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Full-Text Articles in Judges
Bending The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn, Julia Simon-Kerr
Bending The Rules Of Evidence, Edward K. Cheng, G. Alexander Nunn, Julia Simon-Kerr
Faculty Scholarship
The evidence rules have well-established, standard textual meanings—meanings that evidence professors teach their law students every year. Yet, despite the rules’ clarity, courts misapply them across a wide array of cases: Judges allow past acts to bypass the propensity prohibition, squeeze hearsay into facially inapplicable exceptions, and poke holes in supposedly ironclad privileges. And that’s just the beginning.
The evidence literature sees these misapplications as mistakes by inept trial judges. This Article takes a very different view. These “mistakes” are often not mistakes at all, but rather instances in which courts are intentionally bending the rules of evidence. Codified evidentiary …
The Dignitary Confrontation Clause, Erin Sheley
The Dignitary Confrontation Clause, Erin Sheley
Washington Law Review
For seventeen years, the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has been confused and confusing. In Crawford v. Washington (2004), the Court overruled prior precedent and held that “testimonial” out-of-court statements could not be admitted at trial unless the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, even when the statement would be otherwise admissible as particularly reliable under an exception to the rule against hearsay. In a series of contradictory opinions over the next several years, the Court proceeded to expand and then seemingly roll back this holding, leading to widespread chaos in common types of cases, particularly those involving …
Assertion And Hearsay, Richard Lloret
Assertion And Hearsay, Richard Lloret
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
This article explores the characteristics and functions of assertion and considers how the term influences the definition of hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801. Rule 801(a) defines hearsay by limiting it to words and conduct intended as an assertion, but the rule does not define the term assertion. Courts and legal scholars have focused relatively little attention on the nature and definition of assertion. That is unfortunate, because assertion is a robust concept that has been the subject of intense philosophic study over recent decades. Assertion is not a mere cypher standing in for whatever speech or conduct one …
Hearsay In The Smiley Face: Analyzing The Use Of Emojis As Evidence, Erin Janssen
Hearsay In The Smiley Face: Analyzing The Use Of Emojis As Evidence, Erin Janssen
St. Mary's Law Journal
Abstract forthcoming
Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, R. Michael Cassidy
Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, R. Michael Cassidy
R. Michael Cassidy
In this article the author explores how domestic violence prevention efforts have been adversely impacted by the Supreme Court’s new “testimonial” approach to the confrontation clause. Examining the Court’s trilogy of cases from Crawford to Davis and Hammon, the author argues that the introduction of certain forms of hearsay in criminal cases has been drastically limited by the court’s new originalist approach to the Sixth Amendment. The author explains how state spousal privilege statutes often present a significant barrier to obtaining live testimony from victims of domestic violence. The author then argues that state legislatures should reconsider their spousal privilege …
Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, Richard D. Friedman
Crawford Surprises: Mostly Unpleasant, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
Crawford v. Washington should not have been surprising. The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The doctrine of Ohio v. Roberts, treating the clause as a general proscription against the admission of hearsay-except hearsay that fits within a "firmly rooted" exception or is otherwise deemed reliable-had so little to do with the constitutional text, or with the history or principle behind it, that eventually it was bound to be discarded. And the appeal of a testimonial approach to the clause seemed sufficiently strong to yield high hopes that ultimately the …
The Federal Rules Of Evidence--Past, Present, And Future: A Twenty-Year Perspective, Faust Rossi
The Federal Rules Of Evidence--Past, Present, And Future: A Twenty-Year Perspective, Faust Rossi
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This Essay surveys three major transformations in state and federal rules of evidence since the introduction of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rules have not only inspired a movement toward codification in the states, they have also liberalized the admission of expert testimony and hearsay. This partially explains thirteen states' reluctance to codify. Judges have furthered this trend by admitting far more discretionary hearsay evidence than Congress intended. Professor Rossi doubts this expansion of the hearsay exceptions would have occurred without the adoption of the FRE and suggests that the newly formed Advisory Committee will produce greater substantive changes …
The Supreme Court Rules On Statements Against Interest, Michael M. Martin
The Supreme Court Rules On Statements Against Interest, Michael M. Martin
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
A Brief Look At New York's Efforts To Codify Its Law Of Evidence, Barbara C. Salken
A Brief Look At New York's Efforts To Codify Its Law Of Evidence, Barbara C. Salken
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Coconspirator Statements And Former Testimony In New York And Federal Courts With Some Comments On Codification, Randolph N. Jonakait
Coconspirator Statements And Former Testimony In New York And Federal Courts With Some Comments On Codification, Randolph N. Jonakait
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Preliminary Notes Toward A Study Of Judicial Notice, E. F. Roberts
Preliminary Notes Toward A Study Of Judicial Notice, E. F. Roberts
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The author describes the common law as a "machine," with judges and lawyers as its working parts. He explains that its successful operation requires a kind of "intellectual adrenalin" in order to keep it responsive to its changing environment. This is the function of judicial notice. The author next examines the different views of judicial notice and points out that each is a reflection of the era in which it was created. He concludes that judicial notice is not a distinct doctrine like the hearsay rule, but rather is simply the art of thinking as practiced within the legal system.