International Law Commons^™

In Defense Of Pure Sovereignty In Cyberspace, Kevin Jon Heller

International Law Studies

States currently endorse three different positions concerning the international wrongfulness of cyber operations that penetrate computer systems located on the territory of another state but do not rise to the level of a use of force or prohibited intervention. The first position is that such low-intensity cyber operations are never wrongful, because sovereignty is a principle of international law, not a primary rule that can be independently violated. The second is that low-intensity cyber operations are always wrongful, because sovereignty is a primary rule of international law that is violated by any non-consensual penetration of a computer system located on …

U.S. Recognition Of Japanese Sovereignty Over The Senkaku Islands, Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

International Law Studies

Every U.S. administration from Truman to Kennedy recognized Japanese residual sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. U.S. policy changed, however, to one of neutrality under the Nixon administration during the negotiations of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. The change in policy was not based on a belief that Japan did not retain sovereignty over the islands, but rather was done to appease the Republic of China over its impending expulsion from the United Nations and to break an impasse of the ongoing textile negotiations with Taipei. The administration’s overtures to China, culminating in Nixon’s visit to China contributed to the decision. Since …

Responding To Hostile Cyber Operations: The “In-Kind” Option, Michael N. Schmitt, Durward E. Johnson

International Law Studies

Facing hostile cyber operations, States are crafting responsive strategies, tactics and rules of engagement. One of the major challenges in doing so is that key aspects of the international law governing cyber responses are vague, unsettled or complex. Not surprisingly, therefore, international law is markedly absent from strategies and operational concepts. Rather, they tend to take on a practical “tit-for-tat” feel as policymakers logically view “in-kind” responses as “fair play.” For them, responding in-kind surely must be lawful notwithstanding any challenges in discerning the precise legal character of the initial hostile cyber operation.

Testing that sense, this article examines the …