Jurisprudence Commons^™

Use Your Words: On The "Speech" In "Freedom Of Speech", Leslie Kendrick

Michigan Law Review

Freedom of speech occupies a special place in American society. But what counts as “speech” is a contentious issue. In countless cases, courts struggle to distinguish highly protected speech from easily regulated economic activity. Skeptics view this struggle as evidence that speech is, in fact, not distinguishable from other forms of activity.

This Article refutes that view. It argues that speech is indeed distinct from other forms of activity, and that even accounts that deny this distinction actually admit it. It then argues that the features that make speech distinctive as a phenomenon also make it distinctive as a normative …

Reflections On Comity In The Law Of American Federalism, Gil Seinfeld

Articles

Comity is a nebulous concept familiar to us from the law of international relations. Roughly speaking, it describes a set of reciprocal norms among nations that call for one state to recognize, and sometimes defer to, the laws, judgments, or interests of another. Comity also features prominently in the law of American federalism, but in that context, it operates within limits that have received almost no attention from scholarly commentators. Specifically, although courts routinely describe duties that run from one state to another, or from the federal government to the states, as exercises in comity, they almost never rely on …

Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard For Fear-Based Injury In Clapper V. Amnesty International Usa, Andrew C. Sand

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can have Article III standing based on a fear of future harm, or fear-based injury. The Court’s approach to fear-based injury, however, has been unclear and inconsistent. This Note seeks to clarify the Court’s doctrine using principles from probability theory. It contends that fear-based injury should be governed by a substantial-risk standard that encapsulates the probability concept of expected value. This standard appears in footnote 5 of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a recent case in which the Court held that a group of plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of …

The Rule Of Law And The Perils Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In a world where circumstances never changed and where every judicial decision was unassailably correct, applying the doctrine of stare decisis would be a breeze. Fidelity to precedent and commitment to sound legal interpretation would meld into a single, coherent enterprise. That world, alas, is not the one we live in. Like so much else in law, the concept of stare decisis encompasses a series of trade-offs-and difficult ones at that. Prominent among them is the tension between allowing past decisions to remain settled and establishing a body of legal rules that is flexible enough to adapt and improve over …

Stare Decisis And The Rule Of Law: A Layered Approach, Jeremy Waldron

Michigan Law Review

Stare decisis remains a controversial feature of the legal systems that recognize it. Some jurists argue that the doctrine is at odds with the rule of law; others argue that there are good rule-of-law arguments in favor of stare decisis. This Article considers one possible good rule-of-law argument. It suggests that we should approach stare decisis in a layered way, looking at what the rule of law requires of the various judges involved in the development of a precedent. One rule-of-law principle, the principle of constancy, counsels against lightly overturning such precedents as there are. But that is not in …

Cute Prickly Critter With Presbyopia, Don Herzog

Reviews

Ronald Dworkin's' latest, long-awaited, and most ambitious book is a puzzle. Truth in advertising first: despite the title, this isn't centrally a book about justice. It's a book about the realm of value-all of that realm. Dworkin is most interested here in morality, but really touches on all of it, as a matter of the application of the abstract argument and sometimes in black and white right on the page, from aesthetics to prudence to morality to politics to law to . . . . It's fun to read, also frustrating. It stretches out lazily in handling some issues but …

A Neo-Chicago Perspective On Antitrust Institutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

It has long been fashionable to categorize antitrust by its "schools." From the Sherman Act's passage to World War II, there were (at least) neo-classical marginalism, populism, progressivism, associationalism, business commonwealthism, and Brandeisianism. From World War II to the present, we have seen (at least, and without counting the European Ordo-Liberals) PaleoHarvard structuralism, the Chicago School, Neo-Harvard institutionalism, and Post -Chicagoans. So why not Neo-Chicago? I am already on record as suggesting the possible emergence of such a school, so it is too late for me to dismiss the entire "schools" conversation as window-dressing. This Symposium is dedicated to defining …

Hustle And Flow: A Social Network Analysis Of The American Federal Judiciary, Daniel Martin Katz, Derek Stafford

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

Scholars have long asserted that social structure is an important feature of a variety of societal institutions. As part of a larger effort to develop a fully integrated model of judicial decision making, we argue that social structure—operationalized as the professional and social connections between judicial actors—partially directs outcomes in the hierarchical federal judiciary.

Since different social structures impose dissimilar consequences upon outputs, the precursor to evaluating the doctrinal consequences that a given social structure imposes is a descriptive effort to characterize its nature. Given the difficulty associated with obtaining appropriate data for federal judges, it is necessary to rely …

"How To Think About Equality." Review Of Sovereign Virtue: The Theory And Practice Of Equality, By R. Dworkin, Don Herzog

Reviews

Ronald Dworkin's' latest might well seem sharply discontinuous with his other work. The formal theoretical apparatus that kicks off the book is a forbiddingly abstract - some will say arcane - hypothetical auction, coupled with a hypothetical insurance market. There is simply nothing like it in Taking Rights Seriously, or A Matter of Principle, or Law's Empire, or Life's Dominion, or Freedom's Law. Then again, Dworkin first published the key papers on the auction some twenty years. ago and has never flagged, as far as I know, in his commitment to the basic project.2 Theorists have been waiting for the …

Pragmatism Regained, Christopher Kutz

Michigan Law Review

Jules Coleman's The Practice of Principle serves as a focal point for current, newly intensified debates in legal theory, and provides some of the deepest, most sustained reflections on methodology that legal theory has seen. Coleman is one of the leading legal philosophers in the Anglo-American world, and his writings on tort theory, contract theory, the normative foundations of law and economics, social choice theory, and analytical jurisprudence have been the point of departure for much of the most interesting activity in the field for the last three decades. Indeed, the origin of this book lies in Oxford University's invitation …

Logic And Elements. (Premises And Conclusions: Symbolic Logic For Legal Analysis)." , Richard D. Friedman

Articles

We may happily agree with Holmes that logic is not the life of the law' and yet contend that logic should play a significant role in legal discourse. Logic cannot demonstrate the truth of premises, and so by itself it cannot demonstrate the merits of a legal argument. Moreover, even given the premises, it may be that a leap of faith, or intuition, has an irreducible role at least in some good legal arguments.2 But at least a sound legal argument will not be an illogical one. An argument will not be persuasive if it appears to violate basic principles …

Up From Individualism (The Brennan Center Symposium On Constitutional Law)." , Donald J. Herzog

Articles

I was sitting, ruefully contemplating the dilemmas of being a commentator, wondering whether I had the effrontery to rise and offer a dreadful confession: the first time I encountered the countermajoritarian difficulty, I didn't bite. I didn't say, "Wow, that's a giant problem." I didn't immediately start casting about for ingenious ways to solve or dissolve it. I just shrugged. Now I don't think that's because my commitments to either democracy or constitutionalism are somehow faulty or suspect. Nor do I think it's that they obviously cohere. It's rather that the framing, "look, these nine unelected characters can strike down …

Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't mean to argue that …

What Is A Postmodern Constitutionalism?, J. M. Balkin

Michigan Law Review

I begin with a puzzle. It must certainly strike one as odd that the subject of postmodern constitutional law arises at a time when the actual arbiters of the Constitution - the federal judiciary and in particular the Supreme Court of the United States - appear to be more conservative than they have been for many years, and indeed, are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Postmodernism is often associated with what is new, innovative, and on the cutting edge of cultural development. Yet if we were to define the elements of a postmodern constitutional culture, it would …

Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, Robert S. Summers

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Problems of Jurisprudence by Richard A. Posner

The Supreme Court-October 1959 Term, Bernard Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

A country's constitutional law is but a reflection of its political, economic, and social life. Not unnaturally, the external conditions of any particular period are bound to have their effects in the legal sphere as well-especially in the field of public law. This is as true of the United States as it is of other countries. From this point of view, the constitutional jurisprudence of the American Supreme Court is only the juristic mirror of the different stages through which American history has passed. 'Our jurisprudence is distinctive,' said Justice Jackson on the 150th anniversary of the Supreme Court, 'in …

Full Faith And Credit To Judgments And Public Acts, Kurt H. Nadelmann

Michigan Law Review

Interest here is concentrated on full faith and credit for public acts. But what led to insertion of the command respecting public acts cannot be divorced historically from the study of the command of full faith for judgments. The whole field, therefore, has been included in the reexamination. Clarifications obtainable on the "judgments" side, it will be seen, help also on the "public acts" side. On both sides there are historical facts which deserve greater attention than has been hitherto given, and if, as a result, some of the myths surrounding the' Lawyers Clause are exploded, the rethinking may have …

Book Reviews, Nathan Isaacs, Horace Lafayette Wilgus, Arthur H. Basye, Leonard D. White, Victor H. Lane, Edwin D. Dickinson

Michigan Law Review

What does a judge do when he decides a case? It would be interesting to collect the answers ranging from those furnished by primitive systems of law in which the judge was supposed to consult the gods to the ultra-modern, rather profane system described to me recently by a retrospective judge: "I make up my mind which way the case ought to be decided, and then I see if I can't get some legal ground to make it stick." Perhaps the widespread impression is the curiously erroneous one lampooned by Gnaeus Flavius (Kantorowitz). The judge is supposed to sit at …