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Articles 1 - 14 of 14

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker Jan 2017

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference—the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they did not. Among …


Chevron's Interstitial Steps, Cary Coglianese Jan 2017

Chevron's Interstitial Steps, Cary Coglianese

All Faculty Scholarship

The Chevron doctrine’s apparent simplicity has long captivated judges, lawyers, and scholars. According to the standard formulation, Chevron involves just two straightforward steps: (1) Is a statute clear? (2) If not, is the agency’s interpretation of the statute reasonable? Despite the influence of this two-step framework, Chevron has come under fire in recent years. Some critics bemoan what they perceive as the Supreme Court’s incoherent application of the Chevron framework over time. Others argue that Chevron’s second step, which calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility. …


Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule Jun 2016

Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …


A Look Back: Developing Indiana Law; Post-Bench Reflections Of An Indiana Supreme Court Justice; Selected Developments In Indiana Administrative Law (1989-2012), Frank Sullivan Jr. Nov 2015

A Look Back: Developing Indiana Law; Post-Bench Reflections Of An Indiana Supreme Court Justice; Selected Developments In Indiana Administrative Law (1989-2012), Frank Sullivan Jr.

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.


The Clarity Of Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir: Mission (Mostly) Accomplished, Ryan D. Robb Oct 2015

The Clarity Of Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir: Mission (Mostly) Accomplished, Ryan D. Robb

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This project develops an interpretive account of the single reasonableness standard as it has evolved in the Canadian Supreme Court case law since its introduction in New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir. My analyses show, contrary to the bulk of the academic commentary, that reasonableness is a clear and coherent standard of review. Specifically I show that in the eyes of the Court, interference owing to unreasonableness is required only when decisions are not justified in the context of the legal framework. Unjustified decisions demand interference because they are arbitrary in the sense that the powers of the …


Constituencies And Contemporaneousness In Reason-Giving: Thoughts And Direction After T-Mobile, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2014

Constituencies And Contemporaneousness In Reason-Giving: Thoughts And Direction After T-Mobile, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

This Article presents a framework for reason giving requirements in administrative law that includes a demand on agencies that reasons be produced contemporaneously with agency decisions where multiple constituencies (including regulated entities) and not just the courts (and judiciary review) are served and respected as consumers of the reasons. The Article postulates that the January 2015 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell may prove to be groundbreaking and stir this framework to the forefront of administrative law decisionmaking. There are some fundamental yet very understated lessons in the T-Mobile …


The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley Mar 2014

The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …


Fernandez-Vargas V. Gonzales: An Examination Of Retroactivity And The Effect Of The Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigrant Responsibility Act, Brooke Hardin Apr 2013

Fernandez-Vargas V. Gonzales: An Examination Of Retroactivity And The Effect Of The Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigrant Responsibility Act, Brooke Hardin

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.


The Supreme Court's Take On Immigration In Nken V. Holder: Reaffirming A Traditional Standard That Affords Courts More Time And Flexibility To Decide Immigration Appeals Before Deporting Aliens, Elizaveta Kabanova Mar 2013

The Supreme Court's Take On Immigration In Nken V. Holder: Reaffirming A Traditional Standard That Affords Courts More Time And Flexibility To Decide Immigration Appeals Before Deporting Aliens, Elizaveta Kabanova

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.


Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack Dec 2012

Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack

Michigan Law Review

The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law, courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation. The neglect of regulatory interpretation is not only a shortcoming in interpretive theory but also a practical problem for administrative law. Canonical doctrines of administrative law - Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi - involve interpreting regulations, and yet courts lack a consistent approach. This Article develops a method for interpreting regulations and, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal interpretation. It argues that a purposive …


“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen Jan 2010

“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is a foundational principle of administrative law that a reviewing court should not dispose of a petition for review or appeal on grounds not relied upon by the agency, and should not reach issues in the first instance not addressed administratively. In such circumstances, there is a strong presumption that the reviewing court should remand the case to the agency for further proceedings rather than reach out to decide the disputed issues. The United States Supreme Court explicitly extended operation of the “ordinary remand rule” to the immigration context in its 2002 decision in INS v. Ventura. Notwithstanding subsequent …


Administrative Law - Judicial Control - Appellate Review Of Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, David A. Nelson S. Ed. Jun 1959

Administrative Law - Judicial Control - Appellate Review Of Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, David A. Nelson S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

During its forty-five year life the Federal Trade Commission has gone through some difficult periods to emerge today as one of the fundamental instrumentalities of government in the regulation of business. Its vast powers and influence, well known to lawyers, will not be explored here. Rather, the purpose of this comment is to appraise the extent of control which the judiciary now exercises over the commission in its adjudicative functions, so as to offer some indication to the practitioner of the probabilities regarding the outcome of judicial review on an appeal beyond the full commission. The approach to be used …


Judicial Review In Europe, Gottfried Dietze Feb 1957

Judicial Review In Europe, Gottfried Dietze

Michigan Law Review

The years following the Second World War witnessed a wave of constitution making in Europe. In East and West alike, popular government was instituted through new basic laws. But whereas the constitutions of Eastern Europe established a Rousseauistic form. of democracy through the creation of an omnipotent legislature, those of the West, while reflecting a belief in parliamentary government, to a larger or smaller degree limited the power of the legislature through the introduction of judicial review. This acceptance of judicial review can be attributed mainly to two factors. It sprung from a distrust of a parliamentarism under which, during …


Gray Vs. Powell And The Scope Of Review, Bernard Schwartz Nov 1955

Gray Vs. Powell And The Scope Of Review, Bernard Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

In dissenting from the decision of the Supreme Court in a celebrated administrative-law case, Justice Jackson once declared: "I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it.' " It cannot be denied that the learned justice's reaction is one which is often felt by students of Supreme Court jurisprudence. This has been particularly true of the field involved in the case which called forth Justice Jackson's plaint--i.e., that of administrative law. American administrative lawyers have not infrequently had this same response to decisions of …