Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

International Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Constitutional Law

Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Journal

Democracy

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in International Law

Enforcing Interstate Compacts In Federal Systems, Michael Osborn Mar 2022

Enforcing Interstate Compacts In Federal Systems, Michael Osborn

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

The central goal of a federal system is for local government units to retain degrees of independence, specifically over matters of importance to that local unit. A logical corollary to that independence is the ability for local units to negotiate and contract with other local units on matters of importance. Therefore, it is not surprising that almost every federal system allows, either implicitly or explicitly, member states to form binding compacts with other states, the union government, or municipalities.1 Some federal democracies even allow member states to compact with foreign governments. Furthermore, almost every federal constitution includes a provision outlining …


The Cosmopolitan Turn In Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception Of Public Law, Mattias Kumm Jul 2013

The Cosmopolitan Turn In Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception Of Public Law, Mattias Kumm

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

If the point of constitutionalism is to define the legal framework within which collective self-government can legitimately take place, constitutionalism has to take a cosmopolitan turn: it has to occupy itself with the global legitimacy conditions for the exercise of state sovereignty. Contrary to widely made implicit assumptions in constitutional theory and practice, constitutional legitimacy is not self-standing. Whether a national constitution and the political practices authorized by it are legitimate does not depend only on the appropriate democratic quality and rights-respecting nature of domestic legal practices. Instead, national constitutional legitimacy depends, in part, on how the national constitution is …


Changing Burma From Without: Political Activism Among The Burmese Diaspora, David C. Williams Jan 2012

Changing Burma From Without: Political Activism Among The Burmese Diaspora, David C. Williams

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This Article examines the role that the Burmese diaspora plays from afar in influencing reform inside the country. It offers a brief history of the crisis in Burma as background for identifying the various elements of the diaspora: those on the run from the military; those in camps for internally displaced persons and refugees; migrant workers; leaders of the democracy movement active on Burma's borders; asylees; and professional activists with influence on the international community. The different groups use the different strategies available to them. The leadership on the borders is helping to lead the democracy movement inside the country; …


Democracy, Gender Equality, And Customary Law: Constitutionalizing Internal Cultural Disruption, Susan H. Williams Jan 2011

Democracy, Gender Equality, And Customary Law: Constitutionalizing Internal Cultural Disruption, Susan H. Williams

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Customary law often includes gender discriminatory rules that violate women's rights under constitutional equality guarantees. Dialogic democracy theory offers valuable tools that can help a legal system both to protect customary law and to protect the equality of its women citizens. By focusing on the need for challenge and on the dialogue within the cultural community, the legal system can create incentives and conditions to support the capacity of women to shape the customary law of their own communities. This approach is necessary because legal rights for women, when imposed by the larger society, often result in backlash within minority …


When Common Interests Are Not Common: Why The Global Basic Structure Should Be Democratic, Andreas Føllesdal Jul 2009

When Common Interests Are Not Common: Why The Global Basic Structure Should Be Democratic, Andreas Føllesdal

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

The global constitution-the fundamental international norms and structures that serve constitutional functions-should include mechanisms of democratic contestation and accountability. This central claim of global constitutionalism faces three objections extrapolated from arguments made by Andrew Moravcsik and Giandomenico Majone in debates about the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU): the global constitution only regulates issues of low salience for citizens; democratic control is explicitly counter to the self-binding system that international regulations aim to achieve; and the EU's track record suggests that democratic control at the international level may be unnecessary to ensure congruence between voters' preferences and actual regulations. …