Judges Commons^™

Bottom-Up Federal Sentencing Reform, Andrew W. Grindrod

William & Mary Law Review

Today, about 160,000 people live behind the bars of a federal prison. That is roughly the population of Alexandria, Virginia. Starting from the premise that the federal system’s contribution to mass incarceration should be curbed and recognizing that broad legislative reform seems unlikely, this Article considers the federal judiciary’s potential role in sentencing reform.

Bottom-up sentencing reform consists of federal trial judges exercising their decisional authority in individual cases to engage with the fundamental premises and assumptions that underlie traditional sentencing decisions, categorically rejecting them when appropriate. This approach to reform is available under current law. In fact, a few …

Unclear Guidelines From The Sentencing Commission And A Prejudiced Warden Result In (Un)Compassionate Release, Mary Trotter

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

Congress first developed compassionate release in 1984, granting federal courts the authority to reduce sentences for “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. Compassionate release allows the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and inmates to apply for immediate early release on grounds of “particularly extraordinary or compelling circumstances which could not reasonably have been foreseen by the court at the time of sentencing.” Questions remain about how the BOP and the courts grant compassionate release and whether the courts apply the compassionate release guidelines consistently. The uncertainty is due to the lack of clarity from the USSC to define “extraordinary or compelling circumstances,” …

Core And Periphery In Constitutional Law, R. George Wright

William & Mary Law Review Online

This paper embarks on an excursion through a number of the most vital constitutional rights cases, and other contexts as well, and seeks to show that the recurring judicial attempts to distinguish between core and peripheral areas within any given broad constitutional right are unnecessary and distracting. Intriguingly, the case for this conclusion varies significantly depending upon the nature of the general constitutional right in question. But the overall lesson is that courts should abandon their attempts to distinguish between core and peripheral areas of any given broad constitutional right. Courts should instead focus—directly or indirectly—on their best assessment of …

Beyond “Children Are Different”: The Revolution In Juvenile Intake And Sentencing, Josh Gupta-Kagan

Washington Law Review

For more than 120 years, juvenile justice law has not substantively defined the core questions in most delinquency cases—when should the state prosecute children rather than divert them from the court system (the intake decision), and what should the state do with children once they are convicted (the sentencing decision)? Instead, the law has granted certain legal actors wide discretion over these decisions, namely prosecutors at intake and judges at sentencing. This Article identifies and analyzes an essential reform trend changing that reality: legislation, enacted in at least eight states in the 2010s, to limit when children can be prosecuted …

Judicial Discretion Is Advised: The Lack Of Discretionary Appointments Of Counsel For Children In Washington State Dependency Proceedings, Marisa Forthun

Washington Law Review Online

State agencies initiate dependency proceedings when a child is alleged, often due to parental neglect or abuse, to be a dependent of the state. The state must intervene “[w]hen parents do not comply with [Child Protective Services] requirements, or when the state believes the child is at too great a risk to remain at home even if parents were to comply with services.” Dependency proceedings usually take place in juvenile courts and involve the local state agency, the parents, and the child. After the government files a petition alleging circumstances of neglect or abuse, “[t]he court issues temporary orders regarding …

Rethinking Appeals, Uri Weiss

Touro Law Review

This paper makes the point that a court decision that is open to an appeal is akin to a take-it-or-leave-it settlement proposal for both parties. For the case to not be appealed, both parties need to “take,” i.e., accept, this proposal. Thus, on one hand, if both parties cannot achieve a settlement by themselves, they usually benefit from the right to appeal. On the other hand, a right to appeal activates the regressive effects that characterize settlements, which also applies to lower-court decisions. For example, legal uncertainty has a regressive effect on lower-court decisions: if the judge wishes to block …

Distinguishing Starfish From Cobras: The Importance Of Discretion For The Juvenile Judge In Fitness Hearings, Socrates Peter Manoukian

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Have We Come Full Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion Revived In Booker And Fanfan, Sandra D. Jordan

Pepperdine Law Review

The much anticipated Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker and Fanfan has both invalidated the mandatory nature of the federal Sentencing Guidelines as well as restored judicial discretion for federal judges. With the Booker decision there is a renewed opportunity to correct some of the imbalance that came about as a result of the mandatory guidelines and the sentencing policies of the past twenty years. Booker has implications for all future sentencing as the power between the judiciary and the jury has been realigned and the power of the government has been reduced. Sentencing cannot accomplish legitimate goals …

Kimbrough And Gall: Taking Another "Crack" At Expanding Judicial Discretion Under The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Chris Gaspard

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Judicial Philosophy: People-Oriented Justice, Larry V. Starcher

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Realism Of Judges Past And Present, Brian Z. Tamanaha

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article has a single objective: to dispel the notion that judges are deceptive or deluded about judging. These unwarranted assumptions about judges distort theoretical and empirical debates about judging. Ordinarily the participants in any activity are presumed to possess valuable insights about the nature of that activity. Owing to the assumption that judges are deluded or dishonest, what they say on the subject of judging is often regarded with skepticism, discounted at the outset.

United States V. Leveto, Jennifer Steward

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Judicial Discretion And Statutory Interpretation, Steven J. Cleveland

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reply To Judge Easterbrook: Regarding History As A Judicial Duty, Harry F. Tepker

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Second Annual Henry Lecture: Judicial Discretion In Statutory Interpretation, Frank H. Easterbrook

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reply To Judge Easterbrook: The Unsupported Delegation Of Conflict Adjudication In Erisa Benefit Claims Under The Guise Of Judicial Deference, Donald T. Bogan

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Civil Disobedience And The Law: The Role Of Legal Professionals, James Macpherson

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Discusses the role of judges when cases of civil disobedience are brought before the court.

Taking Its Toll: Partisan Judging And Judicial Review, Jeff Broadwater

The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process

No abstract provided.

Coercion, Pop-Psychology, And Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals For Curbing Judicial Abuse Of Probation Conditions, Andrew Horwitz

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dworkin And The Doctrine Of Judicial Discretion, David Jennex

Dalhousie Law Journal

In a series of books and articles published over the last thirty years, Ronald Dworkin has relentlessly attacked the positivist view according to which law is a species of empirically verifiable fact. A position closely associated with this view, and with which Dworkin also takes issue, is the doctrine of judicial discretion. This doctrine asserts that in hard cases - cases in which it is unclear what the law requires - there is no legally required dispensation, so that judges are entitled to use discretion in making their decision. Dworkin disagrees, maintaining that in many such cases a thorough investigation …

Judicial Discretion: Is One More Of A Good Thing Too Much?, David B. Sentelle

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Judicial Discretion by Aharon Barak

Retrospective Justification, Jeffrey Malkan

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Where To Draw The Guideline: Factoring The Fruits Of Illegal Searches Into Sentencing Guidelines Calculations, Cheryl G. Bader, David S. Douglas

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judge Learned Hand And The Limits Of Judicial Discretion, Robert S. Lancaster

Vanderbilt Law Review

Learned Hand stands among the great judges of the Anglo-American legal tradition. He is preeminently the judge's judge. His long judicial career, spanning one of the crucial periods in the development of American law, and his long service on the bench in a circuit where crucial legal issues come into final focus and where a major part of the commercial law of the nation is first enunciated and explained, peculiarly fit him for the task of explaining the judge's function in the American system of law and the court's role in our jural order. His own legal experience, his non-official …