Judges Commons^™

Inside The Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In this paper, we extend our prior work on generalist judges to explore whether specialization leads to superior judicial decision making. To do so, we report the results of a study of federal bankruptcy judges. In one prior study of bankruptcy judges, Ted Eisenberg reported evidence suggesting that bankruptcy judges, like generalist judges, are susceptible to the "self-serving" or "egocentric" bias when making judgments. Here, we report evidence showing that bankruptcy judges are vulnerable to anchoring and framing effects, but appear largely unaffected by the omission bias, a debtor's race, a debtor's apology, and "terror management" or "mortality salience."'

Because …

Federal Court Self-Preservation And Terri Schiavo, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

If the federal court in Florida had granted preliminary relief to allow itself more time to consider the constitutional claims that Terri Schiavo's parents brought on her behalf, and if, as expected, those claims were ultimately rejected, the federal court would have been placed in the unenviable position of having to be the institution that made the final decision to terminate Terri Schiavo's feeding and other treatment. Although I have no way of knowing whether this fact, which has not been noted in the commentary,' actually entered into the mind of any of the federal judges who considered the case, …

Letter To Clerk Of Court Re: Walter Roache, Roger J. Miner '56

Correspondence

No abstract provided.

Edward R. Becker: A Man In Full, Stephen B. Burbank

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

I Accuse...! A Letter To The Honorable Clarence Thomas, Donald E. Wilkes Jr.

Popular Media

My dear Mr. Justice Thomas,

With all respect, will you permit me to express candidly my concerns about your proclivity for demeaning human rights? Will you allow me to tell you frankly, sir, that because of your relentless hostility to human rights claims you are a painful embarrassment to the Court you sit on, to America's heritage of liberty, and to the rule of law?

Protecting Your Personal Privacy: A Self-Help Guide For Judges And Their Families (2006), Chicago Bar Association’S Privacy Task Force, John Marshall Law School Center For Information Technology & Privacy Law, Leslie Ann Reis

UIC Law White Papers

“I believe that the Internet is a brave new world in the matter of judicial security.” – Testimony of Joan H. Lefkow, United States District Judge, before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate (May 18, 2005).

Your personal information may be no farther away than a mouse-click... Your name, locations of your home and workplace, your phone number and email address, details of your family members, your political leanings and many more pieces of information are available through a wide array of public and private sources. But, this is nothing new. Some personal information about you has always …

Judges, Juries, And Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using The Civil Justice Survey Of State Courts 1992, 1996, And 2001 Data, Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford, Michael Heise, Neil Lafountain, Brian Ostrom, Martin T. Wells, G. Thomas Munsterman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

We analyze thousands of trials from a substantial fraction of the nation's most populous counties. Evidence across ten years and three major datasets suggests that: (1) juries and judges award punitive damages in approximately the same ratio to compensatory damages, (2) the level of punitive damages awards has not increased, and (3) juries' and judges' tendencies to award punitive damages differ in bodily injury and no-bodily-injury cases. Jury trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in financial injury cases. Judge trials are associated with a greater rate of punitive damages awards in bodily injury cases.

Judges As Rulemakers, Emily Sherwin

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In Do Cases Make Bad Law?, Frederick Schauer raises some serious questions about the process of judicial lawmaking. Schauer takes issue with the widely held assumption that judge-made law benefits from the court's focus on a particular real-world dispute. Writing with characteristic eloquence, Schauer argues that the need to resolve a concrete dispute does not enhance the ability of judges to craft sound rules, but instead generates cognitive biases that distort judicial development of legal rules.

Schauer's observations about the risks of rulemaking in an adjudicatory setting are very persuasive. Yet his overall assessment of the common law process …

Supreme Court Of The United States, October Term 2005 Overview, Georgetown University Law Center, Supreme Court Institute, Rebecca Cady

Supreme Court Overviews

No abstract provided.

