, Yet Ever-Present, Interpretive Method, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2015

Deeds And The Determinacy Norm: Insights From Brandt And Other Cases On An Undesignated, Yet Ever-Present, Interpretive Method, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

The land one holds is generally only as good as the property rights contained in the deed.
The rights contained in the deed are only as good as the ability to get those rights enforced.
And, the enforcement is only valuable if it recognizes a determinate meaning in the deeds from
the point of conveyance. This Article pens the term “determinacy norm” to explain a collection
of rules for the interpretation of deed terms that aim to make the meaning of deed terms determinate.
I contend that, in order to satisfy the determinacy norm for deed interpretation,
courts must (and …


A Swindle With Big Words And Virtues?: Leiter On Dworkin And "Nonsense Jurisprudence", Timothy J. Stostad Dec 2011

A Swindle With Big Words And Virtues?: Leiter On Dworkin And "Nonsense Jurisprudence", Timothy J. Stostad

Timothy J. Stostad

In a recent essay, Professor Brian Leiter argues that the jurisprudence of Professor Ronald Dworkin, which Leiter calls “Moralist” jurisprudence, is neither “relevant [nor] illuminating when it comes to law and adjudication.” Exponents of such jurisprudence, Leiter argues, credulously attend to the articulated doctrinal rationales offered by judges as grounds for their decisions. “Realists,” by contrast, recognize that certain nonlegal factors better predict patterns of judicial decision making than do doctrinal rationales. According to Leiter, it follows from the fact that nonlegal factors predict and presumably influence judicial decisions, that attention to judges’ stated rationales is largely a mistake. Here, …