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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee
Jazz Improvisation And The Law: Constrained Choice, Sequence, And Strategic Movement Within Rules, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article argues that a richer understanding of the nature of law is possible through comparative, analogical examination of legal work and the art of jazz improvisation. This exploration illuminates a middle ground between rule of law aspirations emphasizing stability and determinate meanings and contrasting claims that the untenable alternative is pervasive discretionary or politicized law. In both the law and jazz improvisation settings, the work involves constraining rules, others’ unpredictable actions, and strategic choosing with attention to where a collective creation is going. One expects change and creativity in improvisation, but the many analogous characteristics of law illuminate why …
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
This article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this article we offer a narrative discussion of key variables and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …
The Judge As A Fly On The Wall: Interpretive Lessons From The Positive Political Theory Of Legislation, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew Mccubbins
The Judge As A Fly On The Wall: Interpretive Lessons From The Positive Political Theory Of Legislation, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew Mccubbins
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series
In the modern debate over statutory interpretation, scholars frequently talk past one another, arguing for one or another interpretive approach on the basis of competing, and frequently undertheorized, conceptions of legislative supremacy and political theory. For example, so-called new textualists insist that the plain meaning approach is compelled by the U.S. Constitution and rule of law values; by contrast, theorists counseling a more dynamic approach often reject the premise of legislative supremacy that is supposed by the textualist view. A key element missing, therefore, from the modern statutory interpretation debate is a conspicuous articulation of the positive and empirical premises …
Name-Calling And The Clear Error Rule, Robert F. Nagel
Name-Calling And The Clear Error Rule, Robert F. Nagel
Publications
No abstract provided.
Grammarians At The Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving Plain Meaning Approach To Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, Walter Effross
Grammarians At The Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving Plain Meaning Approach To Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, Walter Effross
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
No abstract provided.
The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel
The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Scholarly Works
No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …