Jurisprudence Commons^™

Kennedy's Legacy: A Principled Justice, Mitchell N. Berman, David Peters

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After three decades on the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy remains its most widely maligned member. Concentrating on his constitutional jurisprudence, critics from across the ideological spectrum have derided Justice Kennedy as “a self-aggrandizing turncoat,” “an unprincipled weathervane,” and, succinctly, “America’s worst Justice.” We believe that Kennedy is not as bereft of a constitutional theory as common wisdom maintains. To the contrary, this Article argues, his constitutional decisionmaking reflects a genuine grasp (less than perfect, more than rudimentary) of a coherent and, we think, compelling theory of constitutional law—the account, more or less, that one of has introduced in other work …

Certainty Versus Flexibility In The Conflict Of Laws, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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Traditional choice of law theory conceives of certainty and flexibility as opposed values: increase one, and you inevitably decrease the other. This article challenges the received wisdom by reconceptualizing the distinction. Rather than caring about certainty or flexibility for their own sake, it suggests, we care about them because each makes it easier to promote a certain cluster of values. And while there may be a necessary tradeoff between certainty and flexibility, there is no necessary tradeoff between the clusters of values. It is possible to improve a choice of law system with regard to both of them. The article …

Arguing With Friends, William Baude, Ryan D. Doerfler

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It is a fact of life that judges sometimes disagree about the best outcome in appealed cases. The question is what they should make of this. The two purest possibilities are to shut out all other views, or else to let them all in, leading one to concede ambiguity and uncertainty in most if not all contested cases.

Drawing on the philosophical concepts of “peer disagreement” and “epistemic peerhood,” we argue that there is a better way. Judges ought to give significant weight to the views of others, but only when those others share the judge’s basic methodology or interpretive …

Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer

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The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968. The time seems ripe, therefore, to explore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review under the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution. This Article constitutes the first such comprehensive exploration.

The Article begins with an historical overview of the evolution of the Pennsylvania Constitution, culminating in the Constitution of 1968. It then presents a census of the 372 cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has vindicated distinctive Pennsylvania Constitutional rights under the Constitution of 1968.

Analysis of these cases leads to three conclusions:

1. Exercise of independent constitutional …

The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman

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Justice Antonin Scalia was, by the time of his death last February, the Supreme Court’s best known and most influential member. He was also its most polarizing, a jurist whom most students of American law either love or hate. This essay, styled as a twenty-year retrospective on A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia’s Tanner lectures on statutory and constitutional interpretation, aims to prod partisans on both sides of our central legal and political divisions to better appreciate at least some of what their opponents see—the other side of Scalia’s legacy. Along the way, it critically assesses Scalia’s particular brand of …

Justice Scalia’S Originalism And Formalism: The Rule Of Criminal Law As A Law Of Rules, Stephanos Bibas

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Far too many reporters and pundits collapse law into politics, assuming that the left–right divide between Democratic and Republican appointees neatly explains politically liberal versus politically conservative outcomes at the Supreme Court. The late Justice Antonin Scalia defied such caricatures. His consistent judicial philosophy made him the leading exponent of originalism, textualism, and formalism in American law, and over the course of his three decades on the Court, he changed the terms of judicial debate. Now, as a result, supporters and critics alike start with the plain meaning of the statutory or constitutional text rather than loose appeals to legislative …

The Questionable Origins Of The Copyright Infringement Analysis, Shyamkrishna Balganesh

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Central to modern copyright law is its test for determining infringement, famously developed by Judge Jerome Frank in the landmark case of Arnstein v. Porter. The “Arnstein test,” which courts continue to apply, demands that the analysis be divided into two components, actual copying — the question whether the defendant did in fact copy, and improper appropriation — the question whether such copying, if it did exist, was unlawful. Somewhat counter-intuitively though, the test treats both components as pure questions of fact, requiring that even the question of improper appropriation go to a jury. This jury-centric approach continues to influence …

Judge Posner’S Simple Law, Mitchell N. Berman

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The world is complex, Richard Posner observes in his most recent book, Reflections on Judging. It follows that, to resolve real-world disputes sensibly, judges must be astute students of the world’s complexity. The problem, he says, is that, thanks to disposition, training, and professional incentives, they aren’t. Worse than that, the legal system generates its own complexity precisely to enable judges “to avoid rather than meet and overcome the challenge of complexity” that the world delivers. Reflections concerns how judges needlessly complexify inherently simple law, and how this complexification can be corrected.

Posner’s diagnoses and prescriptions range widely—from the Bluebook …

Justice Kennedy's Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, Stephanos Bibas

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This essay, written as part of a symposium on the evolution of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, surveys three areas of criminal procedure under the Sixth Amendment: sentence enhancements, the admissibility of hearsay, and the regulation of defense counsel’s responsibilities. In each area, Justice Kennedy has been a notable voice of pragmatism, focusing not on bygone analogies to the eighteenth century but on a hard-headed appreciation of the twenty-first. He has shown sensitivity to modern criminal practice, prevailing professional norms, and practical constraints, as befits a Justice who came to the bench with many years of private-practice experience. His touchstone is not …

Interpretation And Construction: Originalism And Its Discontents, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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No abstract provided.

