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Jurisprudence Commons

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Legal Studies

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Law and Economics

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton Jan 2005

Welfare, Dialectic, And Mediation In Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Lawyers On The Auction Block: Evaluation And Selection Of Class Counsel By Auction, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2002

Lawyers On The Auction Block: Evaluation And Selection Of Class Counsel By Auction, Jill E. Fisch

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The lead counsel auction has attracted increasing attention. Auction advocates mgue that auctions introduce competitive market forces that improve the selection and compensation of class counsel. The benefits of the auction, the;' claim, include lower legal fees and better representation. Careful scrutiny reveals that auction advocates have overlooked substantial methodological problems with the design and implementation of the lead counsel auction. Even if these problems were overcome, the auction procedure is flawed: Auctions are poor tools for selecting firms based on multiple criteria, compromise the judicial role, and are unlikely to produce reasonable fee awards. Although the existing record is ...


Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton Jan 1999

Law And Economics Of English Only, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Deadweight Costs And Intrinsic Wrongs Of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, And Legal Suppression Of Spanish, William W. Bratton, Drucilla L. Cornell Jan 1999

Deadweight Costs And Intrinsic Wrongs Of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, And Legal Suppression Of Spanish, William W. Bratton, Drucilla L. Cornell

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 1994

The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

America's political institutions are built on the principle that individual preferences are central to the formation of policy. The two most important institutions in our system, democracy and the market, make individual preference decisive in the formation of policy and the allocation of resources. American legal traditions have always reflected the centrality of preference in policy determination. In private law, the importance of preference is reflected mainly in the development and persistence of common-law rules, which are intended to facilitate private transactions over legal entitlements. In constitutional law, the centrality of preference is reflected in the high position we ...


The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton Jan 1989

The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.