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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Judges
No Longer A Second-Class Class Action? Finding Common Ground In The Debate Over Wage Collective Actions With Best Practices For Litigation And Adjudication, Scott A. Moss, Nantiya Ruan
No Longer A Second-Class Class Action? Finding Common Ground In The Debate Over Wage Collective Actions With Best Practices For Litigation And Adjudication, Scott A. Moss, Nantiya Ruan
Publications
Rule 23 class actions include all potential members, if granted certification. For wage claims, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) allows not class but collective actions covering only those opting in. Courts have practiced Rule 23-style gatekeeping in collective actions – requiring certification motions, which they deny if members lack enough commonality. Our 2012 article argued against this practice. No statute or rule grants judges the § 216(b) gatekeeping power early cases assumed, and with good reason: opt-in reduces the agency problems justifying Rule 23 gatekeeping; and Congress passed § 216(b) as not a stricter, opt-in form of class action, but liberalized …
The Disruptive Neuroscience Of Judicial Choice, Anna Spain Bradley
The Disruptive Neuroscience Of Judicial Choice, Anna Spain Bradley
Publications
Scholars of judicial behavior overwhelmingly substantiate the historical presumption that most judges act impartially and independent most of the time. The reality of human behavior, however, says otherwise. Drawing upon untapped evidence from neuroscience, this Article provides a comprehensive evaluation of how bias, emotion, and empathy—all central to human decision-making—are inevitable in judicial choice. The Article offers three novel neuroscientific insights that explain why this inevitability is so. First, because human cognition associated with decision-making involves multiple, and often intersecting, neural regions and circuits, logic and reason are not separate from bias and emotion in the brain. Second, bias, emotion, …
Fact-Bargaining: An American Phenomenon, William T. Pizzi
Fact-Bargaining: An American Phenomenon, William T. Pizzi
Publications
No abstract provided.
Lessons From Reforming Inquisitorial Systems, William T. Pizzi
Lessons From Reforming Inquisitorial Systems, William T. Pizzi
Publications
No abstract provided.
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
Specialized Courts In Administrative Law, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Controlling The Structural Injunction, Robert F. Nagel
Controlling The Structural Injunction, Robert F. Nagel
Publications
No abstract provided.
Prior Consistent Statements, Arthur H. Travers Jr.
Instructing The Jury Upon Presumptions In Civil Cases: Comparing Federal Rule 301 With Uniform Rule 301, Christopher B. Mueller
Instructing The Jury Upon Presumptions In Civil Cases: Comparing Federal Rule 301 With Uniform Rule 301, Christopher B. Mueller
Publications
No abstract provided.
American Indian Courts And Tribal Self-Government, Richard B. Collins, Ralph W. Johnson, Kathy Imig Perkins
American Indian Courts And Tribal Self-Government, Richard B. Collins, Ralph W. Johnson, Kathy Imig Perkins
Publications
No abstract provided.
Arizona's Inferior Courts, Harold H. Bruff
Arizona's Inferior Courts, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
For many citizens Arizona's inferior courts provide their primary, perhaps only, contact with the state's justice system. This Article--based in large part upon a thorough empirical and personal study of these lower courts--discusses the role that the courts play, the procedures that they observe, the qualifications of the personnel they employ, and the sufficiency of the justice they render. These findings are then evaluated, and recommendations for change are made.