Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Judges
Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory Of Judging, Lawrence B. Solum
Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory Of Judging, Lawrence B. Solum
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
"Virtue jurisprudence" is a normative and explanatory theory of law that utilizes the resources of virtue ethics to answer the central questions of legal theory. The main focus of the essay is the development of a virtue-centered theory of judging. The exposition of the theory begins with exploration of defects in judicial character such as corruption and incompetence. Next, an account of judicial virtue is introduced. This includes judicial wisdom, a form of phronesis, or sound practical judgment. A virtue-centered account of justice is defended against the argument that theories of fairness are prior to theories of justice. The …
What Do We Mean By "Judicial Independence"?, Stephen B. Burbank
What Do We Mean By "Judicial Independence"?, Stephen B. Burbank
All Faculty Scholarship
In this article, the author argues that the concept of "judicial independence" has served more as an object of rhetoric than it has of sustained study. He views the scholarly literatures that treat it as ships passing in the night, each subject to weaknesses that reflect the needs and fashions of the discipline, but all tending to ignore courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Seeking both greater rigor and greater flexibility than one usually finds in public policy debates about, and in the legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence, the author attributes much of …
Why Theories Of Law Have Little Or Nothing To Do With Judicial Restraint, Philip E. Soper
Why Theories Of Law Have Little Or Nothing To Do With Judicial Restraint, Philip E. Soper
Articles
The question I explore here, stated in its broadest form, is this: What is the connection between theory and practice between academic claims about how judges should decide cases and the actual behavior of judges as revealed in the opinions they write? More particularly, do theories about the nature of law have any implications for the question whether a judge should adopt an "activist" or a "restrained" approach to deciding cases? As you might infer from my title, I defend here what I call "the skeptical thesis" in answer to both the general and particular questions. Judges pay little or …