Judges Commons^™

Judge Posner's Jurisprudence Of Skepticism, Steven J. Burton

Michigan Law Review

This essay suggests that there is an instructive incompleteness in Judge Posner's transition from scientific observer to legal actor. His legal skepticism should be understood as a legacy of his days as an inquiring economist, observing and forming beliefs about law and the judicial process from the academy. His affirmation of judicial practices stems from his new respect for practical reason, which seems to result from the experience of performing judicial duties. This essay will argue that a more complete assimilation of the practical perspective of the legal actor would undercut Judge Posner's arguments for legal skepticism.

Practical Legal Studies And Critical Legal Studies, Jay M. Feinman

Michigan Law Review

The basic questions that Practical Legal Studies confronts are how judges decide cases and how judges should decide cases. The traditional analytic response to these questions has been that judges apply formal methods of legal reasoning, and the formal methods sufficiently comport with the courts' role in the political structure to provide legitimacy. That response has been untenable for a generation or more; thus PLS has moved to informal legal reasoning as a description of adjudication and as a source of legitimacy.

Posner presents a two-part response to the questions. First, judges can relatively easily arrive at the correct decision …

Legal Theory And The Obligation Of A Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute, E. Philip Soper

Michigan Law Review

This article offers a review of the Hart-Dworkin dispute and a qualified defense of the positivist's model against Dworkin's attack. The defense is cast primarily in the form of the second possible response to a descriptive theory: Dworkin's attack fails, I suggest, because it involves descriptive claims that can be accommodated to the positivist's conceptual theory regardless of one's view about the plausibility of those claims.