Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Judges Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 12 of 12

Full-Text Articles in Judges

Four Futures Of Chevron Deference, Daniel E. Walters Mar 2024

Four Futures Of Chevron Deference, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

In two upcoming cases, the Supreme Court will consider whether to overturn the Chevron doctrine, which, since 1984, has required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of otherwise ambiguous statutes. In this short essay, I defend the proposition that, even on death’s door, Chevron deference is likely to be resurrected, and I offer a simple positive political theory model that helps explain why. The core insight of this model is that the prevailing approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law is politically contingent—that is, it is likely to represent an equilibrium that efficiently maximizes the Supreme Court’s …


Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 2020

Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation. The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpretation provide much account of actual practice. This Article argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the social practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy that produces a much better fit between theory and practice. …


Judges And Judgment: In Praise Of Instigators, Kathryn Judge Jan 2019

Judges And Judgment: In Praise Of Instigators, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay is about mutual funds. Because of that, it may put many to sleep long before we get to the heart of the matter. I encourage you right now to stay awake, or at least keep one eye propped open. For embedded in this story about mutual funds, rent seeking, the challenge of separating the good and the bad, and the even greater challenge of respecting autonomy in an environment where so many choices seem to be bad ones, is the story of a judge. That judge is the Honorable Richard A. Posner, aka RAP, Dick, Professor Posner, the …


A Secular Test For A Secular Statute, Abner S. Greene Jan 2016

A Secular Test For A Secular Statute, Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

This short essay argues that a secular test is available to determine what constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. It takes issue with the Court’s approach that is more deferential to the claimant, and with approaches offered by Professors Sepinwall and Helfand. It resists Sepinwall’s argument that proximity in law tracks a subjective sense of complicity, and it takes issue with Helfand’s argument that examining the substantiality of burden would implicate the religious question doctrine.


The Politics Of Statutory Interpretation, Margaret H. Lemos Jan 2013

The Politics Of Statutory Interpretation, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

In a new book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner describe and defend the textualist methodology for which Justice Scalia is famous. For Scalia and Garner, the normative appeal of textualism lies in its objectivity: by focusing on text, context, and canons of construction, textualism offers protection against ideological judging—a way to separate law from politics. Yet, as Scalia and Garner well know, textualism is widely regarded as a politically conservative methodology. The charge of conservative bias is more common than it is concrete, but it reflects the notion that textualism narrows the …


Confirmatory Legislative History , James J. Brudney Jan 2010

Confirmatory Legislative History , James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

Textualists and intentionalists regularly lock horns over the proper approach to construing statutory language regarded as inconclusive. The interpretive debate seems less contentious, however, when the words of the law are deemed clear. There may be reasonable disagreement as to whether the text at issue in a particular controversy has a plain meaning, but if it does then that meaning arguably preempts further inquiry. Since 1990, Supreme Court majority opinions are replete with declarations such as: "Given [a] straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history"; or "we do not resort to legislative history to cloud …


What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons From Positive Theories Of Communication And Legislation, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez Jan 2007

What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons From Positive Theories Of Communication And Legislation, Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Conditions For Judicial Independence, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast Jan 2006

Conditions For Judicial Independence, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger Noll, Barry R. Weingast

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Courts, Congress, And Public Policy, Part Ii: The Impact Of The Reapportionment Revolution On Congress And State Legislatures, Jeffrey R. Lax, Mathew D. Mccubbins Jan 2006

Courts, Congress, And Public Policy, Part Ii: The Impact Of The Reapportionment Revolution On Congress And State Legislatures, Jeffrey R. Lax, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Statutory Interpretation And The Intentional(Ist) Stance, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez Jan 2005

Statutory Interpretation And The Intentional(Ist) Stance, Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Daniel B. Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: Perspectives On Judicial Independence: Accountability And Separation Of Power Issues, James J. Brudney Jan 2003

Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: Perspectives On Judicial Independence: Accountability And Separation Of Power Issues, James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

It is well settled that independent courts play a vital role in promoting rule-of-law and separation-of-powers norms. At the same time, judicial independence must be reconciled with other values that we also wish to recognize as foundational. Professor Brudney addresses two areas of controversy that are associated with the celebration of judicial autonomy in our legal culture. He first discusses the role of political and personal background factors in shaping judicial selection and influencing judicial outcomes. He explains why both the President and Congress have come to rely increasingly on such background factors when seeking to anticipate the broad contours …


Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski Jan 1996

Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's legislative powers. Using history as authority, they admonish a return to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders. These "first principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." Because the people of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain, "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, …