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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Jurisdiction
Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder
Health Choice Or Health Coercion? The Osha Emergency Temporary Standard Covid-19 Vaccination Mandates: Ax Or Vax, Savannah Snyder
Helm's School of Government Conference - American Revival: Citizenship & Virtue
No abstract provided.
“Drive-By” Jurisdiction: Congressional Oversight In Court, Daniel Epstein
“Drive-By” Jurisdiction: Congressional Oversight In Court, Daniel Epstein
Pepperdine Law Review
On July 9, 2020, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP and Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, the Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not adequately consider the separation of powers concerns attendant to congressional subpoenas for presidential information. Given that the question presented in Mazars concerned whether Congress had a legitimate legislative purpose in subpoenaing the President’s personal records, the Supreme Court’s decision is anything but a model of clarity. The Court simultaneously opined that disputes “involving nonprivileged, private information” “do[ ] not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations” while claiming “congressional subpoenas for the President’s information unavoidably pit …
The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum
The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.
This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …
Introduction To Constraining The Executive, Tom Campbell
Introduction To Constraining The Executive, Tom Campbell
Tom Campbell
War By Legislation: The Constitutionality Of Congressional Regulation Of Detentions In Armed Conflicts, Christopher M. Ford
War By Legislation: The Constitutionality Of Congressional Regulation Of Detentions In Armed Conflicts, Christopher M. Ford
Northwestern University Law Review
In this essay, Ford considers provisions of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which place restrictions on the disposition of detainees held in Guantánamo Bay. These provisions raise substantial separation of powers issues regarding the ability of Congress to restrict detention operations of the Executive. These restrictions, and similar restrictions found in earlier NDAAs, specifically implicate the Executive's powers in foreign affairs and as Commander in Chief. Ford concludes that, with the exception of a similar provision found in the 2013 NDAA, the restrictions are constitutional.
How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton
Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton
Sarah L Brinton
The Supreme Court has erred on sovereign immunity. The current federal immunity doctrine wrongly gives Congress the exclusive authority to waive immunity (“exclusive congressional waiver”), but the Constitution mandates that Congress share the waiver power with the Court. This Article develops the doctrine of a two-way shared waiver and then explores a third possibility: the sharing of the immunity waiver power among all three branches of government.
The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun
The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun
Publications
The judiciary should impose a heavy burden of justification on the executive when a habeas petitioner challenges the accuracy of facts on which an enemy combatant designation rests. A heavy burden of justification will ensure that the essential institutional purposes of the writ--and legitimate, separated-powers government--are preserved, even during times of national exigency. The institutional purposes of the writ argue for robust judicial review rather than deference to the executive. Moreover, the procedural flexibility traditionally associated with the writ gives the judiciary the tools to ensure that a heavy burden of justification can be imposed.
Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig
Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig
The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)
6 pages.
"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda
The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct An Orrery, Harold H. Bruff
The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct An Orrery, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Can Buckley Clear Customs?, Harold H. Bruff
A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel
A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel
The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel
Publications
No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers And The Scope Of Federal Equitable Remedies, Robert F. Nagel
Separation Of Powers And The Scope Of Federal Equitable Remedies, Robert F. Nagel
Publications
No abstract provided.
Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn
Publications
Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships between the branches of government. Extrapolating from this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process, may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on …
Presidential Exemption From Mandatory Retirement Of Members Of The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Harold H. Bruff
Presidential Exemption From Mandatory Retirement Of Members Of The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.