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Resolving Alj Removal Protections Problem Following Lucia, Spencer Davenport
Resolving Alj Removal Protections Problem Following Lucia, Spencer Davenport
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
When the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC and held that administrative law judges (ALJs) are Officers under the Constitution, the Court opened a flood of constitutional issues around the status of ALJs and related government positions. One central issue relates to ALJs’ removal protections. ALJs currently have two layers of protection between them and the President. In an earlier Supreme Court decision, the Court held that two layers of tenure protection between an “Officer of the United States” and the President was unconstitutional as it deprived the President the power to hold his officers accountable. As impartial adjudicators, ALJs …
Six Overrulings, Andrew Koppelman
Six Overrulings, Andrew Koppelman
Michigan Law Review
John Paul Stevens, who retired in 2010 at the age of ninety after more than thirty-four years on the Supreme Court, has capped his astoundingly distinguished career by becoming an important public intellectual. He reviews books, gives high-profile interviews, wrote a memoir of the chief justices he has known, and has now written a second book. Six Amendments revisits half a dozen old, lost battles. Stevens appeals over the heads of his colleagues to a higher authority: the public. Now that he is off the Court, Stevens explains why six decisions in which he dissented should be overruled by constitutional …
But How Will The People Know? Public Opinion As A Meager Influence In Shaping Contemporary Supreme Court Decision Making, Tom Goldstein, Amy Howe
But How Will The People Know? Public Opinion As A Meager Influence In Shaping Contemporary Supreme Court Decision Making, Tom Goldstein, Amy Howe
Michigan Law Review
Chief Justice John Roberts famously described the ideal Supreme Court Justice as analogous to a baseball umpire, who simply "applies" the rules, rather than making them. Roberts promised to "remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat." At her own recent confirmation hearings, Elena Kagan demurred, opining that Roberts's metaphor might erroneously suggest that "everything is clear-cut, and that there's no judgment in the process." Based on his 2009 book, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution, Barry Friedman …
Judicial Compensation And The Definition Of Judicial Power In The Early Republic, James E. Pfander
Judicial Compensation And The Definition Of Judicial Power In The Early Republic, James E. Pfander
Michigan Law Review
Article III's provision for the compensation of federal judges has been much celebrated for the no-diminution provision that forecloses judicial pay cuts. But other features of Article Ill's compensation provision have largely escaped notice. In particular, little attention has been paid to the framers' apparent expectation that Congress would compensate federal judges with salaries alone, payable from the treasury at stated times. Article III's presumption in favor of salary-based compensation may rule out fee-based compensation, which was a common form of judicial compensation in England and the colonies but had grown controversial by the time of the framing. Among other …
Pragmatism And Parity In Appointments, Yxta Maya Murray
Pragmatism And Parity In Appointments, Yxta Maya Murray
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
This review uses Carter's two foci as a springboard for analyzing the Article II, Section II appointment process. First, Carter's discussion of indecency in modern appointments may be a valuable theoretical insight into the process instead of a mere sociological observation. "Indecency" in appointments, or what is known as "borking" in Carter parlance, may also be a symptom of race and gender bias in the administration of the Article II, Section II power. To ameliorate the effects of this bias, I suggest the incorporation of pragmatism (a thread of philosophical and legal thought) and parity concepts into the existing appointments …
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Michigan Law Review
In Part I of this article, we examine the global puzzle of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the local confusion or perversion lurking behind virtually every key word and phrase in the clause as now construed. In Part II we elaborate our reading of the clause and show how it clears up the local problems and solves the overall puzzle.
Reply: Self-Incrimination And The Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Kamisar, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Reply: Self-Incrimination And The Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Kamisar, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Michigan Law Review
A Reply to Yale Kamisar's Response to the "Fifth Amendment Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause"
Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role Of The Supreme Court, Michigan Law Review
Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role Of The Supreme Court, Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Toward Increased Judicial Activism: The Political Role of the Supreme Court by Arthur Selwyn Miller
Is The Burger Court Really Like The Warren Court?, Paul Bender
Is The Burger Court Really Like The Warren Court?, Paul Bender
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't by Vincent Blasi
Does Doctrine Matter?, Frederick Schauer
Does Doctrine Matter?, Frederick Schauer
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't by Vincent Blasi
The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson
The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson
Michigan Law Review
This analysis of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence avoids the pitfalls of previous theories. It does not see the Federalist political program as the source of Marshall's constitutional doctrines and thus does not need to explain how Marshall qualified his political principles or how he convinced non-Federalist judges to accept them. Instead, this essay argues that legal, not political, principles underlay Marshall's jurisprudence, but it attempts to understand those principles in a manner consistent with the unavoidable twentieth-century assumption that law is a body of flexible rules responsive to social reality rather than a series of immutable, unambiguous doctrines derived from a …