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Articles 1 - 30 of 80
Full-Text Articles in Judges
Does The Discourse On 303 Creative Portend A Standing Realignment?, Richard M. Re
Does The Discourse On 303 Creative Portend A Standing Realignment?, Richard M. Re
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
Perhaps the most surprising feature of the last Supreme Court Term was the extraordinary public discourse on 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. According to many commentators, the Court decided what was really a “fake” or “made-up” case brought by someone who asserted standing merely because “she worries.” As a doctrinal matter, these criticisms are unfounded. But what makes this episode interesting is that the criticisms came from the legal Left, which has long been associated with expansive principles of standing. Doubts about standing in 303 Creative may therefore portend a broader standing realignment, in which liberal Justices become jurisdictionally hawkish. …
To Stay Or Not To Stay: Competing Motions In The Shadow Of Multidistrict Litigation, Emily M. Dowling
To Stay Or Not To Stay: Competing Motions In The Shadow Of Multidistrict Litigation, Emily M. Dowling
Notre Dame Law Review
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a basic overview of the inherent power, with an emphasis on the interaction between inherent power and jurisdiction. In Part II, it reintroduces the Opioid outcome and describes the mechanisms producing it by summarizing district courts’ varied approaches to resolving competing motions to remand or stay. In Part III, it identifies the flaws of those approaches and proposes an alternative solution, applying jurisdictional resequencing doctrine to the ordering inquiry and concluding that the remand must go first.
The Power Of Interpretation: Minimizing The Construction Zone, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport
The Power Of Interpretation: Minimizing The Construction Zone, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport
Notre Dame Law Review
One of the most important conceptual innovations within modern originalism is the distinction between a zone of interpretation and a zone of construction. When constitutional provisions have a determinate meaning, decisions find that meaning occurs within the interpretation zone. But when the original meaning of a constitutional provision is indeterminate, decisions are based on something other than the original meaning and occur within the construction zone.
This Article represents the first sustained challenge to the importance of the distinction. It argues that a variety of techniques enhance the power of interpretation to resolve uncertainties and thus greatly reduce the size …
Thinking Like A Lawyer About Legislation: Implementing Legislative Decision Theory Through Improved Citation, Hugh L. Brady
Thinking Like A Lawyer About Legislation: Implementing Legislative Decision Theory Through Improved Citation, Hugh L. Brady
Journal of Legislation
The Texas Supreme Court in the late 1990s, in two significant cases, arguably interpreted statutes to achieve a result directly opposite to the Texas Legislature’s decision to adopt a specific text. Why do lawyers and judges struggle when reading and applying legislation, especially when using enactment history? Under Professor Victoria Nourse’s legislative decision theory, the struggle is attributable to the fact that lawyers do not consider the legislature’s institutional rules and procedures to find the proper text to interpret a statute in light of the available legislative evidence. Wider implementation of her theory is hampered by current legal citation practices …
A Survivor's Perspective: Federal Judicial Selection From George Bush To Donald Trump, Leslie H. Southwick
A Survivor's Perspective: Federal Judicial Selection From George Bush To Donald Trump, Leslie H. Southwick
Notre Dame Law Review
Over recent decades, federal judicial selection controversies are worsening in their frequency and intensity. They distort all three branches of government. My particular concern is with federal judicial selection for judgeships below the Olympian heights of those on the United States Supreme Court, namely, the judges on the twelve regional circuit courts of appeals and the ninety-four district courts.
