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Constitutional law

Selected Works

Articles 1 - 12 of 12

Full-Text Articles in Judges

Collaborative Divorce: What Louis Brandeis Might Say About The Promise And Problems?, Susan Saab Fortney Sep 2019

Collaborative Divorce: What Louis Brandeis Might Say About The Promise And Problems?, Susan Saab Fortney

Susan S. Fortney

No abstract provided.

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Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle And The Moral Life Of Judges, Barry Sullivan Jun 2019

Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle And The Moral Life Of Judges, Barry Sullivan

Barry Sullivan

No abstract provided.

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Procedural Due Process Claims, Erwin Chemerinsky Jun 2017

Procedural Due Process Claims, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

No abstract provided.

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Justice Lewis F. Powell's Baffling Vote In Roe V. Wade, Samuel W. Calhoun May 2014

Justice Lewis F. Powell's Baffling Vote In Roe V. Wade, Samuel W. Calhoun

Samuel W. Calhoun

No abstract provided.

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Sovereignty And The American Courts At The Cocktail Party Of International Law: The Dangers Of Domestic Invocations Of Foreign And International Law, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2005

Sovereignty And The American Courts At The Cocktail Party Of International Law: The Dangers Of Domestic Invocations Of Foreign And International Law, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

With increasing frequency and heightened debate, United States courts have been citing foreign and “international” law as authority for domestic decisions. This trend is inappropriate, undemocratic, and dangerous. The trend touches on fundamental concepts of sovereignty, democracy, the judicial role, and overall issues of effective governance. There are multiple problems with the judiciary’s reliance on extraterritorial and extra-constitutional foreign or international sources to guide their decisions. Perhaps the most fundamental flaw is its interference with rule of law values. To borrow from Judge Harold Levanthal, the use of international sources in judicial decision-making might be described as “the equivalent of …

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The Worst Way Of Selecting Judges—Except All The Others That Have Been Tried, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2004

The Worst Way Of Selecting Judges—Except All The Others That Have Been Tried, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

This Essay critiques the arguments leveled at judicial elections. For each criticism--which I have discovered through a reasonably thorough review of cases and law review commentary--I assess the degree to which the criticism is valid, and also the degree to which other judicial-selection methods fall prey to the same criticism. I argue that the flaws of judicial elections, though often considerable, are shared in large part by alternative selection systems. Beyond, however, being simply equivalent in malignity to other selection methods, elections have--or, rather, may have, depending on the content of judicial election campaigns--one advantage over other systems that instigated …

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The Non-Political Branch (Reviewing Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice And Consent: The Politics Of Judicial Appointments (2005)), Michael R. Dimino Dec 2004

The Non-Political Branch (Reviewing Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Advice And Consent: The Politics Of Judicial Appointments (2005)), Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

The realization that judicial ideology matters to case outcomes may have driven the judicial selection process to become increasingly ideological and partisan, but to some degree it has brought ideology and partisanship to bear on the selection process from the time of the Founding. As the authors note, “Presidents, senators, and
interest groups alike realize that the judges themselves are political.” Judging may in some ways be different from politics, but politicians’ judgments about judging most certainly are not.

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The Unconstitutionality Of Class-Based Statutory Limitations On Presidential Nominations: Can A Man Head The Women's Bureau At The Department Of Labor?, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2004

The Unconstitutionality Of Class-Based Statutory Limitations On Presidential Nominations: Can A Man Head The Women's Bureau At The Department Of Labor?, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Can a man be the Director of the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor? According to Congress, the answer is no. Congress has stated by statute that a woman must be the nominee to head the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor. The key questions are: (1) even if it makes sense on policy grounds, is it constitutional? and (2) if we accept such a statutory limitation power what are the potential precedential consequences for other appointment matters? This Article’s case study is particularly relevant today, examining just how far Congress can go to limit the discretion of …

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The Futile Quest For A System Of Judicial “Merit” Selection, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2003

The Futile Quest For A System Of Judicial “Merit” Selection, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

Others have discussed exhaustively the merits and demerits of merit selection, and I do not intend in this essay to debate the“ success” or “failure,” per se, of merit selection since its introduction in Missouri in 1940. Instead, I wish to discuss the effect merit selection has on squelching public debate about the judiciary. Once that effect is demonstrated, I then wish to assess this antidemocratic tendency against the purported goal of merit selection: maintaining some measure of accountability in a selection system nonetheless designed to make judges confident enough in their independence to render decisions according to the law …

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Pay No Attention To That Man Behind The Robe: Judicial Elections, The First Amendment, And Judges As Politicians, Michael R. Dimino Dec 2002

Pay No Attention To That Man Behind The Robe: Judicial Elections, The First Amendment, And Judges As Politicians, Michael R. Dimino

Michael R Dimino

The question this Article seeks to answer is whether the First Amendment can maintain a distinction between the two types of races. Specifically, I discuss whether the governmental interests in maintaining an independent,
impartial judiciary and in protecting the appearance of the judiciary as independent and impartial can provide justification for the suppression of speech, where such suppression would be held impermissible in elections for
other offices. I conclude that it cannot. My recommendation, therefore, is to subject restrictions on legislative, executive, and judicial campaign speech to the same exacting scrutiny.

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State Laws And The Independent Judiciary: An Analysis Of The Effects Of The Seventeenth Amendment On The Number Of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws Unconstitutional, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2002

State Laws And The Independent Judiciary: An Analysis Of The Effects Of The Seventeenth Amendment On The Number Of Supreme Court Cases Holding State Laws Unconstitutional, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

In recent years, the Seventeenth Amendment has been the subject of legal scholarship, congressional hearings and debate, Supreme Court opinions, popular press articles and commentary, state legislative efforts aimed at repeal, and activist repeal movements. To date, the literature on the effects of the Seventeenth Amendment has focused almost exclusively on the effects on the political production of legislation and competition between legislative bodies. Very little attention has been given to the potential adverse effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the relationship between state legislatures and the federal courts. This Article seeks to fill part of that literature gap, applying …

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"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan Dec 1997

"Public Use" And The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation In An Interest-Group Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

This Article reexamines the doctrine of public use under the Takings Clause and its ability to impede takings for private use through an application of public choice theory. It argues that the judicial validation of interest-group capture of the condemnation power through a relaxed public use standard in Takings Clause review can be explained by interest group politics and public choice theory and by institutional tendencies inherent in the independent judiciary. Legislators can sell the eminent domain power to special interests for almost any use, promising durability in the deal given the low probability that the judiciary will invalidate it …

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