Judges Commons^™

Ensuring An Exemplary Judiciary Workplace: An Alternative To A Mandatory Reporting Requirement For Judges, Arthur D. Hellman

Testimony

In December 2017, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, responding to a request from Chief Justice Roberts, formed a Working Group to recommend measures “to ensure an exemplary workplace for every judge and every court employee.” The Working Group issued its report in June 2018. On October 30, 2018, two committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the administrative policy-making body of the federal judiciary, held a hearing on proposed amendments to the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. Both sets of proposed amendments …

Comments On Proposed Amendments To The Rules For Judicial-Conduct And Judicial-Disability Proceedings, Arthur D. Hellman

Testimony

In late 2017, prominent Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski was accused of engaging in sexual harassment and other misconduct over a long period during his tenure as a judge. Judge Kozinski resigned, but the controversy continued. The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, responding to a request from Chief Justice Roberts, formed a Working Group to recommend measures “to ensure an exemplary workplace for every judge and every court employee.” The Working Group issued its report in June 2018.

In September 2018, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability (Conduct Committee) of the Judicial Conference of …

"Beauty Is Truth And Truth Beauty": How Intuitive Insights Shape Legal Reasoning And The Rule Of Law, Stephen M. Maurer

Seattle University Law Review

Scientists have long recognized two distinct forms of human thought. “Type 1” reasoning is unconscious, intuitive, and specializes in finding complex patterns. It is typically associated with the aesthetic emotion that John Keats called “beauty.” “Type 2” reasoning is conscious, articulable, and deductive. Scholars usually assume that legal reasoning is entirely Type 2. However, critics from Holmes to Posner have protested that unconscious and intuitive judgments are at least comparably important. This Article takes the conjecture seriously by asking what science can add to our understanding of how lawyers and judges interpret legal texts. The analysis is overdue. Humanities scholars …

Nomination And Confirmation Of Supreme Court Justices: Some Personal Observations, Joseph L. Rauth Jr.

Maine Law Review

The following remarks were delivered on October 13, 1992, on the occasion of the first Frank M. Coffin Lecture on Law and Public Service, henceforth to be an annual event at the University of Maine School of Law. The speech was written by the late Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., who died a few weeks before the speech was to be given. The speech was presented by his widow, Olie Rauh, and their son, Michael Rauh.

Justice Edward Godfrey And The "Public Purpose" Decision, Orlando E. Delogu

Maine Law Review

At the end of 1994 Dean Edward S. Godfrey III stepped down from his teaching position as Professor Emeritus of the University of Maine School of Law. In honor of his service to Maine’s only law school, to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, to the Maine Bar, and to the people of the State of Maine, the Board and Staff dedicate Volume 47 of the Maine Law Review to Dean Edward Godfrey. Reviews by Maine Law School faculty members of Dean Godfrey’s Law Court decisions in several areas of the law follow.

Doctrinal Reasoning As A Disruptive Practice, Jessie Allen

Articles

Legal doctrine is generally thought to contribute to legal decision making only to the extent it determines substantive results. Yet in many cases, the available authorities are indeterminate. I propose a different model for how doctrinal reasoning might contribute to judicial decisions. Drawing on performance theory and psychological studies of readers, I argue that judges’ engagement with formal legal doctrine might have self-disrupting effects like those performers experience when they adopt uncharacteristic behaviors. Such disruptive effects would not explain how judges ultimately select, or should select, legal results. But they might help legal decision makers to set aside subjective biases.

Still Living After Fifty Years: A Census Of Judicial Review Under The Pennsylvania Constitution Of 1968, Seth F. Kreimer

All Faculty Scholarship

The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968. The time seems ripe, therefore, to explore the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review under the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution. This Article constitutes the first such comprehensive exploration.

The Article begins with an historical overview of the evolution of the Pennsylvania Constitution, culminating in the Constitution of 1968. It then presents a census of the 372 cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has vindicated distinctive Pennsylvania Constitutional rights under the Constitution of 1968.

Analysis of these cases leads to three conclusions:

1. Exercise of independent constitutional …

Arguing With Friends, William Baude, Ryan D. Doerfler

All Faculty Scholarship

It is a fact of life that judges sometimes disagree about the best outcome in appealed cases. The question is what they should make of this. The two purest possibilities are to shut out all other views, or else to let them all in, leading one to concede ambiguity and uncertainty in most if not all contested cases.

Drawing on the philosophical concepts of “peer disagreement” and “epistemic peerhood,” we argue that there is a better way. Judges ought to give significant weight to the views of others, but only when those others share the judge’s basic methodology or interpretive …

The Subversions And Perversions Of Shadow Vigilantism, Paul H. Robinson, Sarah M. Robinson

All Faculty Scholarship

This excerpt from the recently published Shadow Vigilantes book argues that, while vigilantism, even moral vigilantism, can be dangerous to a society, the real danger is not of hordes of citizens, frustrated by the system’s doctrines of disillusionment, rising up to take the law into their own hands. Frustration can spark a vigilante impulse, but such classic aggressive vigilantism is not the typical response. More common is the expression of disillusionment in less brazen ways by a more surreptitious undermining and distortion of the operation of the criminal justice system.

Shadow vigilantes, as they might be called, can affect the …