Jurisprudence Commons^™

How Practices Make Principles, And How Principles Make Rules, Mitchell N. Berman

All Faculty Scholarship

The most fundamental question in general jurisprudence concerns what makes it the case that the law has the content that it does. This article offers a novel answer. According to the theory it christens “principled positivism,” legal practices ground legal principles, and legal principles determine legal rules. This two-level account of the determination of legal content differs from Hart’s celebrated theory in two essential respects: in relaxing Hart’s requirement that fundamental legal notions depend for their existence on judicial consensus; and in assigning weighted contributory legal norms—“principles”—an essential role in the determination of legal rights, duties, powers, and permissions. Drawing …

Religion, Public Law, And The Refuge Of Formalism, Howard Kislowicz, Benjamin Berger

All Papers

In this article we suggest that the encounter with religious legal traditions has surfaced a distinct vein of formalism in Canadian public law, discernable across the Court’s law and religion jurisprudence. This is so despite the centrality of substantive analysis in the account Canadian public law gives of itself. But there are distinct challenges and a particular anxiety that surrounds the law-religion encounter; we argue that the fraught sovereignty and pluralism problems that this encounter presents has led Canadian public law to rediscover its formalist habits and the comfort that they bring.

The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Wall …

Reasoning V. Rhetoric: The Strange Case Of “Unconstitutional Beyond A Reasonable Doubt”, Hugh D. Spitzer

Articles

An odd formulation has frequented American constitutional discourse for 125 years: a declaration that courts should not overturn a statute on constitutional grounds unless it is “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” This concept has been thought of as a presumption, a standard, a doctrine, or a philosophy of coordinate branch respect and judicial restraint. Yet it has been criticized because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is at root an evidentiary standard of proof in criminal cases rather than a workable theory or standard for deciding constitutional law cases. This article discusses the history and use of “unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt,” …

But What Is Personalized Law?, Sandra G. Mayson

All Faculty Scholarship

In Personalized Law: Different Rules for Different People, Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat undertake to ground a burgeoning field of legal thought. The book imagines and thoughtfully assesses an array of personalized legal rules, including individualized speed limits, fines calibrated to income, and medical disclosure requirements responsive to individual health profiles. Throughout, though, the conceptual parameters of “personalized law” remain elusive. It is clear that personalized law involves more data, more machine-learning, and more direct communication to individuals. But it is not clear how deep these changes go. Are they incremental—just today’s law with better tech—or do they represent …

Navigating The Identity Thicket: Trademark's Lost Theory Of Personality, The Right Of Publicity, And Preemption, Jennifer E. Rothman

All Faculty Scholarship

Both trademark and unfair competition laws and state right of publicity laws protect against unauthorized uses of a person’s identity. Increasingly, however, these rights are working at odds with one another, and can point in different directions with regard to who controls a person’s name, likeness, and broader indicia of identity. This creates what I call an "identity thicket" of overlapping and conflicting rights over a person’s identity. Current jurisprudence provides little to no guidance on the most basic questions surrounding this thicket, such as what right to use a person’s identity, if any, flows from the transfer of marks …