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Full-Text Articles in Evidence
Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein
Probability And Proof In State V. Skipper: An Internet Exchange, Ronald J. Allen, David J. Balding, Peter Donnelly, Richard D. Friedman, David H. Kaye, Lewis Henry Larue, Roger C. Park, Bernard Robertson, Alexander Stein
Articles
This is not a conventional article. It is an edited version of messages sent to an Internet discussion list. The listings begin with the mention of a recent opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court, parts of which are reproduced below. The listings soon move to broader issues concerning probability and other formal systems, their limitations, and their uses either in court or as devices for understanding legal proof.
Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman
Prior Statements Of A Witness: A Nettlesome Corner Of The Hearsay Thicket, Richard D. Friedman
Articles
In Tome v United States, for the fifth time in eight years, the Supreme Court decided a case presenting the problem of how a child's allegations of sexual abuse should be presented in court. Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to testify at trial, or at least unable to testify effectively under standard procedures. These cases therefore raise intriguing and difficult questions related to the rule against hearsay and to an accused's right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him. One would hardly guess that, however, from the rather arid debate …
An Opinion: Federal Judges Misconstrue Rule 704 (Or Is That An Impermissible Legal Conclusion), Kathy Jo Cook
An Opinion: Federal Judges Misconstrue Rule 704 (Or Is That An Impermissible Legal Conclusion), Kathy Jo Cook
Cleveland State Law Review
This article addresses the need to formulate a uniform and predictable approach to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony which relates the law to the facts. First, it briefly discusses the history of expert opinion testimony. Second, it discusses, through a case analysis, the difficult, if not impossible task that courts have assumed in attempting to differentiate between two types of expert opinions: (1) those which are, by their nature, factual; and (2) those which require some level of legal analysis-directly relating the law to the facts of the case. Finally, this article suggests an alternative approach which is arguably …