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Full-Text Articles in Insurance Law
Playing With Fire? Testing Moral Hazard In Homeowners Insurance Valued Policies, Peter Molk
Playing With Fire? Testing Moral Hazard In Homeowners Insurance Valued Policies, Peter Molk
UF Law Faculty Publications
Insurance policy design and regulation continually grapples with moral hazard concerns. Yet these concerns rest largely on theory-based assumptions about how rational economic actors will respond to financial incentives. Advances in behavioral economics call these assumptions into question. This Article conducts an empirical test of moral hazard in homeowners insurance markets. Eighteen states’ “valued policy” laws require more generous compensation by insurers for certain total house losses. I test the moral hazard prediction that fire rates will consequently be higher in these states than in others. Using a private insurance database on the cause of loss for over four million …
The Government's Role In Climate Change Insurance, Peter Molk
The Government's Role In Climate Change Insurance, Peter Molk
UF Law Faculty Publications
There are no robust insurance markets for climate change insurance. While these markets would provide valuable loss-mitigation incentives, at the same time giving financial certainty to individuals and businesses that face staggering future liabilities, existing efforts have produced a fragmented set of private and public products that provide only piecemeal coverage. This symposium contribution examines the government’s role in providing unified markets for insuring climate change risk. Although innovations in reinsurance markets suggest that private insurers could cover discrete risks associated with climate change, such as flood or wind loss, climate change’s broader systemic risks present problems of scale and …
The Ownership Of Health Insurers, Peter Molk
The Ownership Of Health Insurers, Peter Molk
UF Law Faculty Publications
Spending by private health insurers exceeds $800 billion and is expected to rise. The Affordable Care Act provides $2 billion in subsidies to jump-start health insurers owned by their policyholders in an attempt to bring these costs under control. Firms with this corporate ownership structure have succeeded in other insurance markets, where Nationwide, Northwestern Mutual, and State Farm are just a few prominent examples. However, the potential of policyholder ownership in health insurance, which is dominated by investor and nonprofit ownership, is poorly understood. This Article applies theories of corporate ownership and control to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of …
Employer Costs And Conflicts Under The Affordable Care Act, Peter Molk
Employer Costs And Conflicts Under The Affordable Care Act, Peter Molk
UF Law Faculty Publications
In January 2015, qualified employers must provide health care coverage under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 or face a fine. As employers actively attempt to minimize the costs that they will incur, the possibility emerges that employers will retaliate against or harass employees who seek coverage. This Essay discusses the protections for employees under the law and the possible deficiencies in the law. It shows that employers and employees often have contrasting incentives – employers to avoid coverage, and employees to take coverage – and these incentives may result in employer harassment and retaliation of employees. …
Regulating The Business Of Insurance: Federalism In An Age Of Difficult Risk, Robert H. Jerry Ii, Steven E. Roberts
Regulating The Business Of Insurance: Federalism In An Age Of Difficult Risk, Robert H. Jerry Ii, Steven E. Roberts
UF Law Faculty Publications
Although the United States has not established a much-needed and increasingly discussed national catastrophe policy, most significant points in current risk management strategies involve significant federal coordination and control. The authors suggest that a regulatory model that defers to the states with respect to the regulation of the insurance aspects of difficult risks is no longer viable, and an enhanced federal role in insurance regulation specifically -- and in risk management more generally -- is both necessary and appropriate with respect to difficult risks.
Terrorism Risk In A Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence Of Capital Markets, Insurance, And Government Action, Robert J. Rhee
Terrorism Risk In A Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence Of Capital Markets, Insurance, And Government Action, Robert J. Rhee
UF Law Faculty Publications
September 11 changed the American economy and the global insurance market. The insurance industry no longer covers terrorism risk for "free." The traditional insurance mechanism alone cannot spread the risk of repeated catastrophic losses. Beyond the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 lingers the questions of a longterm solution and government's role therein. Government can assume different roles: reinsurer, wealth (re)distributor, regulator, or a combination thereof. This article suggests that the government should foster a regulatory and tax environment in which the private sector can develop a capital market solution for terrorism risk. Securitization is an alternative to reinsurance and …
Insurance, Terrorism, And 9/11: Reflections On Three Threshold Questions, Robert H. Jerry Ii
Insurance, Terrorism, And 9/11: Reflections On Three Threshold Questions, Robert H. Jerry Ii
UF Law Faculty Publications
For most of us, the collapse of the World Trade Center towers exists at the outermost edge of human comprehension. Even after one visits Ground Zero, the events of 9/11 retain a surreal quality, invoking feelings beyond words as one tries to contemplate losses immeasurable with numbers. Indeed, the insurance losses are insignificant when compared to the human tragedies caused by the terrorist attacks -- and in insurance terms, we witnessed the most costly, complex events to transpire in a single day in the history of the planet. Many years will pass before all the insurance ramifications of 9/11 are …
Cybercoverage For Cyber-Risks: An Overview Of Insurers' Responses To The Perils Of E-Commerce, Robert H. Jerry Ii, Michele L. Mekel
Cybercoverage For Cyber-Risks: An Overview Of Insurers' Responses To The Perils Of E-Commerce, Robert H. Jerry Ii, Michele L. Mekel
UF Law Faculty Publications
Insurers' responses to the risks inherent in e-commerce and the demand for coverage have been anything but uniform. Instead, the solutions are a patchwork of stop-gap measures and niche offerings, including: (1) exclusions to coverage; (2) modifications to existing policies in order to extend or to limit coverage; and (3) the creation of new policies that specifically target Internet-related liabilities and losses. These various measures have been applied in both the first- and third-party settings. This article presents an overview of some of the risks involved in the new "e-economy" and surveys how insurers are responding to these new risks.