The depth of partisan acrimony over judicial confirmations has placed us in the infernal regions, and we seem to be continuing our descent. Analyzing how we got there is invariably affected by the biases, or more gently, by the perspectives of …
The Judicial Reforms Of 1937, Barry Cushman
The Judicial Reforms Of 1937, Barry Cushman
Journal Articles
The literature on reform of the federal courts in 1937 understandably focuses on the history and consequences of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated proposal to increase the membership of the Supreme Court. A series of decisions declaring various components of the New Deal unconstitutional had persuaded Roosevelt and some of his advisors that the best way out of the impasse was to enlarge the number of justiceships and to appoint to the new positions jurists who would be “dependable” supporters of the Administration’s program. Yet Roosevelt and congressional Democrats also were deeply troubled by what they perceived as judicial obstruction …
Rethinking The Efficiency Of The Common Law, D. Daniel Sokol
Rethinking The Efficiency Of The Common Law, D. Daniel Sokol
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article shows how Posner and other scholars who claimed that common law was efficient misunderstood the structure of common law. If common law was more efficient, there would have been a noticeable push across most, if not all, doctrines to greater efficiency. This has not been the case. Rather, common law, better recast as a “platform,” could, under a certain set of parameters, lead to efficient outcomes. Next, the Article’s analysis suggests that while not every judge thinks about efficiency in decisionmaking, there must be some architectural or governance feature pushing in the direction of efficiency—which exists in some …
Keynote Address: Staying Afloat And Engaged In Today's Flooded Marketplace Of Speech, Michael Y. Scudder
Keynote Address: Staying Afloat And Engaged In Today's Flooded Marketplace Of Speech, Michael Y. Scudder
Notre Dame Law Review
The contributions to this Symposium cover substantial ground, address important issues, and offer much to react to. This Symposium, I submit, also occurs at a time of significance for the First Amendment in the Supreme Court. Perhaps the Court’s most fervent and consequential defender of free speech, Justice Anthony Kennedy, has retired. His impact on American constitutional law was enormous, including, in my view, in the area of free speech. I had the privilege of clerking for Justice Kennedy, admire him deeply as judge and person, and want to offer some reflections on what I see as a few of …
Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, And The Law Of Stare Decisis, Randy J. Kozel
Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, And The Law Of Stare Decisis, Randy J. Kozel
Journal Articles
This Article examines three facets of the relationship between statutory interpretation and the law of stare decisis: judicial interpretation, administrative interpretation, and interpretive methodology. In analyzing these issues, I emphasize the role of stare decisis in pursuing balance between past and present. That role admits of no distinction between statutory and constitutional decisions, calling into question the practice of giving superstrong deference to judicial interpretations of statutes. The pursuit of balance also suggests that one Supreme Court cannot bind future Justices to a wide-ranging interpretive methodology. As for rules requiring deference to administrative interpretations of statutes and regulations, they are …
Ensuring Justice Without "Beating The Deal", Sean P. Flynn
Ensuring Justice Without "Beating The Deal", Sean P. Flynn
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
In 1950 military justice changed drastically with the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ brought many protections to service members that were standard in civilian criminal practice, but there still existed differences between the two systems. Recent changes to the UCMJ eliminated more of those differences. The Joint Service Committee recommended further changes, which were accepted, to the way the military handles guilty pleas and plea agreements in the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), which govern the procedure and substance of courts-martial. The primary change discussed here is the removal of the military’s “beat the deal” …
Gains, Losses, And Judges: Framing And The Judiciary, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich
Gains, Losses, And Judges: Framing And The Judiciary, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich
Notre Dame Law Review
Losses hurt more than foregone gains—an asymmetry that psychologists call “loss aversion.” Losses cause more regret than foregone gains, and people struggle harder to avoid losses than to obtain equivalent gains. Loss aversion produces a variety of anomalous behaviors: people’s preferences depend upon the initial reference point (reference-dependent choice); people are overly focused on maintaining the status quo (status quo bias); people attach more value to goods they own than to identical goods that they do not (endowment effect); and people take excessive risks to avoid sure losses (risk seeking in the face of losses). These phenomena are so pervasive …
If The Text Is Clear—Lexical Ordering In Statutory Interpretation, Adam M. Samaha
If The Text Is Clear—Lexical Ordering In Statutory Interpretation, Adam M. Samaha
Notre Dame Law Review
Most courts now endorse lexical ordering for statutory cases. That is, a limited set of top-tier sources, if adequately clear, are supposed to establish statutory meaning. Lower-tier sources are held in reserve for close calls. Examples include legislative history and deference to agency positions, which often are demoted into tiebreaking roles. In fact, some such hierarchy of sources is approved by working majorities at the U.S. Supreme Court and more than forty state supreme courts. Although popular today, lexically ordered interpretation has risen and fallen before. Indeed, we should pause to reconsider whether these instructions are justified and whether judges …
The Algorithm Game, Jane Bambauer, Tal Zarsky
The Algorithm Game, Jane Bambauer, Tal Zarsky
Notre Dame Law Review
Most of the discourse on algorithmic decisionmaking, whether it comes in the form of praise or warning, assumes that algorithms apply to a static world. But automated decisionmaking is a dynamic process. Algorithms attempt to estimate some difficult-to-measure quality about a subject using proxies, and the subjects in turn change their behavior in order to game the system and get a better treatment for themselves (or, in some cases, to protest the system.) These behavioral changes can then prompt the algorithm to make corrections. The moves and countermoves create a dance that has great import to the fairness and efficiency …
Solitary Troubles, Alexander A. Reinert
Solitary Troubles, Alexander A. Reinert
Notre Dame Law Review
Solitary confinement is one of the most severe forms of punishment that can be inflicted on human beings. In recent years, the use of extreme isolation in our prisons and jails has been questioned by correctional officials, medical experts, and reform advocates alike. Yet for nearly the entirety of American history, judicial regulation of the practice has been extremely limited. This Article explains why judges hesitate to question the use of solitary confinement, while also providing a path forward for greater scrutiny of the practice.
