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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Judges
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión De Derechos En El Código Civil Peruano, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
La Cesión de Derechos en el Código Civil Peruano
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Algunos Apuntes En Torno A La Prescripción Extintiva Y La Caducidad, Edward Ivan Cueva
Edward Ivan Cueva
No abstract provided.
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John M. Lande
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John M. Lande
Faculty Publications
This article critiques Professor Chris Guthrie's lead symposium article entitled, "Misjudging." Guthrie's article makes two major arguments. The first is a descriptive, empirical argument that judges are prone to error because of three types of "blinders" and that people underestimate the amount of such judicial error. The second argument is prescriptive, recommending that, because of these judicial blinders, disputants should consider using non-judicial dispute resolution processes generally, and particularly facilitative mediation and arbitration.This article critiques both arguments. It notes that, although Guthrie presents evidence that judges do make the kinds of errors that he describes, his article does not address …
Mis(Understanding)Judging, Philip M. Pro
Evidentiary Wisdom And Blinders In Perspective: Thoughts On Misjudging, Elaine W. Shoben
Evidentiary Wisdom And Blinders In Perspective: Thoughts On Misjudging, Elaine W. Shoben
Nevada Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Misjudging: Implications For Dispute Resolution, Donna Shestowsky
Misjudging: Implications For Dispute Resolution, Donna Shestowsky
Nevada Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John Lande
Judging Judges And Dispute Resolution Processes, John Lande
Nevada Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Nobody's Perfect, Stephan Landsman
El Futuro Del Enjuiciamiento Penal Argentino, Horacio M. Lynch
El Futuro Del Enjuiciamiento Penal Argentino, Horacio M. Lynch
Horacio M. LYNCH
Advierte las consecuencias negativas del fallo Casal de la Corte Suprema sobre el sistema penal argentino y formula propuestas.
Política Criminal Y Juicio Penal, Horacio M. Lynch
Política Criminal Y Juicio Penal, Horacio M. Lynch
Horacio M. LYNCH
Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich
Blinking On The Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
How do judges judge? Do they apply law to facts in a mechanical and deliberative way, as the formalists suggest they do, or do they rely on hunches and gut feelings, as the realists maintain? Debate has raged for decades, but researchers have offered little hard evidence in support of either model. Relying on empirical studies of judicial reasoning and decision making, we propose an entirely new model of judging that provides a more accurate explanation of judicial behavior. Our model accounts for the tendency of the human brain to make automatic, snap judgments, which are surprisingly accurate, but which …
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.