Fourteenth Amendment Commons^™

Bostock And Textualism: A Response To Berman And Krishnamurthi, Andrew Koppelman

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The Bostock Court adopted an argument I’ve been making for years, and that I pressed upon it in an amicus brief: that discrimina-tion against gay people is necessarily sex discrimination. I defended Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion for the Court in my article, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves, which catalogues various common but unsuccessful strategies for evading the force of the sex discrimination argument. That piece, originally drafted before the Supreme Court’s decision as a critique of arguments by Court of Appeals judges, was easy to revise and update. The dissenters, Justices Samuel Alito (joined by Clarence …

Sex Offender Legislation Ex Post Facto: The History And Constitutionality Of Michigan's Sex Offenders Registration Act, Alexander W. Furtaw

Journal of Legislation

Is Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (“MSORA”) constitutional? Until 2016, courts routinely said yes. In 2016, the Sixth Circuit in Does #1–5 v. Snyder held that the statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. In 2021, the Michigan Supreme Court echoed the Sixth Circuit’s holding in People v. Betts. In response, the Michigan legislature passed Public Law 295 of 2020 to amend MSORA, and courts treat the amended act as a “new” statute. Critical analysis of the amended statute’s legality is difficult because the state legislature has seemingly ignored constitutional issues with statutory proposals until after the fact, and …

The Incorporation Of The Republican Guarantee Clause, Jason Mazzone

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article makes the case for understanding the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Republican Guarantee Clause of Article IV. Incorporation shifts the focus of the Guarantee Clause from the interests of states to the interests of citizens; from protecting popular sovereignty as a political ideal to safeguarding more specifically rights that citizens hold and exercise in a republican system. Once incorporated, the Guarantee Clause should be understood to require states themselves to maintain a republican form of government and to act to correct departures from republicanism within their own governing arrangements. In addition, an incorporated Guarantee Clause informs the meaning …

Brown, History, And The Fourteenth Amendment, Christopher W. Schmidt

Notre Dame Law Review

Legal scholars and historians in recent years have sought to elevate Reconstruction to the stature of a “second Founding,” according it the same careful inquiry and legitimating function as the first. Their work marks the latest iteration of a decades-long campaign to displace the far more dismissive attitude toward Reconstruction that permeated historical scholarship and legal opinions in the first half of the twentieth century. In this Article, I present the flurry of engagement with the history of the Fourteenth Amendment during the litigation of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) as a key transition point in how historians and …

The Intent Of The Framer: John Bingham’S Fourteenth Amendment, Michael Zuckert

Notre Dame Law Review

It is not often that a single individual is responsible for constitutional provisions as important as Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. My project in this Essay is not to engage in a study of original intent, or original public meaning, or however we wish now to characterize the originalist project, but to engage in a quest for John Bingham’s Amendment, for understanding the Amendment as he understood it. Whether this gives us an authoritative reading of the Amendment for the purposes of constitutional interpretation and adjudication is a separate issue. I treat Bingham as an author and …

The Difference Narrows: A Reply To Kurt Lash, Randy E. Barnett, Evan D. Bernick

Notre Dame Law Review

We thank the Notre Dame Law Review for allowing us to respond to Kurt Lash’s reply to our critique of his interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. We could forgive readers for having difficulty adjudicating this dispute. When Lash argues, evidence always comes pouring forth, and the sheer volume can overwhelm the senses. We sometimes have a hard time following his arguments, and we are experts in the field. We can only imagine how it seems to those who are otherwise unfamiliar with this terrain.

So, in this reply—with a few exceptions—we will avoid piling up any new evidence …

The Privileges Or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A Critique Of Kurt Lash On The Fourteenth Amendment, Randy E. Barnett, Evan D. Bernick

Notre Dame Law Review

In earlier writings, both of us have expressed sympathy for the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause affords absolute protection to unenumerated rights, such as those contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and authorizes Congress to enact protective legislation. Neither of us, however, has engaged with Kurt Lash’s most recent and unique two-class interpretation of the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the depth that it deserves. Nor have we evaluated his recent efforts to demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause empowers the federal courts and Congress to protect unenumerated …

The Enumerated-Rights Reading Of The Privileges Or Immunities Clause: A Response To Barnett And Bernick, Kurt T. Lash

Notre Dame Law Review

In their new article, The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick insist that this historical evidence does not support the enumerated-rights reading. Instead, Barnett and Bernick embrace what I call the “fundamental-rights” reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. This view maintains that the Clause should be understood as protecting a set of absolute rights nowhere expressly enumerated in the text of the Constitution, for example the unenumerated economic right to contract or to pursue a trade.

