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Food and Drug Law Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Food and Drug Law

Patents V. Statutory Exclusivities In Biological Pharmaceuticals - Do We Really Need Both, Yaniv Heled Oct 2014

Patents V. Statutory Exclusivities In Biological Pharmaceuticals - Do We Really Need Both, Yaniv Heled

Yaniv Heled

Over the past decade or so, the United States has been the arena of a boisterous debate regarding the creation of a new regulatory framework for the approval of generic versions of biologics-based pharmaceutical products (also known as "biological products" and "biologics")--an important and increasingly growing class of drugs. The basic purpose of such a framework is to create a fast and less-costly route to FDA approval for biologics that would be similar or identical to already-approved biological products--typically ones that are sold on the market at monopoly rates--thereby allowing cheaper versions of such medicines to enter the market. One …


Cgmp Violations Should Not Be Used As A Basis For Fca Actions Absent Fraud, Kyle Faget Oct 2014

Cgmp Violations Should Not Be Used As A Basis For Fca Actions Absent Fraud, Kyle Faget

Seattle University Law Review

Since Congress amended the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1986, the statute has evolved into a seemingly boundless weapon for enforcing other statutes and regulations applicable to every industry that accepts any form of government funding. Use of the FCA by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and by private citizens bringing actions on behalf of the U.S. government to enforce other statutes and regulations is particularly evident in the field of health care. The FCA has been utilized in actions where the allegations include off-label promotion of drugs, kickbacks, and violations of current good manufacturing practices (cGMPs) by linking the …


Pay-For-Delay Settlements In The Wake Of Actavis, Michael L. Fialkoff May 2014

Pay-For-Delay Settlements In The Wake Of Actavis, Michael L. Fialkoff

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

“Pay-for-delay” settlements, also known as reverse payments, arise when a generic manufacturer pursues FDA approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug. If a patent protects the brand-name drug, the generic manufacturer has the option of contesting the validity of the patent or arguing that its product does not infringe the patent covering the brand-name drug. If the generic manufacturer prevails on either of these claims, the FDA will approve its generic version for sale. Approval of a generic version of a brand-name drug reduces the profitability of the brand-name drug by forcing the brand-name manufacturer to price its …


Making Do In Making Drugs: Innovation Policy And Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, W. Nicholson Price Ii Jan 2014

Making Do In Making Drugs: Innovation Policy And Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, W. Nicholson Price Ii

Law Faculty Scholarship

Despite increasing recalls, contamination events, and shortages, drug companies continue to rely on outdated manufacturing plants and processes. Drug manufacturing’s inefficiency and lack of innovation stand in stark contrast to drug discovery, which is the focus of a calibrated innovation policy that combines patents and FDA regulation. Pharmaceutical manufacturing lags far behind the innovative techniques found in other industries due to high regulatory barriers and ineffective intellectual property incentives. Among other challenges, although manufacturers tend to rely on trade secrecy because of the difficulty in enforcing patents on manufacturing processes, trade secrecy provides limited incentives for innovation. To increase those …


Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2014

Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Actavis decision punted more than it decided. Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most challenging issues of regulatory policy raised by pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on “reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted without reverse payments. …