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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Texans Shortlisted For The U.S. Supreme Court: Why Did Lightning Only Strike Once?, The Honorable John G. Browning
Texans Shortlisted For The U.S. Supreme Court: Why Did Lightning Only Strike Once?, The Honorable John G. Browning
St. Mary's Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Fmc Corp. V. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Seth T. Bonilla
Fmc Corp. V. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Seth T. Bonilla
Public Land & Resources Law Review
In 1998, FMC Corporation agreed to submit to the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ permitting processes, including the payment of fees, for clean-up work required as part of consent decree negotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency. Then, in 2002, FMC refused to pay the Tribes under a permitting agreement entered into by both parties, even though the company continued to store hazardous waste on land within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. FMC challenged the Tribes’ authority to enforce the $1.5 million permitting fees first in tribal court and later challenged the Tribes’ authority to exercise civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over …
Textualism For Realists, Ian Samuel
Textualism For Realists, Ian Samuel
Michigan Law Review
Review of Richard L. Hasen's The Justice of Contradictions: Antonin Scalia and the Politics of Disruption.
Why The Burger Court Mattered, David A. Strauss
Why The Burger Court Mattered, David A. Strauss
Michigan Law Review
A review of Michael J. Graetz and Linda Greenhouse, The Burger Court and the Rise of the Judicial Right.
Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule
Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule
Michigan Law Review
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …
Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich
Fun With Administrative Law: A Game For Lawyers And Judges, Adam Babich
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
The practice of law is not a game. Administrative law in particular can implicate important issues that impact people’s health, safety, and welfare and change business’ profitability or even viability. Nonetheless, it can seem like a game. This is because courts rarely explain administrative law rulings in terms of the public purposes and policies at issue in lawsuits. Instead, the courts’ administrative law opinions tend to turn on arcane interpretive doctrines with silly names, such as the “Chevron two-step” or “Chevron step zero.” To advance doctrinal arguments, advocates and courts engage in linguistic debates that resemble a smokescreen—tending to obscure …
Religion And First Amendment Prosecutions: An Analysis Of Justice Black's Constitutional Interpretation, Constance Mauney
Religion And First Amendment Prosecutions: An Analysis Of Justice Black's Constitutional Interpretation, Constance Mauney
Pepperdine Law Review
Justice Hugo L. Black served on the United States Supreme Court over a period of thirty-four years, encompassing Supreme Court terms from 1937 to 1971. During this period, the subject of the constitutional limitations of the freedom of religion was increasingly subjected to intense social pressures. Justice Black figured prominently in the development of constitutional law as the Supreme Court attempted to give meaning to the establishment and free exercise clause of the first amendment. He wrote the majority opinions which dealt with the establishment clause in the Everson, McCulloin, Engel and Torcaso cases. Yet, on later occasions, Justice Black …
Statutory Interpretation Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making , R. Randall Kelso
Statutory Interpretation Doctrine On The Modern Supreme Court And Four Doctrinal Approaches To Judicial Decision-Making , R. Randall Kelso
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Swing Votes On The Current Supreme Court: The Joint Opinion In Casey And Its Progeny, R. Randall Kelso, Charles D. Kelso
Swing Votes On The Current Supreme Court: The Joint Opinion In Casey And Its Progeny, R. Randall Kelso, Charles D. Kelso
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
A Plea For Help: Pleading Problems In Section 1983 Municipal Liability Claims, Evan S. Schwartz
A Plea For Help: Pleading Problems In Section 1983 Municipal Liability Claims, Evan S. Schwartz
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Arizona V. Youngblood: Does The Criminal Defendant Lose His Right To Due Process When The State Loses Exculpatory Evidence?, Willis C. Moore
Arizona V. Youngblood: Does The Criminal Defendant Lose His Right To Due Process When The State Loses Exculpatory Evidence?, Willis C. Moore
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson
The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson
Michigan Law Review
This analysis of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence avoids the pitfalls of previous theories. It does not see the Federalist political program as the source of Marshall's constitutional doctrines and thus does not need to explain how Marshall qualified his political principles or how he convinced non-Federalist judges to accept them. Instead, this essay argues that legal, not political, principles underlay Marshall's jurisprudence, but it attempts to understand those principles in a manner consistent with the unavoidable twentieth-century assumption that law is a body of flexible rules responsive to social reality rather than a series of immutable, unambiguous doctrines derived from a …