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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Judges
Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism From The Founding To The Present, Sophia Z. Lee
Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism From The Founding To The Present, Sophia Z. Lee
All Faculty Scholarship
This article argues that administrative agencies have been primary interpreters and implementers of the federal Constitution throughout the history of the United States, although the scale and scope of this "administrative constitutionalism" has changed significantly over time as the balance of opportunities and constraints has shifted. Courts have nonetheless cast an increasingly long shadow over the administered Constitution. In part, this is because of the well-known expansion of judicial review in the 20th century. But the shift has as much to do with changes in the legal profession, legal theory, and lawyers’ roles in agency administration. The result is that …
Kennedy's Legacy: A Principled Justice, Mitchell N. Berman, David Peters
Kennedy's Legacy: A Principled Justice, Mitchell N. Berman, David Peters
All Faculty Scholarship
After three decades on the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy remains its most widely maligned member. Concentrating on his constitutional jurisprudence, critics from across the ideological spectrum have derided Justice Kennedy as “a self-aggrandizing turncoat,” “an unprincipled weathervane,” and, succinctly, “America’s worst Justice.” We believe that Kennedy is not as bereft of a constitutional theory as common wisdom maintains. To the contrary, this Article argues, his constitutional decisionmaking reflects a genuine grasp (less than perfect, more than rudimentary) of a coherent and, we think, compelling theory of constitutional law—the account, more or less, that one of has introduced in other work …
An Incomplete Masterpiece, Chad Flanders, Sean Oliveira
An Incomplete Masterpiece, Chad Flanders, Sean Oliveira
All Faculty Scholarship
The recent wave of popular and academic commentary on Masterpiece Cakeshop sounded a common theme: disappointment, even frustration. Masterpiece was held out as a case that was finally going to explain and resolve the conflicts between free expression, free exercise, and discrimination that were coming up again and again in the lower courts. But Justice Kennedy, the critical consensus went, avoided reaching many of the main First Amendment issues in the case and had instead ruled narrowly, giving us a prime example of"judicial minimalism:•
This assessment may be far too generous. In our short Article, we make the case that …
Certainty Versus Flexibility In The Conflict Of Laws, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
Certainty Versus Flexibility In The Conflict Of Laws, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
All Faculty Scholarship
Traditional choice of law theory conceives of certainty and flexibility as opposed values: increase one, and you inevitably decrease the other. This article challenges the received wisdom by reconceptualizing the distinction. Rather than caring about certainty or flexibility for their own sake, it suggests, we care about them because each makes it easier to promote a certain cluster of values. And while there may be a necessary tradeoff between certainty and flexibility, there is no necessary tradeoff between the clusters of values. It is possible to improve a choice of law system with regard to both of them. The article …