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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb Apr 2024

Slaughtering Slaughter-House: An Assessment Of 14th Amendment Privileges Or Immunities Jurisprudence, Caleb Webb

Senior Honors Theses

In 1872, the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases, which applied a narrow interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment that effectually eroded the clause from the Constitution. Following Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court compensated by utilizing elastic interpretations of the Due Process Clause in its substantive due process jurisprudence to cover the rights that would have otherwise been protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In more recent years, the Court has heard arguments favoring alternative interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but has yet to evaluate them thoroughly. By applying the …


Three Observations About Justice Alito's Draft Opinion In Dobbs - Commentary, John M. Greabe May 2022

Three Observations About Justice Alito's Draft Opinion In Dobbs - Commentary, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt] "There is much to say about Justice Samuel Alito's draft opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which was leaked from the United States Supreme Court on May 2 [2022].

Obviously, the most significant direct consequence of the proposed decision, which overrules Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) while upholding the constitutionality of a Mississippi law that outlaws most abortions after 15 weeks of pregnancy, would be the restriction or elimination of abortion services throughout much of the nation. This will have all sorts of attendant consequences, large and smaller, many of which …


Janus-Faced Judging: How The Supreme Court Is Radically Weakening Stare Decisis, Michael Gentithes Oct 2020

Janus-Faced Judging: How The Supreme Court Is Radically Weakening Stare Decisis, Michael Gentithes

William & Mary Law Review

Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judiciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come under threat.

With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special, practical justification to overrule it. Recent …


Justice Gorsuch's Views On Precedent In The Context Of Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin Jan 2019

Justice Gorsuch's Views On Precedent In The Context Of Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin

Scholarly Works

The doctrine of precedent, in its stare decisis form, presents a challenge to any originalist. This doctrine provides that a court should (at least sometimes) be bound by its own precedent, even if that precedent was wrongly decided in the first place. Yet if the original meaning of the text at issue is a judge’s focus, why should an intervening decision of the court—and a mistaken one at that— matter at all? Despite this tension, every originalist also at least purports to care about precedent.

This Essay focuses on Justice Gorsuch’s apparent views on precedent in the context of statutory …


Precedent In A Polarized Era, Zachary S. Price Nov 2018

Precedent In A Polarized Era, Zachary S. Price

Notre Dame Law Review

My Review begins below in Part I with a brief synopsis of Professor Kozel’s argument. Part II then discusses his theory’s particular value, and challenges, in our historical moment of acute polarization and political conflict over constitutional law. To make Part II’s claims more concrete, Part III then turns to Janus and Wayfair. It uses the two cases to illustrate pressures courts may face in the years ahead and assesses how well these decisions accord with Kozel’s theory. The Review ends with a conclusion reflecting more broadly on the importance of stare decisis and other institutional restraints in the current …


Precedent And Disagreement, Glen Staszewski Apr 2018

Precedent And Disagreement, Glen Staszewski

Michigan Law Review

A review of Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent.


Dead Precedents, Riley T. Svikhart Aug 2017

Dead Precedents, Riley T. Svikhart

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Part I explores the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents more thoroughly. Part II provides a modest account for this phenomenon. Section II.A considers the relationship between the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents and its law declaration bent. Section II.B evaluates this reluctance in light of the doctrinal commitment of stare decisis. Finally, Section II.C examines the link between the Roberts Court’s treatment of dying precedents and its trademark adherence to the constitutional avoidance doctrine.


The Highest Court: A Dialogue Between Justice Louis Brandeis And Justice Antonin Scalia On Stare Decisis, P. Thomas Distanislao Iii May 2017

The Highest Court: A Dialogue Between Justice Louis Brandeis And Justice Antonin Scalia On Stare Decisis, P. Thomas Distanislao Iii

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


Precedent And Speech, Randy J. Kozel Feb 2017

Precedent And Speech, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review

The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a notable willingness to reconsider its First Amendment precedents. In recent years, the Court has departed from its prior statements regarding the constitutional value of false speech. It has revamped its process for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. It has changed its positions on corporate electioneering and aggregate campaign contributions. In short, it has revised the ground rules of expressive freedom in ways large and small. The Court generally describes its past decisions as enjoying a presumption of validity through the doctrine of stare decisis. This Article contends that within the context …


The Curious Case Of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, Monu Bedi Feb 2016

The Curious Case Of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, Monu Bedi

Northwestern University Law Review

Police surveillance ability and information gathering capacity have a dynamic relationship with technology. Greater advancements in technology make it easier for the police to surveil individuals and collect information. This state of affairs leads to heightened concerns over Fourth Amendment protection. This issue has most recently played out in the context of police collecting cell phone location data. Courts disagree on whether and to what extent this data garners Fourth Amendment protection. Underlying this disagreement rests a hitherto overlooked tension between two interrelated Fourth Amendment doctrines—the third-party and the public disclosure doctrines. While both vitiate privacy protection and are commonly …


The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel Mar 2015

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …


The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel Nov 2014

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …


Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role Of Precedent In The Unfolding Dialectic Of Brady V. Maryland, Colin Starger Oct 2012

Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role Of Precedent In The Unfolding Dialectic Of Brady V. Maryland, Colin Starger

All Faculty Scholarship

Does stare decisis constrain the expansion of constitutional doctrine? Does existing precedent preclude the Supreme Court from expanding a criminal defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence? While commentators frequently clash on when stare decisis should prevent the Court from overruling its own precedents, the question of when fidelity to precedent should inhibit doctrinal expansion is surprisingly under-theorized. This Article begins to fill this gap through an in-depth case study of stare decisis and the expansion of criminal due process doctrine.

This Article analyzes the longstanding constitutional dialectic between procedural and substantive schools of criminal due process. Focus is on Brady v. …


Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell Oct 2011

Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell

Michigan Law Review

Almost everyone acknowledges that stare decisis should play a significant role when the Supreme Court of the United States resolves constitutional cases. Yet the academic and judicial rationales for this practice tend to rely on naked consequentialist considerations, and make only passing efforts to square the Court's stare decisis doctrines with the language of the Constitution. This Article offers a qualified defense of constitutional stare decisis that rests exclusively on constitutional text. It aims to broaden the overlapping consensus of interpretive theories that can support a role for constitutional stare decisis, but to do this it must narrow the circumstances …


Under-The-Table Overruling, Christopher J. Peters Oct 2008

Under-The-Table Overruling, Christopher J. Peters

All Faculty Scholarship

In this contribution to a Wayne Law Review symposium on the first three years of the Roberts Court, the author normatively assesses the Court's practice of "under-the-table overruling," or "underruling," in high-profile constitutional cases involving abortion, campaign-finance reform, and affirmative action. The Court "underrules" when it renders a decision that undercuts a recent precedent without admitting that it is doing so. The author contends that underruling either is not supported by, or is directly incompatible with, three common rationales for constitutional stare decisis: the noninstrumental rationale, the predictability rationale, and the legitimacy rationale. In particular, while the latter rationale - …


How Is Constitutional Law Made?, Tracey E. George, Robert J. Pushaw Jr. May 2002

How Is Constitutional Law Made?, Tracey E. George, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Bismarck famously remarked: "Laws are like sausages. It's better not to see them being made." This witticism applies with peculiar force to constitutional law. Judges and commentators examine the sausage (the Supreme Court's doctrine), but ignore the messy details of its production. Maxwell Stearns has demonstrated, with brilliant originality, that the Court fashions constitutional law through process-based rules of decision such as outcome voting, stare decisis, and justiciability. Employing "social choice" economic theory, Professor Stearns argues that the Court, like all multimember decisionmaking bodies, strives to formulate rules that promote both rationality and fairness (p. 4). Viewed through the lens …


Right To Counsel Jan 1991

Right To Counsel

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Interaction Between State And Federal Right To Counsel: The Overruling Of Bartolomeounsel: The Overruling Of Bartolomeo, Joseph D. Sullivan Jan 1991

Interaction Between State And Federal Right To Counsel: The Overruling Of Bartolomeounsel: The Overruling Of Bartolomeo, Joseph D. Sullivan

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall Aug 1990

Contempt Of Congress: A Reply To The Critics Of An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, Lawrence C. Marshall

Michigan Law Review

In the law school tradition of "suspending belief," Professor Eskridge has created a hypothetical in which I, in my first case as Chief Justice of the United States, must decide whether to adhere to various antiquated and seemingly erroneous precedents interpreting the Mann Act. Eskridge assumes that I will feel compelled to adhere to these decisions, for to do otherwise, he contends, would force me to abandon the proposal for an absolute rule of statutory stare decisis that I advanced recently in this Law Review. Eskridge then offers a variety of critiques of my thesis, coming from perspectives as diverse …


Government Nonacquiescence Case In Point: Social Security Litigation Jan 1986

Government Nonacquiescence Case In Point: Social Security Litigation

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Embezzled Funds As Taxable Income: A Study In Judicial Footwork, Jerome B. Libin, George R. Haydon Jr. Jan 1963

Embezzled Funds As Taxable Income: A Study In Judicial Footwork, Jerome B. Libin, George R. Haydon Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The James case might not be worthy of extensive comment if its only significance rested on the decision that embezzled funds constitute taxable income in the year of misappropriation. But close analysis of the five separate opinions that were written indicates that James may have considerable significance beyond its precise holding.


Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision- Toward A Theory Of Legal Justification, William B. Harvey Feb 1962

Wasserstrom: The Judicial Decision- Toward A Theory Of Legal Justification, William B. Harvey

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Judicial Decision- Toward A Theory of Legal Justification By Richard A. Wasserstrom.


"Overruling" Opinions In The Supreme Court, Albert P. Blaustein, Andrew H. Field Dec 1958

"Overruling" Opinions In The Supreme Court, Albert P. Blaustein, Andrew H. Field

Michigan Law Review

Despite its vaunted reputation for rectitude, the United States Supreme Court has been the first to deny its own judicial infallibility. For in at least ninety decisions, dating as far back as 1810 and as recent as its 1956 Term, the Supreme Court has made public confession of error by overruling its previous determinations.

This is a study of those ninety decisions-a statistical accounting of overruling cases and cases overruled, and a listing of the judges who agreed and disagreed with what was said and done. And this is a study of the "right to be wrong" -an inquiry into …


Justice Jackson And The Judicial Function, Paul A. Weidner Feb 1955

Justice Jackson And The Judicial Function, Paul A. Weidner

Michigan Law Review

Much of the pattern of division in the present Supreme Court is traceable to basic differences of opinion regarding the proper role of a judge in the process of constitutional adjudication. Some students of the Court, yielding to the current fashion of reducing even intricate problems to capsule terms, have tried to explain the controversy by classifying the justices as either "liberals" or "conservatives." A second school poses the disagreement largely in terms of judicial "activism" as opposed to judicial "restraint." It is this view that has the greater relevance for the present discussion. C.H. Pritchett, one of the leading …