Constitutional Constructions And Constitutional Decision Rules: Thoughts On The Carving Of Implementation Space, Mitchell N. Berman

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No abstract provided.

Imagining Judges That Apply Law: How They Might Do It, James Maxeiner

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"Judges should apply the law, not make it." That plea appears perennially in American politics. American legal scholars belittle it as a simple-minded demand that is silly and misleading. A glance beyond our shores dispels the notion that the American public is naive to expect judges to apply rather than to make law.

American obsession with judicial lawmaking has its price: indifference to judicial law applying. If truth be told, practically we have no method for judges, as a matter of routine, to apply law to facts. Our failure leads American legal scholars to question whether applying law to facts …

Symposium: Supreme Court Review, Symposium Foreword, Mitchell N. Berman

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No abstract provided.

A Review Of “How Judges Think” By Richard A Posner, Chad Flanders

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This is a short review of How Judges Think by Richard Posner.

Judicial Supremacy, Judicial Activism: Cooper V. Aaron And Parents Involved, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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No abstract provided.

Detention And Interrogation In The Post-9/11 World, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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Our detention and interrogation policies in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have been a disaster. This paper, delivered as a Donahue Lecture at Suffolk University Law School in February 2008, explores the dimensions and source of that disaster. It first offers a clear and intelligible narrative of the construction and implementation of executive detention and interrogation policy and then analyzes the roles played by the different branches of government and the American people in order to understand how we have ended up in our current situation.

Judicial Activism And Its Critics, Kermit Roosevelt Iii, Richard Garnett

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No abstract provided.

Aspiration And Underenforcement, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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No abstract provided.

Results Of A Judicial Survey On The Maryland Department Of Juvenile Services, Gloria Danziger, Barbara A. Babb

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No abstract provided.

Constitutional Calcification: How The Law Becomes What The Court Does, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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No abstract provided.

Justice Harry Blackmun And The Phenomenon Of Judicial Preference Change, Theodore Ruger

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No abstract provided.

Justice Scalia's Constitution--And Ours, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

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No abstract provided.

Different Roads To The Rule Of Law: Their Importance For Law Reform In Taiwan, James Maxeiner

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Talk of law reform is in the air throughout East Asia. Whether in Beijing or Tokyo or here, law reform is spoken of in terms of strengthening the Rule of Law. But what is the Rule of Law? Different legal systems have different roads to reach the Rule of Law. These different roads are noticeable mainly in the different emphases different systems place on two critical elements in the realization of the Rule of Law State, namely rules and the machinery for implementing the rules, i.e., courts and administrative agencies. The Rule of Law makes demands on both the legal …

What Do We Mean By "Judicial Independence"?, Stephen B. Burbank

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In this article, the author argues that the concept of "judicial independence" has served more as an object of rhetoric than it has of sustained study. He views the scholarly literatures that treat it as ships passing in the night, each subject to weaknesses that reflect the needs and fashions of the discipline, but all tending to ignore courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Seeking both greater rigor and greater flexibility than one usually finds in public policy debates about, and in the legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence, the author attributes much of …

Assessing The New Judicial Minimalism, Christopher J. Peters

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In this article, which has been published in slightly revised form at 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1454 (2000), I critique some recently prominent arguments for "judicial minimalism" in constitutional decisionmaking. Current minimalist arguments, I contend, are primarily "policentric," that is, focused on the role the judiciary can play in bolstering the accountability and deliberativeness of the political branches. Drawing in part on a previous article, I offer an alternative approach to minimalism that is "juricentric" - focused on the inherent democratic legitimacy of the adjudicative process and the unique competence of that process to produce decisions about individual rights. I …

The Bitter With The Sweet: Tradition, History, And Limitations On Federal Judicial Power--A Case Study, Stephen B. Burbank

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No abstract provided.

The Architecture Of Judicial Independence, Stephen B. Burbank

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No abstract provided.

The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding The Possibilities Of Judicial Discourse, Robert Rubinson

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This Article draws upon the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin to critique judicial discourse as embodied in written opinions. Judicial opinions are typically monologues which reject exploration of complex issues of meaning in favor of simply justifying a result. Opinions should instead be part of a continuing dialogue whose hallmark is exploration, not simplification - what the Article characterizes as "polyphonic," Polyphonic opinions should embrace dialogue and complexity and recognize the validity of multiple perspectives. This goal can not simply be willed, however, because cognition by necessity simplifies. To meet this challenges, the Article concludes with recommendations for "judicial calisthenics," including …

The Myth Of The Impartial Judge, Jane C. Murphy

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No abstract provided.

Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty And Legal Theory, Stephen R. Perry

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No abstract provided.