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International Trade Law Commons

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Full-Text Articles in International Trade Law

Contractual Excuse Under The Cisg: Impediment, Hardship, And The Excuse Doctrines, Larry A. Dimatteo Jan 2015

Contractual Excuse Under The Cisg: Impediment, Hardship, And The Excuse Doctrines, Larry A. Dimatteo

UF Law Faculty Publications

This article will examine the law of excuse as espoused in the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). It will examine the relevant case law applying the doctrine of impediment found in CISG Article 79. The question posed in this analysis is whether the word “impediment” relates only to the occurrences of force majeure, impossibility and frustration of purpose events or if it also includes changed circumstances, impracticability and hardship events. For purposes of simplicity, the first set of excuse or exemption doctrines will be analyzed under the heading of “impossibility” and the second set will …


Counting Once, Counting Twice: The Precarious State Of Subsidy Regulation, Wentong Zheng Jul 2013

Counting Once, Counting Twice: The Precarious State Of Subsidy Regulation, Wentong Zheng

UF Law Faculty Publications

Subsidy regulation is in a precarious state. While it has been so ever since the conception of the current subsidy regulation regime, the recent disputes between the United States and China over the “double counting” or “double remedies” of subsidies have threatened the mere functionality of the current regime. This Article argues that the double counting controversy reveals the self-contradictions of the current subsidy regulation regime as to the fundamental question of why subsidies need to be regulated. These self-contradictions make it impossible to devise a coherent solution to the double counting problem within the framework of the current subsidy …


Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol Jan 2009

Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

When government regulates, it may either intentionally or unintentionally generate restraints that reduce competition ("public restraints"). Public restraints allow a business to cloak its action in government authority and to immunize it from antitrust regulation. Private businesses may misuse the government's grant of antitrust immunity to facilitate behavior that benefits businesses at consumers' expense. One way is by obtaining government grants of immunity from antitrust scrutiny. A recent series of Supreme Court decisions has made this situation worse by limiting the reach of antitrust law in favor of sector regulation. This is true even though the Supreme Court refers to …