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Articles 1 - 17 of 17
Full-Text Articles in Judges
Treating Religion As Speech: Justice Stevens's Religion Clause Jurisprudence, Eduardo M. Peñalver
Treating Religion As Speech: Justice Stevens's Religion Clause Jurisprudence, Eduardo M. Peñalver
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Justice Stevens has sometimes been caricatured as the U.S. Supreme Court Justice who hates religion. Whether considering questions under the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause, questions about the funding or regulation of religious groups, or the permissibility of religious speech in public places, in case after case he has voted against religion. Like most caricatures, this view of Justice Stevens is based on a kernel of truth. He does appear to be more likely to vote against religious groups than any other Justice. But an exploration of the cases in which Justice Stevens has voted in favor of …
Taxation, Compensation, And Judicial Independence, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen
Taxation, Compensation, And Judicial Independence, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen
Faculty Publications
Article III of the Constitution seeks to protect judicial independence, partly through a guarantee of life tenure and partly through a clause that prohibits the diminution of judges' "compensation". The Compensation Clause does not address the subject of taxation, but it has always been understood to affect the federal government's taxing power. This article examines the framing of the Compensation Clause, some nineteenth-century detours that are inconsistent with the original understanding of the Clause, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on taxation of judges under the Clause. The article critically analyzes the Court's most recent case on the subject, United States …
Taxation, Compensation, And Judicial Independence: Hatter V. United States, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen
Taxation, Compensation, And Judicial Independence: Hatter V. United States, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen
Faculty Publications
Article III of the Constitution seeks to protect judicial independence, partly through a guarantee of life tenure and partly through a clause that prohibits the diminution of judges' "compensation". The Compensation Clause does not address the subject of taxation, but it has always been understood to affect the federal government's taxing power. This article examines the framing of the Compensation Clause, some nineteenth-century detours that are inconsistent with the original understanding of the Clause, and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on taxation of judges under the Clause. The article critically analyzes the Court's most recent case on the subject, United States …
United States V. Hatter And The Taxation Of Federal Judges, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen
United States V. Hatter And The Taxation Of Federal Judges, Jonathan L. Entin, Erik M. Jensen
Faculty Publications
Does the constitutional requirement that the "compensation" of federal judges "not be diminished during their Continuance in office" preclude Congress from subjecting sitting judges to the social security taxes from which they had previously been exempt? In Hatter v. United States, the Federal Circuit ruled for judges claiming such an exemption, and, after the Supreme Court granted cert, the authors wrote the first of these two articles, arguing why, for a multitude of reasons, the Supreme Court should reverse and make it clear that judges may constitutionally be subject to a tax of general application. After the Supreme Court held …
Reining In The Supreme Court: Are Term Limits The Answer?, Arthur D. Hellman
Reining In The Supreme Court: Are Term Limits The Answer?, Arthur D. Hellman
Book Chapters
Once again, life tenure for Supreme Court Justices is under attack. The most prominent proposal for reform is to adopt a system of staggered non-renewable terms of 18 years, designed so that each President would have the opportunity to fill two vacancies during a four-year term. This book chapter, based on a presentation at a conference at Duke Law School, addresses the criticisms of life tenure and analyzes the likely consequences of moving to a system of 18-year staggered terms for Supreme Court Justices.
One of the main arguments for term limits is, in essence, that the Supreme Court should …
The Dubitante Opinion, Jason J. Czarnezki
The Dubitante Opinion, Jason J. Czarnezki
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
A dubitante (pronounced d[y]oo-bi-tan-tee) opinion indicates that “the judge doubted a legal point but was unwilling to state that it was wrong.” Judges rarely write dubitante opinions or use the term, and informal polling suggests not many legal scholars are aware of the practice. This short essay endeavors to shed some light on the use of the term dubitante in judicial opinions and spark discussion as to the merits of the dubitante opinion--What is a dubitante opinion? When was the term first used, and how often is the term used? Who uses it and how? What are the consequences of …
Judicial Power And Mobilizable History, Richard A. Primus
Judicial Power And Mobilizable History, Richard A. Primus
Articles
One contribution that law professors can make to constitutional discourse, I suggest, is the nurturing of new mobilizable histories. A "mobilizable history," as I will use the term, is a narrative, image, or other historical source that is sufficiently well-known to the community of constitutional decisionmakers so as to be able to support a credible argument in the discourse of constitutional law. It draws upon materials that are within the collective memory of constitutional interpreters; indeed, a necessary step in nurturing a new mobilizable history is to introduce new information into that collective memory or to raise the prominence of …
William H. Rehnquist: A Life Lived Greatly, And Well, Richard W. Garnett
William H. Rehnquist: A Life Lived Greatly, And Well, Richard W. Garnett
Journal Articles
Chief Justice Rehnquist leaves behind a formidable and important legacy in constitutional law. His work on the Court was animated and guided by the view that We the People, through our Constitution, have authorized our federal courts, legislators, and administrators to do many things - but not everything. Because the Nation's powers are few and defined, Congress may not pursue every good idea or smart policy, nor should courts invalidate every foolish or immoral one. However, for those of us who knew, worked with, learned from, and cared about William Rehnquist, it is his unassuming manner, the care he took …
Who's Afraid Of Unenumerated Rights?, Randy E. Barnett
Who's Afraid Of Unenumerated Rights?, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Unenumerated rights are expressly protected against federal infringement by the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment and against state infringement by the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite this textual recognition, unenumerated rights have received inconsistent and hesitant protection ever since these provisions were enacted, and what protection they do receive is subject to intense criticism. In this essay, the author examines why some are afraid to enforce unenumerated rights. While this reluctance seems most obviously to stem from the uncertainty of ascertaining the content of unenumerated rights, he contends that underlying this …
Aspiration And Underenforcement, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
Aspiration And Underenforcement, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Clauses Not Cases, Randy E. Barnett
Clauses Not Cases, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Clauses Not Cases is a Response to Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, Yale L.J. (The Pocket Part), Jan. 2006.
