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Jurisprudence Commons

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Philosophy

Law and Economics

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Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton Jan 2005

Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Two Observations On Holocaust Claims, William W. Bratton Jan 2001

Two Observations On Holocaust Claims, William W. Bratton

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No abstract provided.


Deadweight Costs And Intrinsic Wrongs Of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, And Legal Suppression Of Spanish, William W. Bratton, Drucilla L. Cornell Jan 1999

Deadweight Costs And Intrinsic Wrongs Of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, And Legal Suppression Of Spanish, William W. Bratton, Drucilla L. Cornell

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No abstract provided.


The New Economics Of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery Jan 1997

The New Economics Of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism In A Second-Best World, William W. Bratton, Joseph A. Mccahery

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No abstract provided.


Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory In A Time Of Restructuring, William W. Bratton Jan 1989

Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory In A Time Of Restructuring, William W. Bratton

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No abstract provided.


The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton Jan 1984

The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary …