Judges Commons^™

What's A Judge To Do? Remedying The Remedy In Institutional Reform Litigation, Susan Poser

Susan Poser

Democracy by Decree is the latest contribution to a scholarly literature, now nearly thirty-years old, which questions whether judges have the legitimacy and the capacity to oversee the remedial phase of institutional reform litigation. Previous contributors to this literature have come out on one side or the other of the legitimacy and capacity debate. Abram Chayes, Owen Fiss, and more recently, Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin, have all argued that the proper role of judges is to remedy rights violations and that judges possess the legitimate institutional authority to order structural injunctions. Lon Fuller, Donald Horowitz, William Fletcher, and Gerald …

Legislatively Directed Judicial Activism: Some Reflections On The Meaning Of The Civil Justice Reform Act, Matthew R. Kipp, Paul B. Lewis

Paul Lewis

With the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), Congress attempted to further a trend that the federal judiciary had undertaken largely on its own initiative. Sensing a critical need to address the mounting expense and delay of federal civil litigation, Congress, like the judiciary, sought to increase the degree of early and active involvement of judges in the adjudicatory process. The result of this mandate has been a further emphasis on the role of the judge as a case manager. As a necessary corollary, the liberty and self-determination of individual litigants-ideals that have historically been seen as philosophical cornerstones of the …

Class Actions And The Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang

Sean Farhang

In this article we situate consideration of class actions in a framework, and fortify it with data, that we have developed as part of a larger project, the goal of which is to assess the counterrevolution against private enforcement of federal law from an institutional perspective. In a series of articles emerging from the project, we have documented how the Executive, Congress and the Supreme Court (wielding both judicial power under Article III of the Constitution and delegated legislative power under the Rules Enabling Act) fared in efforts to reverse or dull the effects of statutory and other incentives for …

The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Early Terms, 1929-1933, Barry Cushman

Barry Cushman

For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the Hughes Court Justices have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. In April of 2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers a report and analysis based on a review of all of the docket books that the Curator’s Office holds for the early Hughes Court, comprising the 1929-1933 Terms. Only one of …

Hustle And Flow: A Social Network Analysis Of The American Federal Judiciary, Daniel Martin Katz

Daniel M Katz

No abstract provided.

Charting The Influences On The Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study Of Judicial Reasoning, Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, Andrew P. Morriss

Andrew P. Morriss

In 1988, hundreds of federal district judges were suddenly confronted with the need to render a decision on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act and the newly promulgated criminal Sentencing Guidelines. Never before has a question of such importance and involving such significant issues of constitutional law mandated the immediate and simultaneous attention of such a large segment of the federal trial bench. Accordingly, this event provides an archetypal model for exploring the influence of social background, ideology, judicial role and institution, and other factors on judicial decisionmaking. Based upon a unique set of written decisions involving an identical …

Justice Brennan: A Tribute To A Federal Judge Who Believes In State's Rights, 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1 (1986), Ann Lousin

Ann M. Lousin

No abstract provided.

What Do We Mean By An Independent Judiciary, 38 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 133 (2011), Michael P. Seng

Michael P. Seng

Issues continue to arise about judicial independence in the United States. The term judicial independence is often not defined with precision. Judicial independence has its roots in the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also grounded in due process and in ethical standards that require judges to be competent and impartial decision-makers. Judicial independence depends upon society having faith in the integrity of the courts. Accountability is thus the handmaid of an independent judiciary. This article defines both the structures and the ethical standards that ensure an independent judiciary.

Ditching "The Disposal Plan": Revisiting Miranda In An Age Of Terror, 20 St. Thomas L. Rev. 155 (2008), Kim D. Chanbonpin

Kim D. Chanbonpin

No abstract provided.

Foreword, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 317 (2004), Samuel R. Olken

Samuel R. Olken

No abstract provided.

Justice George Sutherland And Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism And The Problem Of Factions, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1 (1997), Samuel R. Olken

Samuel R. Olken

Most scholars have viewed Justice George Sutherland as a conservative jurist who opposed government regulation because of his adherence to laissez-faire economics and Social Darwinism, or because of his devotion to natural rights. In this Article, Professor Olken analyzes these widely held misperceptions of Justice Sutherland's economic liberty jurisprudence, which was based not on socio-economic theory, but on historical experience and common law. Justice Sutherland, consistent with the judicial conservatism of the Lochner era, wanted to protect individual rights from the whims of political factions and changing democratic majorities. The Lochner era differentiation between government regulations enacted for the public …

The Ironies Of Marbury V. Madison And John Marshall's Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 391 (2004), Samuel R. Olken

Samuel R. Olken

No abstract provided.

The Business Of Expression: Economic Liberty, Political Factions And The Forgotten First Amendment Legacy Of Justice George Sutherland, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 249 (2002), Samuel R. Olken

Samuel R. Olken

In The Business of Expression: Economic Liberty, Political Factions And The Forgotten First Amendment Legacy of Justice George Sutherland, Samuel Olken traces the dichotomy that emerged in constitutional law in the aftermath of the Lochner era between economic liberty and freedom of expression. During the 1930s, while a deeply divided United States Supreme Court adopted a laissez faire approach to economic regulation, it viewed with great suspicion laws that restricted the manner and content of expression. During this period, Justice George Sutherland often clashed with the majority consistently insisting that state regulation of private economic rights bear a close and …

Chief Justice John Marshall And The Course Of American Constitutional History, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 743 (2000), Samuel R. Olken

Samuel R. Olken

No abstract provided.

Chief Justice John Marshall In Historical Perspective, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 137 (1997), Samuel R. Olken

Samuel R. Olken

No abstract provided.

“Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again”: The Failure Of Illinois Appellate Courts To Protect Their Criminal Decisions From United States Supreme Court Review, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 893 (2005), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

No abstract provided.

Law And The Argumentative Theory, 90 Or. L. Rev. 837 (2012), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

Like many law professors, I have coached my share of moot court teams. As you probably know, in most competitions students either choose or are assigned one side of the case to brief. But for the oral argument segment of the competition, students must argue both sides of the case, “on-brief” and “off-brief,” often in alternate rounds. At the end of a competition, with their heads still swimming with arguments and counterarguments, students will sometimes ask, “OK, so can you tell us which is the correct side?” I always say, “Of course I can. . . . The correct side …

New Law, Old Cases, Fair Outcomes: Why The Illinois Supreme Court Must Overrule People V Flowers, 43 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 727 (2012), Timothy P. O'Neill

Timothy P. O'Neill

No abstract provided.

Preliminary Thoughts On The Virtues Of Passive Dialogue, Michael Heise

Michael Heise

The judicial, legislative, and executive branches interact in many ways. These interactions fuel a constitutional dialogue that serves as a backdrop to myriad governmental activities, both large and small. The judiciary's participation is necessary, desirable, and, as a practical matter, inevitable. In my article I analyze two competing models that bear on the normative question: What form should the judiciary's participation take? Debates over the judiciary's appropriate role in the public constitutional dialogue have captured scholarly attention for decades. Recent attention has focused on a growing distinction between the active and passive models of judicial participation. My article approaches this …

Designing Judicial Review: A Comment On Schauer, Emily Sherwin

Emily L Sherwin

In his characteristically lucid paper, Neutrality and Judicial Review, Frederick Schauer revisits the meaning and plausibility of Herbert Wechsler’s argument for neutral principles in constitutional adjudication. Unlike some critics, Schauer takes the argument seriously, on its own terms, and does an excellent job of sorting through the different ideas that lie behind it. Schauer identifies four different versions of the argument for neutrality. At least three of these are drawn from Wechsler’s 1959 article. Schauer is particularly interested in a fourth version, which favors neutrality in the design and management of the institution of judicial review.

A Framework For Understanding Property Regulation And Land Use Control From A Dynamic Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Inside The Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

In this paper, we extend our prior work on generalist judges to explore whether specialization leads to superior judicial decision making. To do so, we report the results of a study of federal bankruptcy judges. In one prior study of bankruptcy judges, Ted Eisenberg reported evidence suggesting that bankruptcy judges, like generalist judges, are susceptible to the "self-serving" or "egocentric" bias when making judgments. Here, we report evidence showing that bankruptcy judges are vulnerable to anchoring and framing effects, but appear largely unaffected by the omission bias, a debtor's race, a debtor's apology, and "terror management" or "mortality salience."' Because …

Heuristics And Biases In Bankruptcy Judges, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Do specialized judges make better decisions than judges who are generalists? Specialized judges surely come to know their area of law well, but specialization might also allow judges to develop better, more reliable ways of assessing cases. We assessed this question by presenting a group of specialized judges with a set of hypothetical cases designed to elicit a reliance on common heuristics that can lead judges to make poor decisions. Although the judges resisted the influence of some of these heuristics, they also expressed a clear vulnerability to others. These results suggest that specialization does not produce better judgment.

Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, And Paternalism, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Legal scholars commonly argue that the widespread presence of cognitive errors in judgment justifies legal intervention to save people from predictable mistakes. Such arguments often fail to account for individual variation in the commission of such errors even though individual variation is probably common. If predictable groups of people avoid making the errors that others commit, then law should account for such differences because those who avoid errors will not benefit from paternalistic interventions and indeed may be harmed by them. The research on individual variation suggests three parameters that might distinguish people who can avoid error: cognitive ability, experience …

Impeachment Exception To The Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, And Politics, The , James L. Kainen

James L. Kainen

The exclusionary evidence rules derived from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments continue to play an important role in constitutional criminal procedure, despite the intense controversy that surrounds them. The primary justification for these rules has shifted from an "imperative of judicial integrity" to the "deterrence of police conduct that violates... [constitutional] rights." Regardless of the justification it uses for the rules' existence, the Supreme Court continues to limit their breadth "at the margin," when "the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice" outweigh the deterrent effects of exclusion. The most notable limitation on …

Nineteenth Century Interpretations Of The Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation From Vested To Substantive Rights Against The State , James L. Kainen

James L. Kainen

During the early nineteenth century, the contract clause served as the fundamental source of federally protected rights against the state. Yet the Supreme Court gradually eased many of the restrictions on state power enforced in the contract clause cases while developing the doctrine of substantive due process after the Civil War. By the end of the nineteenth century, the due process clause had usurped the place of the contract clause as the centerpiece in litigation about individual rights. Most analyses of the history of federally protected rights against the state have emphasized the rise of substantive due process to the …

Justice Lewis F. Powell's Baffling Vote In Roe V. Wade, Samuel W. Calhoun

Samuel W. Calhoun

No abstract provided.

Tell Us A Story, But Don't Make It A Good One: Resolving The Confusion Regarding Emotional Stories And Federal Rule Of Evidence 403, Cathren Page

Cathren Page

Abstract: Tell Us a Story, But Don’t Make It A Good One: Resolving the Confusion Regarding Emotional Stories and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by Cathren Koehlert-Page Courts need to reword their opinions regarding Rule 403 to address the tension between the advice to tell an emotionally evocative story at trial and the notion that evidence can be excluded if it is too emotional. In the murder mystery Mystic River, Dave Boyle is kidnapped in the beginning. The audience feels empathy for Dave who as an adult becomes one of the main suspects in the murder of his friend Jimmy’s …

Decorating The Structure: The Art Of Making Human Law, Brian M. Mccall

Brian M McCall

The Mask Of Virtue: Theories Of Aretaic Legislation In A Public Choice Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan