Jurisprudence Commons^™

Empirical Doctrine, Jessie Allen

Articles

We can observe and measure how legal decision makers use formal legal authorities, but there is no way to empirically test the determinative capacity of legal doctrine itself. Yet, discussions of empirical studies of judicial behavior sometimes conflate judges’ attention to legal rules with legal rules determining outcomes. Doctrinal determinacy is not the same thing as legal predictability. The extent to which legal outcomes are predictable in given contexts is surely testable empirically. But the idea that doctrine’s capacity to produce or limit those outcomes can be measured empirically is fundamentally misguided. The problem is that to measure doctrinal determinacy, …

Law And Artifice In Blackstone's Commentaries, Jessie Allen

Articles

William Blackstone is often identified as a natural law thinker for whom property rights were preeminent, but reading the Commentaries complicates that description. I propose that Blackstone’s concept of law is more concerned with human invention and artifice than with human nature. At the start of his treatise, Blackstone identifies security, liberty and property as “absolute” rights that form the foundation of English law. But while security and liberty are “inherent by nature in every individual” and “strictly natural,” Blackstone is only willing to say that “private property is probably founded in nature.” Moreover, Blackstone is clear that there is …

‘Jogalkotási Javaslatok Megfogalmazása A Jogtudományban’ [Policy Proposals And Legal Scholarship], Péter Cserne, György Gajduschek

Péter Cserne

This is the manuscript of a chapter written for a Hungarian handbook on legal scholarship. It provides an historical overview and a theoretical defense of a policy oriented, in contrast to doctrinal, study of law. The chapter also provides an introduction to the foundations and methodological tools of public policy analysis, including regulatory impact assessment.

The Persistence Of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives On Skepticism, Jessie Allen

Articles

This Article starts with a puzzle: Why is the doctrinal approach to “proximate cause” so resilient despite longstanding criticism? Proximate cause is a particularly extreme example of doctrine that limps along despite near universal consensus that it cannot actually determine legal outcomes. Why doesn’t that widely recognized indeterminacy disable proximate cause as a decision-making device? To address this puzzle, I pick up a cue from the legal realists, a group of skeptical lawyers, law professors, and judges, who, in the 1920s and 1930s, compared legal doctrine to ritual magic. I take that comparison seriously, perhaps more seriously, and definitely in …

How Money For Legal Scholarship Disadvantages Feminism, Martha T. Mccluskey

Journal Articles

A dramatic infusion of outside money has shaped legal theory over the last several decades, largely to the detriment of feminist theory. Nonetheless, the pervasive influence of this funding is largely ignored in scholarly discussions of legal theory. This denial helps reinforce the marginal position of feminist scholarship and of women in legal theory. Conservative activists and funders have understood the central role of developing community culture and institutions, and have helped shift the prevailing framework for discussion of many questions of theory and policy through substantial investments in law-and-economics centers and in the Federalist Society. Comparing the institutional resources …

Socioeconomic Rights And Theories Of Justice, Jeremy Waldron

San Diego Law Review

This Article considers the relation between theories of justice - such as John Rawls's theory - and theories of socioeconomic rights. In different ways, these two kinds of theories address much of the same subject matter. But they are quite strikingly different in format and texture. Theories of socioeconomic rights defend particular line-item requirements: a right to this or that good or opportunity, such as housing, health care, education, and social security. Theories of justice tend to involve a more integrated normative account of a society's basic structure, though they differ considerably among themselves in their structure. So how exactly …

Heidegger And The Essence Of Adjudication, George Souri

George Souri

This paper presents an account of adjudication based on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. As this paper argues, we can only hope to better understand adjudication if we recognize that adjudication is a socio-temporally situated activity, and not a theoretical object. Heidegger’s philosophical insights are especially salient to such a project for several reasons. First, Heidegger’s re-conception of ontology, and his notion of being-in-the-world, provide a truer-to-observation account of how human beings come to understand their world and take in the content of experience towards completing projects. Second, Heidegger’s account of context, inter-subjectivity, and common understanding provide a basis upon …

The Effect Of Legal Theories On Judicial Decisions, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

I draw a distinction in the beginning of this essay between judicial decision-making and a judge's decision-making. To persuade a judge, we should try to discover what her theories are. Across a range of theories, I offered well-known case examples typically cited as examples of each theory. Then I showed that the exact same theory used to justify or explain those case results could be used to justify or explain the opposite result in each of those cases.

Szerződésértelmezés Hermeneutika És Jogpolitika Között. A Contra Proferentem Szabály [Contract Interpretation Between Hermeneutics And Policy: The Contra Proferentem Rule], Péter Cserne

Péter Cserne

This paper discusses why contract interpretation is substantially different from the interpretation of literary works and illustrates the argument with the analysis of the contra proferentem rule. It is a substantially revised version of my ‘Policy considerations in contract interpretation: the contra proferentem rule from a comparative law and economics perspective’ (2009)

Legal Storytelling: The Theory And The Practice - Reflective Writing Across The Curriculum, Nancy Levit

Nancy Levit

This article concentrates on the theory of narrative or storytelling and addresses the reasons it is vital to encourage in law schools in non-clinical or primarily doctrinal courses. Section I traces the advent of storytelling in legal theory and practice: while lawyers have long recognized that part of their job is to tell their clients' stories, the legal academy was, for many years, resistant to narrative methodologies. Section II examines the current applications of Writing Across the Curriculum in law schools. Most exploratory writing tasks in law school come in clinical courses, although a few adventurous professors are adding reflective …

Jogelmélet Jog Nélkül? [Legal Theory Without Law?], Péter Cserne

Péter Cserne

No abstract provided.

Thinking With Wolves: Left Legal Theory After The Right's Rise (Review Essay), Martha T. Mccluskey

Book Reviews

Reviewing Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Left Legalism/Left Critique (2001).

Left legal theory is in crisis. This crisis reflects a broader problem of contemporary U.S. politics: the lack of grand ideas capable of mobilizing meaningful opposition to the triumph of the political right. Right-wing legal theory has contributed to that dramatic political change by promoting ideas questioning the foundations of the twentieth century liberal welfare and regulatory state.

This review essay analyzes a rare recent attempt to revive left legal theory in the face of the right's triumph: the anthology Left Legalism/Left Critique edited by Wendy Brown and Janet Halley …

Theory's A What Comes Natcherly, Larry Alexander

San Diego Law Review

So what kind of theorizing do we do in law? First, we do empirical, predictive theorizing. We form hypotheses about how the world will be affected by various rules of law, because of their content and form, and by the design of our legal institutions. These hypotheses can be confirmed or falsified. We also form hypotheses about how particular judges will decide future cases, or how legislatures and agencies will react to various proposals. When we do legal history, we reason backwards from effects and form hypotheses about their causes. The second type of theorizing we do is normative. In …

Theory Minimalism, Stanley Fish

San Diego Law Review

We must begin with a sense of what theory is, and I shall derive mine from a question Herbert Wechsler often put to his students. "Ask yourself," he would say, "'Would I reach the same result if the substantive interests were otherwise?"" The challenge of the question is to the student who has determined where the right lies in a disputed matter, and who now must demonstrate that, even if every circumstantial particular of the case were varied-if the plaintiff were a woman instead of a man, if the object of hate speech was a descendant of someone who came …

The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

America's political institutions are built on the principle that individual preferences are central to the formation of policy. The two most important institutions in our system, democracy and the market, make individual preference decisive in the formation of policy and the allocation of resources. American legal traditions have always reflected the centrality of preference in policy determination. In private law, the importance of preference is reflected mainly in the development and persistence of common-law rules, which are intended to facilitate private transactions over legal entitlements. In constitutional law, the centrality of preference is reflected in the high position we assign …

Are Constitutional Cases Political?, Brian Slattery

Brian Slattery

Reason And Reality In Jurisprudence, Jerome Hall

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Law In Action And Social Theory, Fowler Vincent Harper

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.