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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Insurance Law
Nfib V. Sebelius And The Individual Mandate: Thoughts On The Tax/Regulation Distinction, Kyle D. Logue
Nfib V. Sebelius And The Individual Mandate: Thoughts On The Tax/Regulation Distinction, Kyle D. Logue
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
When Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius (NFIB) explaining the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) minimum essential coverage provision (sometimes referred to as the individual mandate), he reasoned that the mandate—or, more precisely, the enforcement provision that accompanied the mandate (the Shared Responsibility Payment or SRP)—could be understood as a tax on the failure to purchase health insurance. According to this view, the enactment of the mandate and its accompanying enforcement provisions fell within Congress’s virtually unlimited power to “lay and collect taxes.” This tax-based interpretation …
The Affordable Care Act, Experience Rating, And The Problem Of Non-Vaccination, Eric Esshaki
The Affordable Care Act, Experience Rating, And The Problem Of Non-Vaccination, Eric Esshaki
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat
Polio, the whooping cough, and the mumps, among many other communicable diseases, were once prevalent in communities within the developed world and killed millions of people.1 The advent of vaccinations contained or eradicated several of these diseases.2 However, these diseases still exist in the environment3 and are making a comeback in the United States.4 Their persistence is directly attributable to the rising trend among parents refusing to vaccinate their children.5 One proposed solution to this problem is to hold parents liable in tort when others are harmed by their failure to vaccinate. Another proposed solution argues that parents should pay …
In Praise Of (Some) Ex Post Regulation: A Response To Professor Galle, Kyle D. Logue
In Praise Of (Some) Ex Post Regulation: A Response To Professor Galle, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
According to modern law-and-economics (“L&E”) orthodoxy, the primary—maybe even the only—legitimate justification for government regulation is to correct a market failure. This conclusion is based on two key assumptions. First, when markets are functioning reasonably well, they are better at achieving efficiency than the government is. Second, most markets function reasonably well most of the time. Although there is probably evidence to support these assumptions (for example, the relative prosperity of market-based economies in comparison with the relative poverty of centrally planned economies), both assumptions are usually taken as articles of faith by mainstream L&E scholars. This is why scholarly …
The Perverse Effects Of Subsidized Weather Insurance, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue
The Perverse Effects Of Subsidized Weather Insurance, Omri Ben-Shahar, Kyle D. Logue
Articles
This Article explores the role of insurance as a substitute for direct regulation of risks posed by severe weather. In pricing the risk of human activity along the predicted path of storms, insurance can provide incentives for efficient location decisions as well as for cost-justified mitigation efforts in building construction and infrastructure. Currently, however, much insurance for severe-weather risks is provided and heavily subsidized by the government. This Article demonstrates two primary distortions arising from the government’s dominance in these insurance markets. First, existing government subsidies are allocated differentially across households, resulting in a significant regressive redistribution favoring affluent homeowners …