Active Judging And Access To Justice, Anna E. Carpenter
Active Judging And Access To Justice, Anna E. Carpenter
Notre Dame Law Review
“Being a good judge in this environment means unlearning what you learned in law school about what a judge is supposed to do. Fairness is doing things a federal judge would never do.”
Active judging, where judges step away from the traditional, passive role to assist those without counsel, is a central feature of recent proposals aimed at solving the pro se crisis in America’s state civil courts. Despite growing support for active judging as an access to justice intervention, we know little, empirically, about how judges interact with pro se parties as a general matter, and even less about …
Opting Out Of Discovery, Jay Tidmarsh
Opting Out Of Discovery, Jay Tidmarsh
Journal Articles
This Article proposes a system in which both parties are provided an opportunity to opt out of discovery. A party who opts out is immunized from dispositive motions, including a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for summary judgment. If neither party opts out of discovery, the parties waive jury-trial rights, thus giving judges the ability to use stronger case-management powers to focus the issues and narrow discovery. If one party opts out of discovery but an opponent does not, the cost of discovery shifts to the opponent. This Article justifies this proposal in …
The Senate Blue-Slip Process As It Bears On Proposals To Split The Ninth Circuit, Wyatt Kozinski
The Senate Blue-Slip Process As It Bears On Proposals To Split The Ninth Circuit, Wyatt Kozinski
Journal of Legislation
No abstract provided.
A New Deal Approach To Statutory Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored By Justice Robert Jackson, Charles Patrick Thomas
A New Deal Approach To Statutory Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored By Justice Robert Jackson, Charles Patrick Thomas
Journal of Legislation
No abstract provided.
The Rank-Order Method For Appellate Subset Selection, Michael J. Hasday
The Rank-Order Method For Appellate Subset Selection, Michael J. Hasday
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the “fatal flaws” of random assignment and direct selection: outlier panels and judicial gaming, respectively. Part II introduces the rank-order method and explains how this method is superior to either random assignment or direct selection. Part III provides detailed examples of how the rank-order method works in practice. Part IV concludes.
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia
Notre Dame Law Review
This Essay examines a specific area that Justice Scalia influenced through the methods of interpretation that he applied—namely, the question of “implied rights of action.”
The idea that federal courts historically applied common law causes of action to remedy federal statutory violations without congressional authorization is a myth. From the first, federal courts heard only those causes of action that Congress had authorized them to hear. And there is reason to think that early federal courts would not have been understood to have power to define their own causes of action had Congress not provided this authorization from the start. …
Boyle As Constitutional Preemption, Bradford R. Clark
Boyle As Constitutional Preemption, Bradford R. Clark
Notre Dame Law Review
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. arguably departed from his usual preferences by recognizing a government contractor defense as a matter of federal common law. This Essay offers an alternative rationale for the decision in Boyle grounded in constitutional preemption, and explains why this approach is more consistent with Justice Scalia’s broader methodological and constitutional commitments.
Reviewability And The "Law Of Rules": An Essay In Honor Of Justice Scalia, Adrian Vermeule
Reviewability And The "Law Of Rules": An Essay In Honor Of Justice Scalia, Adrian Vermeule
Notre Dame Law Review
Justice Scalia developed a consistent approach to questions of reviewability: roughly, the idea that “general programs” and “general policies” are to be excluded from judicial review, and even general and legally binding agency rules may or may not be reviewable before enforcement. On this approach, the proper business of courts is to review specific applications of agency rules to particular parties.
Keynote Address: Two Challenges For The Judge As Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity And Constitutional Exceptions, Brett M. Kavanaugh
Keynote Address: Two Challenges For The Judge As Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity And Constitutional Exceptions, Brett M. Kavanaugh
Notre Dame Law Review
Justice Scalia believed in the rule of law as a law of rules. He wanted judges to be umpires, which ordinarily entails judges applying a settled legal principle to a particular set of facts. I agree with that vision of the judiciary. But there are two major impediments in current jurisprudence to achieving that vision of the judge as umpire. The first is the ambiguity trigger in statutory interpretation. The second is the amorphous tests employed in cases involving claimed constitutional exceptions. We should identify and study these issues. Inspired by Justice Scalia’s longstanding efforts to improve the law, we …
Justice Scalia And Class Actions: A Loving Critique, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Justice Scalia And Class Actions: A Loving Critique, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Notre Dame Law Review
I am not sure any other Justice of the Supreme Court in American history has done more to hinder the class action lawsuit than Justice Scalia did. Under the auspices of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Justice authored two majority opinions giving a green light to corporations that want to opt out of class-wide liability entirely so long as they do so using arbitration contracts. It is very hard to square these opinions with either the text or the history of the FAA.
In Part I of this Essay, I review the Justice’s class action opinions; I give special …
Originalism And Stare Decisis, Amy Coney Barrett
Originalism And Stare Decisis, Amy Coney Barrett
Notre Dame Law Review
The question whether stare decisis is compatible with originalism has occupied both originalists and their critics. In this Essay, I explore what light Justice Scalia’s approach to precedent casts on that question. I argue that while he did treat stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to originalism, that exception was not nearly so gaping as his “fainthearted” quip suggests. In fact, a survey of his opinions regarding precedent suggests new lines of inquiry for originalists grappling with the role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.
Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese
Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese
Notre Dame Law Review
This Essay offers a defense of Justice Scalia’s approach to the Sherman Act.
Justice Scalia's Unfinished Business In Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism's Formalism Gave Up, Abbe R. Gluck
Justice Scalia's Unfinished Business In Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism's Formalism Gave Up, Abbe R. Gluck
Notre Dame Law Review
Justice Scalia, in the end, was no interpretive formalist. He would not be pleased to hear this claim, but the fact is that formalism has not succeeded in statutory interpretation, and in fact, the textualism that Justice Scalia deserves so much credit for creating never really embraced formalism at all.
Textualism lacks all the conditions necessary for formalism. It does not have a defined set of predictable rules ordered to ensure objective application. Instead, we have more than one hundred interpretive presumptions—the presumptions favored by textualists—with no defined method of choosing among them. These doctrines of the field are not …
Beyond The Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism In Practice, Michael D. Ramsey
Beyond The Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism In Practice, Michael D. Ramsey
Notre Dame Law Review
This Essay considers the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s contributions to constitutional originalism as a practical methodology. Justice Scalia was the leading judicial theorist and advocate of originalism of his era, and his legacy has widely been assessed in those terms. He was also, along with Justice Clarence Thomas, the leading judicial practitioner of originalism of his era. This latter role has received less comprehensive attention. Although there are of course countless articles analyzing and critiquing his originalist methodology in particular cases, or seeking to demonstrate that certain of his opinions are inconsistent with his theoretical commitments, relatively few articles have …
The Limits Of Reading Law In The Affordable Care Act Cases, Kevin C. Walsh
The Limits Of Reading Law In The Affordable Care Act Cases, Kevin C. Walsh
Notre Dame Law Review
Justice Scalia’s leadership moved the law of interpretation closer to the central case of statutory interpretation appropriate for our constitutional order. He thereby lawfully improved that law over the course of his judicial tenure even though—over time—this involved transforming rather than simply transmitting the law of interpretation that had been handed down to him.
Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary Lawson
Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary Lawson
Notre Dame Law Review
It seems beyond bizarre to ask whether Justice Scalia had a theory of textual interpretation. If he did not have such a theory, what were he and his critics talking about for the past three decades? The answer is that they were talking about part of a theory of textual interpretation but not an actual, complete theory. A complete theory of textual interpretation must prescribe principles of admissibility (what counts towards meaning), significance (how much does the admissible evidence count), standards of proof (how much evidence do you need for a justified conclusion), burdens of proof (does inertia lie with …