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Full-Text Articles in Insurance Law

Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff Jan 2017

Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff

All Faculty Scholarship

Top law firms are notoriously competitive, fighting for prime clients and matters. But some of the most elite firms are also deeply cooperative, willingly sharing key details about their finances and strategy with their rivals. More surprisingly, they pay handsomely to do so. Nearly half of the AmLaw 100 and 200 belong to mutual insurance organizations that require member firms to provide capital; partner time; and important information about their governance, balance sheets, risk management, strategic plans, and malpractice liability. To answer why these firms do so when there are commercial insurers willing to provide coverage with fewer burdens, we …


In Defense Of The Restatement Of Liability Insurance Law, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue Jan 2017

In Defense Of The Restatement Of Liability Insurance Law, Tom Baker, Kyle D. Logue

All Faculty Scholarship

For most non-contractual legal claims for damages that are brought against individuals or firms, there is some form of liability insurance coverage. The Restatement of the Law Liability Insurance is the American Law Institute’s first effort to “restate” the common law governing such liability insurance policies, and we are the reporters. In a recent essay funded by the insurance industry, Yale Law Professor George Priest launched a strident critique of the Restatement project, arguing that the rules adopted in the Restatement:

(a) are radically contrary to existing case law,

(b) have a naïve “pro-policyholder” bias that ignores basic economic insights …


Encouraging Insurers To Regulate: The Role (If Any) For Tort Law, Kyle D. Logue Dec 2015

Encouraging Insurers To Regulate: The Role (If Any) For Tort Law, Kyle D. Logue

Articles

Insurance companies are financially responsible for a substantial portion of the losses associated with risky activities in the economy. The more insurers can lower the risks posed by their insureds, the more competitively they can price their policies, and the more customers they can attract. Thus, competition forces insurers to be private regulators of risk. To that end, insurers deploy a range of techniques to encourage their insureds to reduce the risks of their insured activities, from charging experience-rated premiums to discounting premium rates for insureds who make specific behavioral changes designed to reduce risk. Somewhat paradoxically, however, tort law …


Liability Cure-All For Insidious Disease Claims, Susan Frankewich Jan 2013

Liability Cure-All For Insidious Disease Claims, Susan Frankewich

Pepperdine Law Review

Recent decisions handed down in various circuits have created virtual chaos in predicting the liability and damage amounts of insidious disease claims. At least three substantially divergent theories have been adopted to impute liability to the manufacturers of the disease catalysts. Additionally, a new trust fund concept has been used on a limited basis to reconcile differences in court decisions. The trust fund approach is relatively flexible and simple to apply in apportioning damages for insidious disease claims. The author examines and analyzes these three liability theories. In conclusion, the adoption of the trust fund concept is recommended.


The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman Jan 2013

The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its risk-spreading gains will likely be larger than its adverse effects on precautionary activities. We discuss the numerous features of liability insurance contracts that are designed to reduce ex ante moral hazard, and examine the evidence of their effects. Most studies conclude that these features work reasonably well, so that liability insurance probably does not generate substantial ex ante moral …


The Shifting Terrain Of Risk And Uncertainty On The Liability Insurance Field, Tom Baker Feb 2011

The Shifting Terrain Of Risk And Uncertainty On The Liability Insurance Field, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent sociological and historical work suggests that insurance risks often are not reliably calculable, except in hindsight. Insurance is “an uncertain business,” characterized by competition for premiums that pushes insurers into the unknown. This essay takes some preliminary steps that extend this insight into the liability insurance field. The essay first provides a simple quantitative comparison of U.S. property and liability insurance premiums over the last sixty years, setting the stage to make three points: (1) liability insurance premiums have grown at a similar rate as property insurance premiums and GDP over this period, providing yet another piece of evidence …


Insurance In Sociolegal Research, Tom Baker May 2010

Insurance In Sociolegal Research, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Insurance has a long history in sociolegal research, most prominently as a window on accident compensation and related tort law in action. Recent work has extended that research, with the result that tort law in action may be the best mapped of any legal field outside criminal law. Sociological research has begun to explore insurance as a form of governance, with effects in many legal fields and across the economy. This essay reviews developments in both bodies of work. Part one examines the relationship between liability insurance and tort law in action using the metaphors of window and frame. Part …


Medical Malpractice And The Insurance Underwriting Cycle, Tom Baker Jan 2005

Medical Malpractice And The Insurance Underwriting Cycle, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Virtues Of Uncertainty In Law: An Experimental Approach, Tom Baker, Alon Harel, Tamar Kugler Jan 2004

The Virtues Of Uncertainty In Law: An Experimental Approach, Tom Baker, Alon Harel, Tamar Kugler

All Faculty Scholarship

Predictability in civil and criminal sanctions is generally understood as desirable. Conversely, unpredictability is condemned as a violation of the rule of law. This paper explores predictability in sanctioning from the point of view of efficiency. It is argued that, given a constant expected sanction, deterrence is increased when either the size of the sanction or the probability that it will be imposed is uncertain. This conclusion follows from earlier findings in behavioral decision research and the results of an experiment conducted specifically to examine this hypothesis. The findings suggest that, within an efficiency framework, there are virtues to uncertainty …


Reconsidering Insurance For Punitive Damages, Tom Baker Jan 1998

Reconsidering Insurance For Punitive Damages, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Conflicts And Defense Lawyers: From Triangles To Tetrahedrons, Tom Baker Jan 1997

Conflicts And Defense Lawyers: From Triangles To Tetrahedrons, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


On The Genealogy Of Moral Hazard, Tom Baker Jan 1996

On The Genealogy Of Moral Hazard, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


On Markets For Risk , Mark Sagoff Jan 1982

On Markets For Risk , Mark Sagoff

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.


Concurrent Causation In Insurance Contracts, William Conant Brewer Jr. Jun 1961

Concurrent Causation In Insurance Contracts, William Conant Brewer Jr.

Michigan Law Review

A great deal of work and thought has been devoted to concurrent causation problems in the field of torts. Less attention has been paid to the insurance cases, and no serious effort has been made to formulate the separate rules applicable to them. It is the thesis of this article that concurrent causation problems which arise under an insurance contract must be handled somewhat differently from those which arise in connection with tort litigation, and that the tendency to borrow rules of law from the larger tort field and apply them to the smaller volume of insurance cases can only …