Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Jurisprudence Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 21 of 21

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Scott V. Harris And The Future Of Summary Judgment, Tobias Barrington Wolff Jul 2015

Scott V. Harris And The Future Of Summary Judgment, Tobias Barrington Wolff

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Harris has quickly become a staple in many Civil Procedure courses, and small wonder. The cinematic high-speed car chase complete with dash-cam video and the Court’s controversial treatment of that video evidence seem tailor-made for classroom discussion. As is often true with instant classics, however, splashy first impressions can mask a more complex state of affairs. At the heart of Scott v. Harris lies the potential for a radical doctrinal reformation: a shift in the core summary judgment standard undertaken to justify a massive expansion of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in qualified immunity cases. …


The Original Meaning Of "God": Using The Language Of The Framing Generation To Create A Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Michael I. Meyerson Apr 2015

The Original Meaning Of "God": Using The Language Of The Framing Generation To Create A Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Michael I. Meyerson

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s attempt to create a standard for evaluating whether the Establishment Clause is violated by religious governmental speech, such as the public display of the Ten Commandments or the Pledge of Allegiance, is a total failure. The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been termed “convoluted,” “a muddled mess,” and “a polite lie.” Unwilling to either allow all governmental religious speech or ban it entirely, the Court is in need of a coherent standard for distinguishing the permissible from the unconstitutional. Thus far, no Justice has offered such a standard.

A careful reading of the history of the framing …


The Rejection Of Horizontal Judicial Review During America's Colonial Period, Robert J. Steinfeld Mar 2015

The Rejection Of Horizontal Judicial Review During America's Colonial Period, Robert J. Steinfeld

Journal Articles

No abstract provided.


In Search Of The Real Roberts Court, Stephen Wermiel Feb 2015

In Search Of The Real Roberts Court, Stephen Wermiel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.


Epilogue: The New Deal At Bay, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Feb 2015

Epilogue: The New Deal At Bay, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Opening of American Law examines changes in American legal thought that began during Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, and extending through the Kennedy/Johnson eras. During this period American judges and legal writers embraced various conceptions of legal "science," although they differed about what that science entailed. Beginning in the Gilded Age, the principal sources were Darwinism in the biological and social sciences, marginalism in economics and psychology, and legal historicism. The impact on judicial, legislative, and later administrative law making is difficult to exaggerate. Among the changes were vastly greater use of behavioral or deterrence based theories of legal …


A Tradition At War With Itself: A Reply To Professor Rana's Review Of America's Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions Of Power And Community, Robert Tsai Jan 2015

A Tradition At War With Itself: A Reply To Professor Rana's Review Of America's Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions Of Power And Community, Robert Tsai

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This essay responds to Professor Aziz Rana's review essay, "The Many American Constitutions," 93 Texas Law Review 1193 (2015).

He contends: (1) my portrayal of American constitutionalism might contain a “hidden” teleological understanding of the development of constitutional law; (2) my notion of "conventional sovereignty" sometimes seems content-free and at other times "interlinked with liberal egalitarianism"; and (3) a focus on failed constitutions "inadvertently tends to compartmentalize the overall tradition."

I answer in the following ways: (1) I reject any sense that constitutional law has moved in an arc of steady progress toward Enlightenment and instead embrace a tradition of …


Magna Charta: The Charter Of The Forest, And The Prerogatives Of Kings, Allen E. Shoenberger Jan 2015

Magna Charta: The Charter Of The Forest, And The Prerogatives Of Kings, Allen E. Shoenberger

Faculty Publications & Other Works

No abstract provided.


Reddall V. Bryan And The Role Of State Law In Federal Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, Shannon Frede Jan 2015

Reddall V. Bryan And The Role Of State Law In Federal Eminent Domain Jurisprudence, Shannon Frede

Legal History Publications

Prior to 1875, the standard federal takings procedure had been for state governments to condemn property on behalf of the federal government. As a result, the majority of interpretative work in the early history of eminent domain jurisprudence was undertaken by state courts. In 1853, the Maryland General Assembly granted the United States Government the power to condemn land in Maryland for an aqueduct across the Potomac to supply water to two District cities. In Reddall v. Bryan, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the aqueduct supplying the city of Washington with water as a public use. The Court …


Reasonableness In And Out Of Negligence Law, Benjamin C. Zipursky Jan 2015

Reasonableness In And Out Of Negligence Law, Benjamin C. Zipursky

Faculty Scholarship

The word "reasonable" and its cognates figure prominently in innumerable areas of the law – from antitrust and contract law to administrative and constitutional law, from the common law of nuisance to an assortment of rules in statutes and regulations. While some thinkers have equated "reasonableness" with "rationality," others have looked to "justifiability," and others still have decided that "reasonableness" means virtually nothing at all, but serves the important function of allocating decisionmaking authority. The reality is that the term "reasonable" is both vague and ambiguous, and thus plays many different roles in the law. As with terms such as …


Originalism As A Theory Of Legal Change, Stephen E. Sachs Jan 2015

Originalism As A Theory Of Legal Change, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Originalism is usually defended as a theory of interpretation. This Article presents a different view. Originalism ought to be defended, if at all, not based on normative goals or abstract philosophy, but as a positive theory of American legal practice, and particularly of our rules for legal change.

One basic assumption of legal systems is that the law, whatever it is, stays the same until it's lawfully changed. Originalism begins this process with an origin, a Founding. Whatever rules we had when the Constitution was adopted, we still have today -- unless something happened that was authorized to change …


The Triumph Of Gay Marriage And The Failure Of Constitutional Law, Louis Michael Seidman Jan 2015

The Triumph Of Gay Marriage And The Failure Of Constitutional Law, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Supreme Court's much anticipated invalidation of gay marriage bans improved the personal lives of millions of ordinary Americans. It made the country a more decent place. Even Chief Justice Roberts, at the conclusion of his otherwise scathing dissent, acknowledged that the decision was a cause for many Americans to celebrate.

But although the Chief Justice thought that advocates of gay marriage should "by all means celebrate today's decision," he admonished them "not [to] celebrate the Constitution." The Constitution, he said, "had nothing to do with it".

Part I of this article quarrels with the Chief Justice's assertion that the …


Time-Mindedness And Jurisprudence, David Luban Jan 2015

Time-Mindedness And Jurisprudence, David Luban

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Analytic jurisprudence often strikes outsiders as a discipline unto itself, unconnected with the problems that other legal scholarship investigates. Gerald Postema, in the article to which this paper responds, traces this “unsociability” to two narrowing defects in the project of analytic jurisprudence: (1) from Austin on, it has concerned itself largely with the analysis of professional concepts, without connecting that analysis with other disciplines that study law, nor with the history of jurisprudence itself, nor with general philosophy; (2) analytic jurisprudence studies only time-­‐slice legal systems, rather than legal systems unfolding in history. He argues that a time-­‐slice legal system …


John Merefield's Common Pleas Reports, William Hamilton Bryson Jan 2015

John Merefield's Common Pleas Reports, William Hamilton Bryson

Law Faculty Publications

John Merefield of Crewkerne, Somerset, was admitted to the Inner Temple on 14 February 1612, and he was called to the bar on 15 October 1620. He gave readings in 1621 and 1641; on 4 November 1638, he was called to the bench. Merefield was created a serjeant in October 1660, and he died in October 1666.


Fourteen Cases From Herbert Jacob's Queen's Bench Reports, William Hamilton Bryson Jan 2015

Fourteen Cases From Herbert Jacob's Queen's Bench Reports, William Hamilton Bryson

Law Faculty Publications

Herbert Jacob was admitted to the Inner Temple on 3 June 1692, called to the bar on 28 June 1699, and called to the bench of the Inner Temple on 22 November 1721. He died in 1725.

Harvard Law School MS. 4081 [formerly MS. 2136] is a collection of Queen's Bench reports dating from 1702 to 1706. This manuscript consists of two books, which are attributed to Herbert Jacob, a barrister of the Inner Temple. The cases in volume one and volume two, ff. 1-71v, are the same reports as 2 Lord Raymond 755-1252, 92 E.R. 4-325. Volume two, ff. …


Thomas Bold's Chancery Reports, William Hamilton Bryson Jan 2015

Thomas Bold's Chancery Reports, William Hamilton Bryson

Law Faculty Publications

Thomas Bold was born in 1695, the son of William Bold of St. Bride's Parish, London. He entered Westminster School in 1708 and Christ Church, Oxford, on 23 June 1713. Bold received his B.A. in 1718 and an M.A. in 1721. He was admitted as a law student at the Middle Temple on 15 June 1711 and called to the bar on 31 May 1717. He was admitted ad eundem at Lincoln's Inn on 23 November 1717.


Foreword: Theorizing Contemporary Legal Thought, Justin Desautels-Stein, Duncan Kennedy Jan 2015

Foreword: Theorizing Contemporary Legal Thought, Justin Desautels-Stein, Duncan Kennedy

Publications

This is a co-authored foreword to a symposium in Law & Contemporary Problems titled "Theorizing Contemporary Legal Thought." It includes a discussion of the background of the project, a brief summary of the articles included in the issue, and a very short statement from Desautels-Stein and Kennedy on the "loss of faith" indicative of Contemporary Legal Thought.


Structuralist Legal Histories, Justin Desautels-Stein Jan 2015

Structuralist Legal Histories, Justin Desautels-Stein

Publications

This is a contribution to a symposium titled "Theorizing Contemporary Legal Thought." The central theme of the piece is the relation between legal structuralism and legal historiography.


Progressive Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2015

Progressive Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

A widely accepted model of American legal history is that "classical" legal thought, which dominated much of the nineteenth century, was displaced by "progressive" legal thought, which survived through the New Deal and in some form to this day. Within its domain, this was a revolution nearly on a par with Copernicus or Newton. This paradigm has been adopted by both progressive liberals who defend this revolution and by classical liberals who lament it.

Classical legal thought is generally identified with efforts to systematize legal rules along lines that had become familiar in the natural sciences. This methodology involved not …


Corporate Law Doctrine And The Legacy Of American Legal Realism, Edward B. Rock Jan 2015

Corporate Law Doctrine And The Legacy Of American Legal Realism, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

In this contribution to a symposium on "Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine," I examine the role that jurisprudence plays in corporate law doctrine. Through an examination of paired cases from the United States and United Kingdom, I offer a case study of the contrasting influence on corporate law judging of American Legal Realism versus traditional U.K. Doctrinalism.

Specialist judges in both systems, aided by specialist lawyers, clearly identify and understand the core policy issues involved in a dispute and arrive at sensible results. Adjusting for differences in background law and institutions, it seems likely that the disputes would ultimately be …


Foreword: The Constraint Of Legal Doctrine, Shyamkrishna Balganesh Jan 2015

Foreword: The Constraint Of Legal Doctrine, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Ironies Of Affirmative Action, Kermit Roosevelt Iii Jan 2015

The Ironies Of Affirmative Action, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s most recent confrontation with race-based affirmative action, Fisher v. University of Texas, did not live up to people’s expectations—or their fears. The Court did not explicitly change the current approach in any substantial way. It did, however, signal that it wants race-based affirmative action to be subject to real strict scrutiny, not the watered-down version featured in Grutter v. Bollinger. That is a significant signal, because under real strict scrutiny, almost all race-based affirmative action programs are likely unconstitutional. This is especially true given the conceptual framework the Court has created for such programs—the way …