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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Judges
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión de Derechos en el Código Civil Peruano
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
No abstract provided.
Efforts To Improve The Illinois Capital Punishment System: Worth The Cost?, Thomas P. Sullivan
Efforts To Improve The Illinois Capital Punishment System: Worth The Cost?, Thomas P. Sullivan
University of Richmond Law Review
No abstract provided.
Annual Analysis Report Of Supreme People’S Court (2006)【最高人民法院年度分析报告（2006）】, Meng Hou
Annual Analysis Report Of Supreme People’S Court (2006)【最高人民法院年度分析报告（2006）】, Meng Hou
Hou Meng
No abstract provided.
El Futuro Del Enjuiciamiento Penal Argentino, Horacio M. Lynch
El Futuro Del Enjuiciamiento Penal Argentino, Horacio M. Lynch
Horacio M. LYNCH
Advierte las consecuencias negativas del fallo Casal de la Corte Suprema sobre el sistema penal argentino y formula propuestas.
Política Criminal Y Juicio Penal, Horacio M. Lynch
Política Criminal Y Juicio Penal, Horacio M. Lynch
Horacio M. LYNCH
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.