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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 639 (2009), Samuel R. Olken
Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 639 (2009), Samuel R. Olken
UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
When Does Might Make Right? Using Force For Regime Change, John Linarelli
When Does Might Make Right? Using Force For Regime Change, John Linarelli
Scholarly Works
Should states use force to bring about regime change? International law recognizes no such grounds. This paper seeks to provide guidance from moral theory. The aim of this paper is to identify the moral grounds for the use of armed force by one state or a group of states, against another state, when the intention of the intervening states is to achieve a fundamental change in the character of the political and legal institutions of the other state. Lawyers tend to place the argument for regime change intervention within putative humanitarian intervention doctrines. The moral justification for humanitarian intervention is …
Originalism Is Bunk, Mitchell N. Berman
Constitutional Theory And The Rule Of Recognition: Toward A Fourth Theory Of Law, Mitchell N. Berman
Constitutional Theory And The Rule Of Recognition: Toward A Fourth Theory Of Law, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay, a contribution to a forthcoming edited volume on Hart's rule of recognition and the U.S. Constitution, advances one argument and pitches one proposal. The argument is that Hart's theory of law does not succeed. On Hart's account, legal propositions are what they are - that is, they have the particular content and status that they do - by virtue of their satisfying necessary and sufficient conditions that are themselves established by a special sort of convergent practice among officials. American constitutional theorists are often troubled by this account because it seems to imply that in the "hard cases" …
Voices Saved From Vanishing, Vivian Grosswald Curran
Voices Saved From Vanishing, Vivian Grosswald Curran
Articles
Jurists Uprooted: German-speaking Émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain examines the lives of eighteen émigré lawyers and legal scholars who made their way to the United Kingdom, almost all to escape Nazism, and analyzes their impact on the development of English law.
Reasons: Practical And Adaptive, Joseph Raz
Reasons: Practical And Adaptive, Joseph Raz
Faculty Scholarship
I will consider some of the differences between epistemic reasons and reasons for action, and use these differences to illuminate a major division between types of normative reasons, which I will call ‘adaptive’ and ‘practical’ reasons. A few clarifications of some aspects of the concept of epistemic reasons will lead to a distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (section 1). Some differences between epistemic and practical reasons will be described and explained in section 2, paving the way to generalising the contrast and explaining the difference between adaptive and practical reasons (section 3). sections 4 and 5 further explain and …