Treating Religion As Speech: Justice Stevens's Religion Clause Jurisprudence, Eduardo M. Peñalver

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Justice Stevens has sometimes been caricatured as the U.S. Supreme Court Justice who hates religion. Whether considering questions under the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause, questions about the funding or regulation of religious groups, or the permissibility of religious speech in public places, in case after case he has voted against religion. Like most caricatures, this view of Justice Stevens is based on a kernel of truth. He does appear to be more likely to vote against religious groups than any other Justice. But an exploration of the cases in which Justice Stevens has voted in favor of …

Taxation, Compensation, And Judicial Independence, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

Article III of the Constitution seeks to protect judicial independence, partly through a guarantee of life tenure and partly through a clause that prohibits the diminution of judges' "compensation". The Compensation Clause does not address the subject of taxation, but it has always been understood to affect the federal government's taxing power. This article examines the framing of the Compensation Clause, some nineteenth-century detours that are inconsistent with the original understanding of the Clause, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on taxation of judges under the Clause. The article critically analyzes the Court's most recent case on the subject, United States …

Taxation, Compensation, And Judicial Independence: Hatter V. United States, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

Article III of the Constitution seeks to protect judicial independence, partly through a guarantee of life tenure and partly through a clause that prohibits the diminution of judges' "compensation". The Compensation Clause does not address the subject of taxation, but it has always been understood to affect the federal government's taxing power. This article examines the framing of the Compensation Clause, some nineteenth-century detours that are inconsistent with the original understanding of the Clause, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on taxation of judges under the Clause. The article critically analyzes the Court's most recent case on the subject, United States …

United States V. Hatter And The Taxation Of Federal Judges, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen

Faculty Publications

Does the constitutional requirement that the "compensation" of federal judges "not be diminished during their Continuance in office" preclude Congress from subjecting sitting judges to the social security taxes from which they had previously been exempt? In Hatter v. United States, the Federal Circuit ruled for judges claiming such an exemption, and, after the Supreme Court granted cert, the authors wrote the first of these two articles, arguing why, for a multitude of reasons, the Supreme Court should reverse and make it clear that judges may constitutionally be subject to a tax of general application. After the Supreme Court held …

Kramer's Popular Constitutionalism: A Quick Normative Assessment, Sarah K. Harding

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Justice Stevens, The Peremptory Challenge, And The Jury (Symposium), Nancy S. Marder

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Ceremonial Swearing-In Of Congresswoman-Elect Kirsten E. Gillibrand, Roger J. Miner '56

Judges

No abstract provided.

Train Our Jurors, Jonathan Koehler

Faculty Working Papers

Lay jurors are often legally and logically unprepared for trial. In response, it is recommended that jurors receive training in how to make better legal decisions. This chapter suggests that jurors should receive comprehensive training in critical legal doctrines and in how to reason with legal evidence. Jurors who cannot be trained to achieve minimal levels of competence (in the law or in basic reasoning) should be excused from jury service. Suggestions are given as to how policy makers and researchers who are interested in jury reform may wish to proceed.

Judge Posner's Dissenting Judicial Oeuvre And The Aesthetics Of Canonicity, Robert F. Blomquist

Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Limits Of The Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction In The Supreme Court, Carolyn Shapiro

All Faculty Scholarship

Throughout its history, the Supreme Court has struggled to control its caseload and to avoid becoming a court of error correction. Instead, it applies its resources to matters of particular national importance and to promoting uniformity in the law. This Article argues that the Court's approach to maintaining uniformity fails to provide adequate guidance to the lower courts. The Court focuses on resolving disagreements among the lower courts over what rules and standards to apply. But the Court largely ignores the question of whether those directives are applied in a consistent or predictable way. As a result, there are areas …

The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation Of Legal Interpretation, 65 Md. L. Rev. 841 (2006), Jason J. Czarnezki, William K. Ford

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

This Article tests a model of judicial decision making that incorporates elements of both the attitudinal model and the legal model, along with measures of institutional and judicial background characteristics such as collegiality and trial court experience. We develop a measure of interpretive philosophy relying primarily on judicial opinions, which we code for certain indicators of traditional interpretive approaches (i.e., the use of interpretive tools). The critical question is whether judges with similar interpretive philosophies are more likely to agree with one another when deciding cases. Our general finding is that ideology and interpretive philosophy are not significant predictors of …

Judging Expertise In Copyright Law, 14 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1 (2006), William K. Ford

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Book Review, Deborah Challener

Journal Articles

COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE is a compelling, informative book. As much as anything, it is a tremendous informational source for anyone interested in the Supreme Court. It is evident that the author has thoroughly researched the topic and provided the reader with a factual view of the past and present responsibilities of a Supreme Court law clerk. Because Peppers relies on principal-agent theory to develop his hypotheses and used exhaustive research to prove them, the book also appears to be objective.

