International Law Commons^™

On The Politics Of Societal Constitutionalism, Emilios Christodoulidis

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This paper is an internal critique of the theory of societal constitutionalism as developed by Gunther Teubner, with a specific emphasis on the constitutional and the political dimensions of the theory. As critique it focuses on the arguably unacknowledged dangers of co-option: the danger that constitutionalization, as an ongoing process, undercuts what we typically associate with the constitutional, which is its framing function; that this problem is accentuated when it comes to the transnational; and that its reflexivity runs the danger of market capture, in which case it remains only nominally political. The danger of market capture for societal constitutionalism …

When Common Interests Are Not Common: Why The Global Basic Structure Should Be Democratic, Andreas Føllesdal

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

The global constitution-the fundamental international norms and structures that serve constitutional functions-should include mechanisms of democratic contestation and accountability. This central claim of global constitutionalism faces three objections extrapolated from arguments made by Andrew Moravcsik and Giandomenico Majone in debates about the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU): the global constitution only regulates issues of low salience for citizens; democratic control is explicitly counter to the self-binding system that international regulations aim to achieve; and the EU's track record suggests that democratic control at the international level may be unnecessary to ensure congruence between voters' preferences and actual regulations. …

An Essay On The Emergence Of Constitutional Courts: The Cases Of Mexico And Columbia, Miguel Schor

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This essay explores the emergence of the Mexican Supreme Court and the Colombian Constitutional Court as powerful political actors. Mexico and Colombia undertook constitutional transformations designed to empower their respective national high courts in the 1990s to facilitate a democratic transition. These constitutional transformations opened up political space for the Mexican Supreme Court and the Colombian Constitutional Court to begin to displace political actors in the tasks of constitutional construction and maintenance.

These two courts play different roles, however, in their respective democratic orders. Mexico chose to empower its Supreme Court to police vertical and horizontal separation of powers whereas …

Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction To A New Global Legal Ordering, Larry Catá Backer

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

The twentieth century has seen a fundamental shift in the ways in which constitutions are understood. By the middle of the twentieth century, a new sort of constitutionalism emerged, rejecting the idea of the legitimacy of every form of political selfconstitution. The central assumptions of this new constitutionalism were grounded in the belief that not all constitutions were legitimate, and that legitimate constitutions shared a number of universal common characteristics. These common characteristics were both procedural (against arbitrary use of state power) and substantive (limiting the sorts of policy choices states could make in constituting its government and exercising governance …

The Political Origins Of The New Constitutionalism, Ran Hirschl

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Globalization, Courts, and Judicial Power Symposium