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Evaluating Legislative Justice Sector Reforms: Creating An Environment For Survival, Lauren A. Shumate Dec 2016

Evaluating Legislative Justice Sector Reforms: Creating An Environment For Survival, Lauren A. Shumate

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.


On The Place Of Judge-Made Law In A Government Of Laws, Matthew J. Steilen Nov 2016

On The Place Of Judge-Made Law In A Government Of Laws, Matthew J. Steilen

Journal Articles

This essay explores a constitutional account of the elevation of the judiciary in American states following the Revolution. The core of the account is a connection between two fundamental concepts in Anglo-American constitutional thinking, discretion and a government of laws. In the periods examined here, arbitrary discretion tended to be associated with alien power and heteronomy, while bounded discretion was associated with self-rule. The formal, solemn, forensic, and public character of proceedings in courts of law suggested to some that judge-made law (a product of judicial discretion under these proceedings) did not express simply the will of the judge or …


Justice Scalia’S Originalism And Formalism: The Rule Of Criminal Law As A Law Of Rules, Stephanos Bibas Aug 2016

Justice Scalia’S Originalism And Formalism: The Rule Of Criminal Law As A Law Of Rules, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

Far too many reporters and pundits collapse law into politics, assuming that the left–right divide between Democratic and Republican appointees neatly explains politically liberal versus politically conservative outcomes at the Supreme Court. The late Justice Antonin Scalia defied such caricatures. His consistent judicial philosophy made him the leading exponent of originalism, textualism, and formalism in American law, and over the course of his three decades on the Court, he changed the terms of judicial debate. Now, as a result, supporters and critics alike start with the plain meaning of the statutory or constitutional text rather than loose appeals to legislative …


How Being Right Can Risk Wrongs, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson Aug 2016

How Being Right Can Risk Wrongs, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson

All Faculty Scholarship

This is a chapter from the new book The Vigilante Echo. Previous chapters have made clear that some vigilantism can be morally justified where the government has failed in its promise under the social contract to protect and to do justice. But this chapter explains how even moral vigilante action can be problematic for the larger society. Vigilantes may try to do the right thing but are likely to lack the training and professional neutrality of police. They may be successful, but only on pushing the crime problem to an adjacent neighborhood. Because their open lawbreaking may seem admirable …


Shadow Vigilante Officials Manipulate And Distort To Force Justice From An Apparently Reluctant System, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson Aug 2016

Shadow Vigilante Officials Manipulate And Distort To Force Justice From An Apparently Reluctant System, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson

All Faculty Scholarship

The real danger of the vigilante impulse is not of hordes of citizens, frustrated by the system’s doctrines of disillusionment, rising up to take the law into their own hands. Frustration can spark a vigilante impulse but such classic aggressive vigilantism is not the typical response. More common is the expression of disillusionment in less brazen ways, by a more surreptitious undermining and distortion of the operation of the criminal justice system.

Shadow vigilantes, as they might be called, can affect the operation of the system in a host of important ways. For example, when people act as classic vigilantes …


If It (Ain’T) Broke, Don’T Fix It: Twombly, Iqbal, Rule 84, And The Forms, Justin Olson Jul 2016

If It (Ain’T) Broke, Don’T Fix It: Twombly, Iqbal, Rule 84, And The Forms, Justin Olson

Seattle University Law Review

The past decade has not been kind to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules). From the growth of summary judgment as a mechanism to let judges instead of juries determine facts, to the love–hate relationship with class actions, judicial interpretations of the Rules have revealed a trend toward complicating the ability of plaintiffs to find redress for their claims. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the shifting standards of pleading requirements under Rule 8. Much has been written by academics and practitioners alike regarding the ripples caused by Twombly and Iqbal. Although the Court would like to …


“Please Stop Telling Her To Leave.” Where Is The Money: Reclaiming Economic Power To Address Domestic Violence, Margo Lindauer Jul 2016

“Please Stop Telling Her To Leave.” Where Is The Money: Reclaiming Economic Power To Address Domestic Violence, Margo Lindauer

Seattle University Law Review

In this Article, I argue that economic dependence is a critical factor in violence prevention. For many victims of domestic violence, the economic entanglement with an abusive partner is too strong to sever contact without another source of economic support. This Article is a thought experiment in economic justice; it asks the question: is there a way to provide outside economic support for a victim of violence fleeing a battering partner? In this Article, I examine existing systems such as Social Security, unemployment assistance, work-readiness programs, crowd sourcing, and others to evaluate how these sources could provide emergency economic support …


The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler Jun 2016

The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler

Northwestern University Law Review

It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.

This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …


The Place Of Policy In International Law, Oscar Schachter Apr 2016

The Place Of Policy In International Law, Oscar Schachter

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.


The Voting Rights Act And The "New And Improved" Intent Test: Old Wine In New Bottles, Randolph M. Scott-Mclaughlin Apr 2016

The Voting Rights Act And The "New And Improved" Intent Test: Old Wine In New Bottles, Randolph M. Scott-Mclaughlin

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Police Misconduct - A Plaintiff's Point Of View, Part Ii, John Williams Apr 2016

Police Misconduct - A Plaintiff's Point Of View, Part Ii, John Williams

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Criminal Prosecution And Section 1983, Barry C. Scheck Apr 2016

Criminal Prosecution And Section 1983, Barry C. Scheck

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Procedural Due Process Claims, Erwin Chemerinsky Apr 2016

Procedural Due Process Claims, Erwin Chemerinsky

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Deeds And The Determinacy Norm: Insights From Brandt And Other Cases On An Undesignated, Yet Ever-Present, Interpretive Method, Donald J. Kochan Dec 2015

Deeds And The Determinacy Norm: Insights From Brandt And Other Cases On An Undesignated, Yet Ever-Present, Interpretive Method, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

The land one holds is generally only as good as the property rights contained in the deed.
The rights contained in the deed are only as good as the ability to get those rights enforced.
And, the enforcement is only valuable if it recognizes a determinate meaning in the deeds from
the point of conveyance. This Article pens the term “determinacy norm” to explain a collection
of rules for the interpretation of deed terms that aim to make the meaning of deed terms determinate.
I contend that, in order to satisfy the determinacy norm for deed interpretation,
courts must (and …