First Amendment Commons^™

The Audacity Of Protecting Racist Speech Under The National Labor Relations Act, Michael Z. Green

Michael Z. Green

This Article, written for a symposium hosted by the University of Chicago Legal Forum on the Disruptive Workplace, analyzes the most recent failures of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to determine a thoughtful and balanced approach in addressing racist speech. Imagine two employees in the private sector workplace are discussing the possibility of selecting a union to represent their interests regarding wages and working conditions. During this conversation, a black employee notes the importance of using their collective voices to improve working conditions and compares the activity of selecting a union with the Black Lives Matter protests aimed at …

Where's The Harm?: Free Speech And The Regulation Of Lies, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

False factual information has no First Amendment value, and yet the United States Supreme Court has accorded lies a measure of First Amendment protection. The First Amendment imposes something in the nature of a presumption against government interference in public discourse. This presumption is rooted in suspicion of the State's ability to distinguish facts from falsehoods as well as its motives for doing so. However, the presumption against regulation of false speech is not absolute. It can be overcome when verifiably false speech poses a direct threat of harm to individual interests. Unlike other countries, the United States has never …

Speech And The Truth-Seeking Value, Brian C. Murchison

Brian C. Murchison

Courts in First Amendment cases long have invoked the truth-seeking value of speech, but they rarely probe its meaning or significance, and some ignore it altogether. As new cases implicate questions of truth and falsity, thorough assessment of the value is needed. This Article fills the gap by making three claims. First, interest in truth-seeking has resurfaced in journalism, politics, philosophy, and fiction, converging on a concept of provisional or “functional” truth. Second, the appeal of functional truth for the law may be that it clarifies thinking about a range of human priorities—survival, progress, and character—without insisting on truth in …

Can Dna Be Speech?, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig

After Citizens United: Extending The Liberal Revolution To The Multinational Corporation, Daniel J.H. Greenwood

Daniel J.H. Greenwood

This Article proposes several routes to reverse Citizens United, the Supreme Court case holding that corporate campaign spending is “speech” protected by the First Amendment.

The core problem of Citizens United is that corporations are illegitimate participants in our politics. Corporate law requires corporate officers to pursue the corporate interest. They are thus disqualified from considering the central political questions of a democratic capitalist country: defining the rules of the market (which define corporate interests) and balancing profit against other, more important, values.

The high road to fixing Citizens United is a constitutional amendment to extend the fundamental insights …

Ex Post Modernism: How The First Amendment Framed Nonrepresentational Art, Sonya G. Bonneau

Sonya G Bonneau

Nonrepresentational art repeatedly surfaces in legal discourse as an example of highly valued First Amendment speech. It is also systematically described in constitutionally valueless terms: nonlinguistic, noncognitive, and apolitical. Why does law talk about nonrepresentational art at all, much less treat it as a constitutional precept? What are the implications for conceptualizing artistic expression as free speech?

This article contends that the source of nonrepresentational art’s presumptive First Amendment value is the same source of its utter lack thereof: modernism. Specifically, a symbolic alliance between abstraction and freedom of expression was forged in the mid-twentieth century, informed by social and …

Free Expression, In-Group Bias, And The Court's Conservatives: A Critique Of The Epstein-Parker-Segal Study, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

In a recent, widely publicized study, a prestigious team of political scientists concluded that there is strong evidence of ideological in-group bias among the Supreme Court’s members in First Amendment free-expression cases, with the current four most conservative justices being the Roberts Court’s worst offenders. Beneath the surface of the authors’ conclusions, however, one finds a surprisingly sizable combination of coding errors, superficial case readings, and questionable judgments about litigants’ ideological affiliations. Many of those problems likely flow either from shortcomings that reportedly afflict the Supreme Court Database (the data set that nearly always provides the starting point for empirical …

Brandenburg And The United States' War On Incitement Abroad: Defending A Double Standard, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

While it is perfectly legitimate for the United States to attempt to persuade foreign citizens and media not to engage in advocacy of violent acts, the administration's rhetoric suggests that the United States expects foreign governments to take action against speech that would be protected by the First Amendment in the United States. What explains this apparent hypocrisy? Is this simply another example of the United States touting democracy at home while supporting despotism abroad? Or is the Brandenburg incitement standard so socially and culturally contingent that it is not appropriate for export, at least to the Arab Middle East? …

Institutional Autonomy And Constitutional Structure, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

This Review makes two claims. The first is that Paul Horwitz’s excellent book, "First Amendment Institutions," depicts the institutionalist movement in robust and provocative form. The second is that it would be a mistake to assume from its immersion in First Amendment jurisprudence (not to mention its title) that the book's implications are limited to the First Amendment. Professor Horwitz presents First Amendment institutionalism as a wide-ranging theory of constitutional structure whose focus is as much on constraining the authority of political government as it is on facilitating expression. These are the terms on which the book's argument — and, …

College Student Speech - What You Can't Say Can't Say Off-Campus On Your Computer And Why, Brett J. Geschke

Brett J Geschke

Student Speech – What you Can’t Say Off-Campus on Your Computer and Why

Brett J. Geschke | Spring 2014

Organization of the Article

Introductory Argument and Thesis ● 1

Overview of the First Amendment – School Speech ● 6

First Amendment School Speech Analysis in the Digital Age ● 16

Recent Federal Cases Applying Tinker and Finding Punishment Constitutional ● 20

Recent Federal Cases Applying Tinker and Finding Punishment Unconstitutional ● 29

An Alternative Framework: A Recent State Supreme Court Case On This Issue ● 37

The Difference Between High School and College Student Speech ● 41

Analyzing On-Point Law …

Nonprofits, Speech, And Unconstitutional Conditions, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer

This Article proposes a new constitutional framework for approaching the issue of speech-related conditions on government funding accepted by nonprofits and demonstrates its application by reviewing the Court’s landmark decisions in this area. It argues that speech rights are generally inalienable as against the government under the First Amendment, and therefore any abridgement of such rights by the government—whether direct or indirect—is subject to strict scrutiny. As a result, the government is not permitted to buy an organization’s speech absent a compelling governmental interest in doing so and then only if the purchase is done in a manner that is …

The Rehnquist Court And The Groundwork For Greater First Amendment Scrutiny Of Intellectual Property, Mark P. Mckenna

Mark P. McKenna

This contribution to the Washington University School of Law conference on the Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment addresses the Rehnquist Court's view of the role of the First Amendment in intellectual property cases. It argues that, while the Rehnquist Court was not eager to find a conflict between intellectual property laws and the First Amendment, there is reason to believe that it set the stage for greater First Amendment scrutiny of intellectual property protections. At the very least, the Court left that road open to future courts, which might be inclined to view intellectual property more skeptically.

Unions, Corporations, And The First Amendment: A Response To Professors Fisk And Chemerinsky, Todd E. Pettys

Todd E. Pettys

In this response to Professor Fisk and Chemerinsky’s critique of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, I make two arguments. First, I challenge the premise of shareholder-employee equivalency that undergirds key portions of Fisk and Chemerinsky’s analysis. Second, I contest the claim that Knox contributes to incoherence in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, I challenge Fisk and Chemerinsky’s argument that Knox is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s leading precedents on the speech rights of government employees, and I raise doubts about their reading of the Court’s compelled-speech cases involving complaints that one’s resources are …

Emerging Technologies And Dwindling Speech, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig

Decoding First Amendment Coverage Of Computer Source Code In The Age Of Youtube, Facebook And The Arab Spring, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig