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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Human Rights Law
The Modern Architecture Of Religious Freedom As A Fundamental Right, Peter G. Danchin
The Modern Architecture Of Religious Freedom As A Fundamental Right, Peter G. Danchin
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Copyright Exceptions Across Borders: Implementing The Marrakesh Treaty, Laurence R. Helfer, Molly K. Land, Ruth L. Okediji
Copyright Exceptions Across Borders: Implementing The Marrakesh Treaty, Laurence R. Helfer, Molly K. Land, Ruth L. Okediji
Faculty Scholarship
This article reviews state ratification and implementation of the Marrakesh Treaty since its conclusion in 2013. We find that most states have adhered closely to the Treaty’s text, thus creating a de facto global template of exceptions and limitations that has increasingly enabled individuals with print disabilities, libraries and schools to create accessible format copies and share them across borders. The article argues that the Marrakesh Treaty’s core innovation—mandatory exceptions to copyright to promote public welfare—together with consultations with a diverse range of stakeholders, may offer a model for harmonising human rights and IP in other contexts.
Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill
Legitimate Interpretation – Or Legitimate Adjudication?, Thomas W. Merrill
Faculty Scholarship
Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation. The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpretation provide much account of actual practice. This Article argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the social practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy that produces a much better fit between theory and practice. …