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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Choice Of Law And The Preponderantly Multistate Rule: The Example Of Successor Corporation Products Liability, Diana Sclar Jan 2021

Choice Of Law And The Preponderantly Multistate Rule: The Example Of Successor Corporation Products Liability, Diana Sclar

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Most state rules of substantive law, whether legislative or judicial, ordinarily adjust rights and obligations among local parties with respect to local events. Conventional choice of law methodologies for adjudicating disputes with multistate connections all start from an explicit or implicit assumption of a choice between such locally oriented substantive rules. This article reveals, for the first time, that some state rules of substantive law ordinarily adjust rights and obligations with respect to parties and events connected to more than one state and only occasionally apply to wholly local matters. For these rules I use the term “nominally domestic rules …


Recovering Wagner V. International Railway Company, Kenneth S. Abraham, G. Edward White Jan 2018

Recovering Wagner V. International Railway Company, Kenneth S. Abraham, G. Edward White

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Medical Malpractice - Statute Of Limitations - Foreign Objects - The Adoption Of The Discovery Rule - Legislative Or Judicial Prerogative? Melnyk V. Cleveland Clinic, Alan J. Sobol Aug 2015

Medical Malpractice - Statute Of Limitations - Foreign Objects - The Adoption Of The Discovery Rule - Legislative Or Judicial Prerogative? Melnyk V. Cleveland Clinic, Alan J. Sobol

Akron Law Review

The rationale of the Court was that Melnyk could be distinguished with the recent case of Wyler v. Tripi, which held that a cause of action for medical malpractice accrues at the latest when the physician-patient relationship terminates, and which also recognized the legislature's authority to act in this area, on the basis that Wyler was not a foreign object case. Therefore, the Court felt it need not disturb the Wyler holding and could nevertheless hold the failure to remove the foreign objects in Melnyk was negligence as a matter of law and that equity and public policy require …


Minors Under The Age Of Seven; Incapable Of Primary Negligence Or Intentional Torts; Conclusive Presumption; Deluca V. Bowden, Robert Austin Cross Aug 2015

Minors Under The Age Of Seven; Incapable Of Primary Negligence Or Intentional Torts; Conclusive Presumption; Deluca V. Bowden, Robert Austin Cross

Akron Law Review

The only question considered by the supreme court was "whether a child under the age of seven is liable for primary negligence or for an intentional tort." The court noted the general incapacity of a child of this age to act with reason and foresight, and further expressed its own reluctance to attach blame to a child "in any sense comparable to the blame attachable to an adult." For these reasons it held that such a child shall be conclusively presumed incapable of both primary negligence and intentional tort.

In so holding, Ohio joins a distinct minority of states which …


World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation V. Woodson: Minimum Contacts In A Modern World, Craig H. Millet Feb 2013

World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation V. Woodson: Minimum Contacts In A Modern World, Craig H. Millet

Pepperdine Law Review

World Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson considers the problem of modifying in personam jurisdiction to comply with the changing nature of the American economy. Several lower courts had adjusted the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington to allow for the differences in modern economic lifestyle, but a uniformity amongst the various approaches was lacking. Rather than synthesize a contemporary test for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction, the World- Wide Court chose to place state sovereignty above modern commercial realities and adhere to a more rigid application of the minimum contacts analysis. The author takes issue with …


Corrective Justice From Aristotle To Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay When The Culpable Cannot?, Kathryn R. Heidt Mar 1990

Corrective Justice From Aristotle To Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay When The Culpable Cannot?, Kathryn R. Heidt

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.