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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Stare Decisis In The Inferior Courts Of The United States, Joseph W. Mead
Stare Decisis In The Inferior Courts Of The United States, Joseph W. Mead
Nevada Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Hiding Behind The Cloak Of Invisibility: The Supreme Court And Per Curiam Opinions, Ira Robbins
Hiding Behind The Cloak Of Invisibility: The Supreme Court And Per Curiam Opinions, Ira Robbins
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
Per curiam--literally translated from Latin to "by the court"-is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "[a]n opinion handed down by an appellate court without identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion." Accordingly the author of a per curiam opinion is meant to be institutional rather than individual, attributable to the court as an entity rather than to a single judge The United States Supreme Court issues a significant number of per curiam dispositions each Term. In the first six years of Chief Justice John Roberts’ tenure, almost nine percent of the Court full opinions were per curiams. The prevalence …
Hiding Behind The Cloak Of Invisibility: The Supreme Court And Per Curiam Opinions, Ira P. Robbins
Hiding Behind The Cloak Of Invisibility: The Supreme Court And Per Curiam Opinions, Ira P. Robbins
Ira P. Robbins
First Options Of Chicago, Inc. V. Kaplan And The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle , Adrianna Dulic
First Options Of Chicago, Inc. V. Kaplan And The Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle , Adrianna Dulic
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court in First Options of Chicago, Incorporated v. Kaplan considered whether arbitral tribunals or courts should have the primary power to decide if parties agreed to arbitrate the merits of the dispute and whether the court of appeals should accept the district court's findings of fact and law or apply a de novo standard of review. The Court unanimously held that, unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, in such a case, …
University Of Baltimore Symposium Report: Debut Of “The Matthew Fogg Symposia On The Vitality Of Stare Decisis In America”, Zena D. Crenshaw-Logal
University Of Baltimore Symposium Report: Debut Of “The Matthew Fogg Symposia On The Vitality Of Stare Decisis In America”, Zena D. Crenshaw-Logal
Zena Denise Crenshaw-Logal
On the first of each two day symposium of the Fogg symposia, lawyers representing NGOs in the civil rights, judicial reform, and whistleblower advocacy fields are to share relevant work of featured legal scholars in lay terms; relate the underlying principles to real life cases; and propose appropriate reform efforts. Four (4) of the scholars spend the next day relating their featured articles to views on the vitality of stare decisis. Specifically, the combined panels of public interest attorneys and law professors consider whether compliance with the doctrine is reasonably assured in America given the: 1. considerable discretion vested in …
Professionalism And Advocacy At Trial – Real Jurors Speak In Detail About The Performance Of Their Advocates, Mitchell J. Frank, Osvaldo F. Morera
Professionalism And Advocacy At Trial – Real Jurors Speak In Detail About The Performance Of Their Advocates, Mitchell J. Frank, Osvaldo F. Morera
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Persistence Of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives On Skepticism, Jessie Allen
The Persistence Of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine Thrives On Skepticism, Jessie Allen
Articles
This Article starts with a puzzle: Why is the doctrinal approach to “proximate cause” so resilient despite longstanding criticism? Proximate cause is a particularly extreme example of doctrine that limps along despite near universal consensus that it cannot actually determine legal outcomes. Why doesn’t that widely recognized indeterminacy disable proximate cause as a decision-making device? To address this puzzle, I pick up a cue from the legal realists, a group of skeptical lawyers, law professors, and judges, who, in the 1920s and 1930s, compared legal doctrine to ritual magic. I take that comparison seriously, perhaps more seriously, and definitely in …