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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Judges
The Justice Who Wouldn't Be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing The Wisdom Of Faith Traditions, Marie Failinger
The Justice Who Wouldn't Be Lutheran: Toward Borrowing The Wisdom Of Faith Traditions, Marie Failinger
Faculty Scholarship
Although many authors have debated the propriety of the use of religious arguments in public policy discussions and lawmaking, few have critically reviewed the jurisprudence of particular judges through the lens of their own faith-traditions. Preliminarily, this article attempts a modest contribution to the discussion about the use of religious argument in public discussions by suggesting that judicial opinions should be viewed rhetorically and that religious assumptions and claims may legitimately be "borrowed" analogically into such opinions, at least their forensic and epideictic elements. More concretely, it analyzes themes in some of Justice William Rehnquist's opinions to determine how consistent …
The Religious Dimension Of Judicial Decision Making And The Defacto Disestablishment, Mark C. Modak-Truran
The Religious Dimension Of Judicial Decision Making And The Defacto Disestablishment, Mark C. Modak-Truran
Journal Articles
Despite the de facto disestablishment of religion, I will try to illustrate the centrality of religion as a resource for understanding judicial decision making. The central question for this inquiry is: What, if any, is the role of religious beliefs in judicial decision making?
Catholic Judges In Capital Cases, John H. Garvey
Catholic Judges In Capital Cases, John H. Garvey
Scholarly Articles
No abstract provided.
Dalla Simbologia Giuridica A Una Filosofia Giuridica E Politica Simbolica ? Ovvero Il Diritto E I Sensi, Paulo Ferreira Da Cunha
Dalla Simbologia Giuridica A Una Filosofia Giuridica E Politica Simbolica ? Ovvero Il Diritto E I Sensi, Paulo Ferreira Da Cunha
Paulo Ferreira da Cunha
La prima conseguenza della nostra cultura giuridica dell'audizione che è anche cultura dell'oralità, del discorso e della scrittura (di tutto ciò che serve per parlare e fissare quello che può essere detto) è la volontaria atrofia degli altri sensi: il tatto, il gusto, l'olfatto e la vista. Il Diritto quasi non tocca le cose. Le concepisce mentalmente, le dice, però, anche se con i guanti deve toccare il corpo del delitto.