In Questioning Justice, Robert Post and Reva Siegel make three claims. First, that the Constitution authorizes the Senate to rest its judgement, in part, on the constitutional philosophy of nominees to the Supreme Court; second, that this practice is justified on grounds of democratic legitimacy; and third, that it is best implemented by asking nominees “to explain the grounds on which they would have voted in past decisions of the …
Aspirational Rights And The Two-Output Thesis, Mitchell N. Berman
Aspirational Rights And The Two-Output Thesis, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Mapp V. Ohio: The First Shot Fired In The Warren Court's Criminal Procedure 'Revolution', Yale Kamisar
Mapp V. Ohio: The First Shot Fired In The Warren Court's Criminal Procedure 'Revolution', Yale Kamisar
Book Chapters
Although Earl Warren ascended to the Supreme Court in 1953, when we speak of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure we really mean the movement that got underway half-way through the Chief Justice's sixteen-year reign. It was the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio, overruling Wolf v. Colorado and holding that the state courts had to exclude illegally seized evidence as a matter of federal constitutional law, that is generally regarded as having launched the so-called criminal procedure revolution.
The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation Of Legal Interpretation, Jason J. Czarnezki
The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation Of Legal Interpretation, Jason J. Czarnezki
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
This Article tests a model of judicial decisionmaking that incorporates elements of both the attitudinal model and the legal model, along with measures of institutional and judicial background characteristics such as collegiality and trial court experience. We develop a measure of interpretive philosophy relying primarily on judicial opinions, which we code for certain indicators of traditional interpretive approaches (i.e., the use of interpretive tools). The critical question is whether judges with similar interpretive philosophies are more likely to agree with one another when deciding cases. Our general finding is that ideology and interpretive philosophy are not significant predictors of agreement. …
Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion To Animus, Steven Goldberg
Beyond Coercion: Justice Kennedy's Aversion To Animus, Steven Goldberg
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In evaluating the constitutionality of religious displays, Justice Kennedy adheres to the coercion test. A crèche on the courthouse steps is acceptable because it does not coerce anyone to support or participate in a religious exercise. He rejects the endorsement test, which asks whether the display makes reasonable nonadherents feel like outsiders, finding it to be “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.” Yet in the free exercise context, Kennedy has focused on whether a community shows hostility to minority faiths, and his opinions in Romer and Lawrence stress that legislatures acted unconstitutionally in showing animus to gays. Suppose …
Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique Of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, Randy E. Barnett
Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique Of "Faint-Hearted" Originalism, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this essay, based on the 2006 William Howard Taft lecture, the author critically evaluates Justice Antonin Scalia's famous and influential 1988 Taft Lecture, entitled Originalism: The Lesser Evil. In his lecture, Justice Scalia began the now-widely-accepted shift from basing constitutional interpretation on the intent of the framers to relying instead on the original public meaning of the text. At the same time, the essay explains how Justice Scalia allows himself three ways to escape originalist results that he finds to be objectionable: (1) when the text is insufficiently rule-like, (2) when precedent has deviated from original meaning and …
Checks And Balances: Congress And The Federal Court, Paul D. Carrington
Checks And Balances: Congress And The Federal Court, Paul D. Carrington
Faculty Scholarship
This essay was published as a chapter in Reforming the Supreme Court: Term Limits for Justices (Paul D. Carrington & Roger Cramton eds, Carolina Academic Press 2006). Its point is that Congress has long neglected its duty implicit in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers to constrain the tendency of the Court, the academy and the legal profession to inflate the Court's status and power. The term "life tenure" is a significant source of a sense of royal status having not only the adverse cultural effects noted by Nagel, but also doleful effects on the administration and enforcement of …