Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Judges Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 9 of 9

Full-Text Articles in Judges

Oral Argument Tactics On The Supreme Court Bench: A Comparative Analysis Of Verbal Tools Used By Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, And Gorsuch, Corinne Cichowicz Apr 2019

Oral Argument Tactics On The Supreme Court Bench: A Comparative Analysis Of Verbal Tools Used By Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, And Gorsuch, Corinne Cichowicz

Politics Honors Papers

Oral argument scholars like Adam Feldman have categorized the Supreme Court justices’ behavior during oral argument using the approach-based method, labeling each as one-sided, even-handed, or restrained. This approach is too narrowly constructed. Scholars sometimes categorize justices in terms of the tools they use, which include questions, hypotheticals, declarations, interruptions, tone of voice, and silence (Feldman 2018a). Neither of these methods alone produce a nuanced analysis of each justice’s actions during an individual case or across a Term. As the Court’s composition and dynamics are continuously changing, scholarship on oral argument needs to adapt to …


Judge Kozinski Objects, Beth H. Wilensky Sep 2017

Judge Kozinski Objects, Beth H. Wilensky

Articles

Sitting judges don’t get to practice law. So although they often opine on the dos and don’ts of effective advocacy, we rarely get to see them put their advice into practice. But a few years ago, a class-action lawsuit provided the rare opportunity to witness a federal judge acting as an advocate before another federal judge—if not in the role of attorney, then certainly in as close to that role as we are likely to see. Given the chance to employ his own advice about effective advocacy, would the judge—Alex Kozinski—practice what he preaches? Would his years of experience on …


Metaphor And Analogy: The Sun And Moon Of Legal Persuasion, Linda L. Berger Jan 2014

Metaphor And Analogy: The Sun And Moon Of Legal Persuasion, Linda L. Berger

Linda L. Berger

Drawing on recent studies in social cognition, decision making, and analogical processing, this article will recommend that lawyers turn to novel characterizations and metaphors to solve a particular kind of persuasion problem that is created by the way judges and juries think and decide. According to social cognition researchers, we perceive and interpret new information by following a process of schematic cognition, analogizing the new data we encounter to the knowledge structures embedded in our memories. Decision-making researchers differentiate between intuitive and reflective processes (System 1 and System 2), and they agree that in System 1 decision making, only the …


The Behavioral Psychology Of Appellate Persuasion, James Ridgway Jan 2013

The Behavioral Psychology Of Appellate Persuasion, James Ridgway

James D. Ridgway

This article uses behavioral psychology research to work backward from how appellate decisions are made to how oral argument, briefing, and argument design can have the maximum impact on the decision makers. Appellate judges are human beings who have the same basic cognitive processes as any others. Understanding these decision-making processes is the key to understanding how to best utilize the few minutes of argument and few pages of briefing that you have to affect what the decision in a case will say. In addition to illuminating the most effective ways to communicate, it also provides insight into how best …


Telling Through Type: Typography And Narrative In Legal Briefs, Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson Jan 2010

Telling Through Type: Typography And Narrative In Legal Briefs, Derek H. Kiernan-Johnson

Publications

Most legal authors today self-publish, using basic word-processing software and letting the software’s default settings determine what their documents will look like when printed. As these settings are not optimized for legal texts, they do so at their peril. The default font Times New Roman, for example, as Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook warns, is "utterly inappropriate for long documents [such as] briefs."

Commentators have started urging a more deliberate approach to legal typography. Their suggestions, however, have been content-neutral, intended for all legal texts and focused on goals such as legibility and readability.

Typography, however, has much greater potential. The …


How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: An Analysis Of Metaphor, Narrative, And Imagination In Child Custody Disputes, Linda L. Berger Jan 2009

How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: An Analysis Of Metaphor, Narrative, And Imagination In Child Custody Disputes, Linda L. Berger

Linda L. Berger

We live in a time of radically changing conceptions of family and of the relationships possible between children and parents. Though undergoing “a sea-change,” family law remains tethered to culturally embedded stories and symbols. While so bound, family law will fail to serve individual families and a society whose family structures diverge sharply by education, race, class, and income. This article advances a critical rhetorical analysis of the interaction of metaphor and narrative within the specific context of child custody disputes. Its goal is to begin to examine how these embedded knowledge structures affect judicial decision making generally; more specifically, …


Of Metaphor, Metonymy, And Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices In Supreme Court Decisions On Campaign Finance Regulation, Linda L. Berger Dec 2006

Of Metaphor, Metonymy, And Corporate Money: Rhetorical Choices In Supreme Court Decisions On Campaign Finance Regulation, Linda L. Berger

Linda L. Berger

No abstract provided.


What Is The Sound Of A Corporation Speaking? How The Cognitive Theory Of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape The Law, Linda L. Berger Jan 2004

What Is The Sound Of A Corporation Speaking? How The Cognitive Theory Of Metaphor Can Help Lawyers Shape The Law, Linda L. Berger

Linda L. Berger

No abstract provided.


In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin Dec 1953

In Suport Of The Thayer Theory Of Presumptions, Charles V. Laughlin

Michigan Law Review

A learned judge once said to a young lawyer, "If you are ever a trial court judge, never give reasons for your decisions. Your rulings will probably be right, but your reasons will likely be wrong." That statement may aptly apply to judicial pronouncements relating to the subject of presumptions. Decisions are largely free from criticism so far as concerns the results reached, but the reasoning processes by which they are reached appear to be in hopeless confusion. It is believed that a theory can be presented which will both reconcile these confusions of judicial techniques and explain the general …