Rather than agreeing with John Bingham, Barnett and Bernick …

Rediscovering Corfield V. Coryell, Gerard N. Magliocca

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article reveals new details about Corfield v. Coryell based on archival research. In 2017, the author found Justice Washington’s original notes on Corfield in the Chicago History Museum. The most important revelation about Corfield is that the Justice was initially inclined to hold that the state law his decision upheld was, in fact, unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The notes also say that he saw Livingston v. Van Ingen as the leading precedent on the Privileges and Immunities Clause and backed Chancellor Kent’s view in that case that the Clause articulated a nondiscrimination rule for out-of-state citizens …

The Fundamental Right To Education, Derek W. Black

Notre Dame Law Review

New litigation has revived one of the most important questions of constitutional law: Is education a fundamental right? The Court’s previous answers have been disappointing. While the Court has hinted that it might recognize some minimal right to education, it has thus far refused to do so.

To recognize a fundamental right to education, the Court would have to overcome two basic problems. First, the Court needs an originalist theory for why our Constitution protects education, particularly since the word education does not even appear in the Constitution. Second, the right to education implicates complex questions regarding its scope. Those …

Adoption And Foster Care Placement Policies: Legislatively Promoting The Best Interest Of Children Amidst Competing Interests Of Religious Freedom And Equal Protection For Same-Sex Couples, Samantha R. Lyew

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

The Meanings Of The "Privileges And Immunities Of Citizens" On The Eve Of The Civil War, David R. Upham

Notre Dame Law Review

The Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution provides, in part, that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” This “Privileges or Immunities Clause” has been called “the darling of the professoriate.” Indeed, in the last decade alone, law professors have published dozens of articles treating the provision. The focus of this particular study is the interpretation of the “privileges and immunities of citizens” offered by American political actors, including not only judges, but also elected officials and private citizens, before the Fourteenth Amendment, and primarily, on the …

Why The Right To Elective Abortion Fails Casey'S Own Interest-Balancing Methodology—And Why It Matters, Stephen G. Gilles

Notre Dame Law Review

Casey adopted a new, interest-balancing framework for the right to elective abortion while preserving the core of that right. But by declining to address whether the right to elective abortion can be justified in interest-balancing terms, Casey opened the door to unduly stringent applications of the undue-burden standard and, no less importantly, to future extensions of the right. By ruling that the state’s interest in protecting pre-viable fetal life outweighs the woman’s interest in an elective abortion, while preserving that right on stare decisis grounds, the Court could ensure that the balance it struck in Casey—and that “was central …

Equal Access In Cyberspace: On Bridging The Digital Divide In Public Accommodations Coverage Through Amendment To The Americans With Disabilities Act, Laura Wolk

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note will proceed in three Parts. Part I will trace the development of the case law on this issue, which has culminated in a circuit split. It will also discuss the influence of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which has not exercised its regulatory authority on the subject but which has initiated enforcement actions consistent with an interpretation that includes freestanding websites. Part II will argue, based on the text, congressional silence, and the statute’s dual principal purposes, that private commercial websites do not fall within the purview of Title III. Part III will propose that disability rights advocates …

Weathering Wal-Mart, Joseph A. Seiner

Notre Dame Law Review

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2531 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a proposed class of over a million women that had alleged pay and promotion discrimination against the nation’s largest retailer could not be certified. According to the Court, the plaintiffs had failed to establish a common thread in the case sufficient to tie their claims together. The academic response to Wal-Mart was immediate and harsh: the decision will serve as the death knell for mass employment litigation, undermining the workplace protections provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). …

The Constraint Of Dignity: Lawrence V. Texas And Public Morality, Kristian R. Mukoski

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I will catalogue the jurisprudential and philosophical conflict over the legitimacy of morals legislation. Part II will examine the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding reproductive and sexual liberty, noting the trend towards conflating liberty with autonomy that culminated in Lawrence v. Texas. Part III will closely scrutinize the characterization of liberty in Lawrence, demonstrating that it is restricted by associational and spatial limitations. Part IV will connect those limitations to the description of dignity Justice Kennedy employed in Lawrence and in other cases. This conception of dignity embodies substantive values concerning the appropriate …

Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, Michael B. Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

In this Article, I challenge the claim that the original meaning clearly allows the states to engage in affirmative action. I argue that the original meaning does not plainly establish that affirmative action by the states is constitutional. Instead, there is, at the least, a reasonable argument to be made that state government affirmative action is unconstitutional. In fact, based on the available evidence, I believe that the case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning prohibits affirmative action as to laws within its scope is stronger than the case for concluding that it allows affirmative action. I do …