Understanding The Person Beneath The Robe: Practical Methods For Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, Evan R. Seamone

Journal Articles

This article presents hands-on self-awareness techniques for use by judges, arbitrators, members of commissions, and other legal decision-makers who are confronted with complex cases. All too often, these judges are expected to make the “right” decisions without knowing how to accomplish this task. While judges, no doubt, are capable of applying the law to a case, this is only one aspect of righteous behavior. This article is concerned with the related expectation that judges are capable of rendering fair and impartial decisions. No matter how much training they receive, judges can only avoid biases that are known to them.

Pro Se Defendants And The Appointment Of Advisory Counsel, H. Patrick Furman

Publications

This article provides an overview of advisory counsel used to assist pro se criminal defendants, including the appointment and duties of advisory counsel, ethical obligations, and considerations for trial judges and prosecutors.

Twenty-First Century Equal Protection: Making Law In An Interregnum, Nan D. Hunter

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

During her remarkable career on the Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor articulated principles, in both concurrence and dissent, which moved to the doctrinal core of multiple areas of jurisprudence. Perhaps, just perhaps, Justice O'Connor has done it again. In Lawrence v. Texas, although the Court's majority decided the case on substantive due process grounds, O'Connor concurred relying solely on the Equal Protection Clause. Because future litigation on sexuality and gender issues is more likely to turn on issues of equality (or expression) than on issues of privacy, her concurrence may ultimately achieve the influence of many of her past …

Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion To Animus, Steven Goldberg

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In evaluating the constitutionality of religious displays, Justice Kennedy adheres to the coercion test. A crèche on the courthouse steps is acceptable because it does not coerce anyone to support or participate in a religious exercise. He rejects the endorsement test, which asks whether the display makes reasonable nonadherents feel like outsiders, finding it to be “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.” Yet in the free exercise context, Kennedy has focused on whether a community shows hostility to minority faiths, and his opinions in Romer and Lawrence stress that legislatures acted unconstitutionally in showing animus to gays. Suppose …

Clauses Not Cases, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Clauses Not Cases is a Response to Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, Yale L.J. (The Pocket Part), Jan. 2006.

In Questioning Justice, Robert Post and Reva Siegel make three claims. First, that the Constitution authorizes the Senate to rest its judgement, in part, on the constitutional philosophy of nominees to the Supreme Court; second, that this practice is justified on grounds of democratic legitimacy; and third, that it is best implemented by asking nominees “to explain the grounds on which they would have voted in past decisions of the …

The South African Judicial Appointments Process, Penelope Andrews

Articles & Chapters

Consideration of racial and gender diversity, and to a lesser extent disability and sexual orientation diversity, has propelled the transformation of the judiciary in South Africa. This consideration is underpinned by both the stated and unstated assumption that a majority white judiciary cannot adequately and fairly serve and deliver justice to a majority black population. The very legitimacy of the judiciary, and indeed the project of constitutional democracy, is contingent on a bench that reflects the racial and gender diversity of the society. Moreover, with equality as the primary principle in the "Bill of Rights," the judiciary has to accommodate …

From Laredo To Fort Worth: Race, Politics And The Texas Redistricting Case, Ellen D. Katz

Articles

LULAC v. Perry held that Texas violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when it displaced nearly 100,000 Latino residents from a congressional district in Laredo to protect the Republican incumbent they refused to support. At the same time, the Justices let stand the dismantling of a so-called “coalition” district in Fort Worth where African-American voters comprising a minority of the district’s population allegedly enjoyed effective control in deciding the district’s representative. Only Justice Kennedy supported the outcome in both Laredo and Fort Worth. His opinion marks the first time that he, or indeed a majority of the Justices, …

Mapp V. Ohio: The First Shot Fired In The Warren Court's Criminal Procedure 'Revolution', Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

Although Earl Warren ascended to the Supreme Court in 1953, when we speak of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure we really mean the movement that got underway half-way through the Chief Justice's sixteen-year reign. It was the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio, overruling Wolf v. Colorado and holding that the state courts had to exclude illegally seized evidence as a matter of federal constitutional law, that is generally regarded as having launched the so-called criminal procedure revolution.