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Full-Text Articles in Evidence

Deceptively Simple: Framing, Intuition And Judicial Gatekeeping Of Forensic Feature-Comparison Methods Evidence, Jane Campbell Moriarty Feb 2018

Deceptively Simple: Framing, Intuition And Judicial Gatekeeping Of Forensic Feature-Comparison Methods Evidence, Jane Campbell Moriarty

Jane Campbell Moriarty

During the Symposium for the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, held at Boston College on October 27, 2017, the scientists, statisticians, legal academics, and criminal defense lawyers presented a unified theme: the federal courts have not fulfilled their role as gatekeepers to exclude or limit potentially unreliable feature-comparison methods of forensic science evidence (“FCM evidence”). The only voiced dissents came from the DOJ and FBI lawyers, who argued that the courts had been admitting such pattern-matching evidence properly and that the evidence was indeed reliable.


Systemic Lying, Julia Simon-Kerr Dec 2014

Systemic Lying, Julia Simon-Kerr

Julia Simon-Kerr

This Article offers the foundational account of systemic lying from a definitional and theoretical perspective. Systemic lying involves the cooperation of multiple actors in the legal system who lie or violate their oaths across cases for a consistent reason that is linked to their conception of justice. It becomes a functioning mechanism within the legal system and changes the operation of the law as written. By identifying systemic lying, this Article challenges the assumption that all lying in the legal system is the same. It argues that systemic lying poses a particular threat to the legal system. This means that …


A Simple Theory Of Complex Valuation, Julia Simon-Kerr, Anthony Casey Dec 2013

A Simple Theory Of Complex Valuation, Julia Simon-Kerr, Anthony Casey

Julia Simon-Kerr

Complex valuations of assets, companies, government programs, damages, and the like cannot be done without expertise, yet judges routinely pick an arbitrary value that falls somewhere between the extreme numbers suggested by competing experts. This creates costly uncertainty and undermines the legitimacy of the court. Proposals to remedy this well-­‐‑recognized difficulty have become increasingly convoluted. As a result, no solution has been effectively adopted and the problem persists. This article suggests that the valuation dilemma stems from a misconception of the inquiry involved. Courts have treated valuation as its own special type of inquiry distinct from traditional fact finding. We …