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Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Melendez-Diaz And The Right To Confrontation, Craig M. Bradley Dec 2009

Melendez-Diaz And The Right To Confrontation, Craig M. Bradley

Chicago-Kent Law Review

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts and adopted new law concerning the use of hearsay testimony at criminal trials. This was based on the Sixth Amendment's command that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him .. " On its face this provision seems to say that the accused has the right to cross-examine anybody who testifies for the prosecution at trial, whether as a live witness or through hearsay. The Supreme Court acknowledged much of this in Crawford, but …


We Have A "Purpose" Requirement If We Can Keep It, James F. Flanagan Oct 2009

We Have A "Purpose" Requirement If We Can Keep It, James F. Flanagan

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court in Giles v. California held that a defendant forfeits the right to confront a witness only when he purposefully keeps the witness away. Many see the "purpose" requirement as an unjustified bar to the use of victim hearsay, particularly in domestic violence prosecutions where victims often refuse to appear. The author defends Giles as a correct reading of history, and independently justified by longstanding precedent that constitutional trial rights can only be lost by intentional manipulation of the judicial process. Moreover, the purpose requirement does not prevent prosecutions or convictions because the definition of testimonial hearsay is …


"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair May 2009

"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The rights of a defendant to confront his accusers and conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel are sacrosanct in the American judicial system. The rights of the defendant are even sometimes exalted at the expense of the rights of the public or of victims of crime. This Note examines the problem of a pro se defendant using his confrontation right to intimidate or harass his alleged victims testifying against him. It is well-established that the confrontation right is not unconditional. The problem comes in determining whether the courts can place limits on the confrontation right of a pro …


Giles V. California: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman Jan 2009

Giles V. California: A Personal Reflection, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

In this Essay, Professor Friedman places Giles v. California in the context of the recent transformation of the law governing the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. He contends that a robust doctrine of forfeiture is an integral part of a sound conception of the confrontation right. One reason this is so is that cases fitting within the traditional hearsay exception for dying declarations can be explained as instances of forfeiture. This explanation leads to a simple structure of confrontation law, qualified by the principle that the confrontation right may be waived or forfeited but not subject to genuine exceptions. …


Case For A Constitutional Definition Of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation Of Testimonial, Nonassertive Conduct And Statements Admitted To Explain An Unchallenged Investigation, The, James L. Kainen, Carrie A. Tendler Jan 2009

Case For A Constitutional Definition Of Hearsay: Requiring Confrontation Of Testimonial, Nonassertive Conduct And Statements Admitted To Explain An Unchallenged Investigation, The, James L. Kainen, Carrie A. Tendler

Faculty Scholarship

Crawford v. Washington’s historical approach to the confrontation clause establishes that testimonial hearsay inadmissible without confrontation at the founding is similarly inadmissible today, despite whether it fits a subsequently developed hearsay exception. Consequently, the requirement of confrontation depends upon whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay, testimonial, and, if so, whether it was nonetheless admissible without confrontation at the founding. A substantial literature has developed about whether hearsay statements are testimonial or were, like dying declarations, otherwise admissible at the founding. In contrast, this article focuses on the first question – whether statements are hearsay – which scholars have thus far …